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South Africa

The Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Iranian revolutions aimed to overthrow dictatorships, perceived foreign imperialism, and unjust economic systems. Efforts for social change in southern Africa, however, confronted the further and more profound obstacle of institutionally and culturally embedded racism. In the late twentieth century only one major nation claimed the distinction of awarding political rights on the basis of race: the Republic of South Africa. The white minority had confirmed its control of the mineral-rich country through the passage of a set of laws during the years 1948–1960 reinforcing race separation under the label "apartheid." In the 1950s peaceful protests against white minority rule were severely repressed, as were attempts at rebellion from the 1960s on. In the 1990s movements opposing apartheid finally achieved access to state power through the national elections of 1994 but struggled to establish the unity and commitment necessary to accomplish a revolutionary transformation of South Africa's economic and social systems. After the first decade of the twenty-first century it was clear that despite the end of white minority rule and apartheid, and even though significant progress was made in some areas, inequality and widespread poverty remained enormous problems that challenged a new generation of South African leaders.

GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

South Africa has a land area of 471,008 square miles (1,219,912 square kilometers) bounded by the Atlantic on the west, the Indian Ocean on the south and east, Namibia in the northwest, Botswana and Zimbabwe in the north, and Mozambique and Swaziland in the northeast. The independent kingdom of Lesotho is an enclave totally

encompassed by South African territory in the southeast. Much of the interior is a high plateau or veld, half of which averages 4,000 feet (1,219 meters). The Drakensberg Mountains rise to 11,000 feet (3,350 meters) in the east. The longest river is the Orange, which begins in Lesotho and flows westward 1,300 miles (2,092 kilometers) to the Atlantic. South Africa possesses large platinum, gold, diamond, uranium, chromium, titanium, and other important mineral deposits. The country's population was estimated at about 49.1 million in 2010, of which approximately 79 percent was of indigenous African ancestry, 9.6 percent of European ancestry, 2.5 percent Asian (mostly persons of Indian ancestry), and 8.9 percent of mixed racial ancestry (identified as "colored" in South African society before 1994).

Prior to the establishment of a Dutch settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652, a number of African peoples inhabited the territories that eventually were to become the Republic of South Africa. The San (whom the colonists called Bushmen) were located in the Cape area. The San had a hunter-gatherer economy based on the abundant game, fish, vegetables, and fruits of the region. They roamed parts of southwestern Africa in bands as small as 25 to as large as 300. The San, like the other major group in the area, the Khoi (whom the colonists called Hottentots), spoke a "click language" (characterized by clicking sounds). The Khoi, however, made use of domesticated animals, sheep, and large herds of cattle. They lived in villages varying in size from 500 to 2,000 over a large territory that stretched from the Cape as far as 500 miles (800 kilometers) to the east and 190 miles (300 kilometers) to the north.

Other peoples in southern Africa were technologically more advanced than the San and the Khoi in that they used iron tools and engaged in agriculture as well as cattle and sheep herding. Most of these groups have been classified by linguists as Bantu speaking. In this sense the expression "Bantu" was used to refer to an African language category that had several major subdivisions. *Bantu* appears to have been derived from the Zulu word *abantu*, which means "people." White colonists later applied the expression in a derogatory sense to all indigenous Africans (Danaher 1984; North 1985).

In the area from the Drakensberg Mountains to the Indian Ocean lived the Nguni-speaking groups of the Bantu linguistic category. These included the Xhosa and the Zulu. Much of the territory of southern Africa to the north of the Orange River was inhabited by the Sotho-Tswana groups, whose Bantu dialects were mutually intelligible. In addition, a number of smaller groups whose languages were included in the Bantu family inhabited various parts of South Africa.

DUTCH AND BRITISH COLONIZATION

After the Dutch East India Company set up a naval refreshment facility at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 for their ships in transit to and from Asia, some of the company's

ry in the southeast. Much of the interior is a plateau 4,000 feet (1,219 meters). The Drakensberg (11,000 feet) runs east-west. The longest river is the Orange, which flows westward 1,300 miles (2,092 kilometers). It carries large deposits of platinum, gold, diamond, uranium, and other mineral deposits. The country's population in 2010, of which approximately 79 percent was of European ancestry, 2.5 percent Asian and 8.9 percent of mixed racial ancestry (identity before 1994).

Early settlement at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 was by Dutch settlers who inhabited the territories that eventually were to be called the Cape Colony. The San (whom the colonists called Bushmen) had a hunter-gatherer economy based on the fruits of the region. They roamed parts of southern Africa as far as 300 miles. The San, like the other major group of colonists called Hottentots, spoke a "click language" (San). The Khoi, however, made use of domesticated cattle. They lived in villages varying in size that stretched from the Cape as far as 500 miles (800 kilometers) to the north.

The Khoi were technologically more advanced than the San. They were skilled in agriculture as well as cattle raising. Groups have been classified by linguists as Bantu. "Bantu" was used to refer to an African language group. Bantu appears to have been derived from the word "people." White colonists later applied the expression to the Khoi. In the interior, from the Orange Mountains to the Indian Ocean lived the Nguni. These included the Xhosa and the Zulu. In southern Africa to the north of the Orange River was the Tswana, whose Bantu dialects were mutually intelligible. Other groups whose languages were included in the Bantu family of South Africa.

BRITISH COLONIZATION

After the discovery of diamonds at the Cape of Good Hope, set up a naval refreshment facility at the Cape of Good Hope, a transit to and from Asia, some of the company's

employees were encouraged to establish farms and cattle herds to help provision the trading vessels. Early white settlers were overwhelmingly Dutch but also included some Germans and significant numbers of French and Belgian Huguenots (Calvinist Protestants). Although the Huguenots constituted about one-sixth of the late-seventeenth-century white settler population, they adopted the Dutch language and affiliated with the Protestant Dutch Reformed Church. Over time, the colonists sharing the Dutch culture added some African expressions and other modifications to their speech, which came to constitute a new Dutch dialect called Afrikaans, and referred to themselves as Afrikaners. The colony's farmers were called Boers. These people obtained land and cattle from the surrounding Khoi, initially through purchase and trade. But when the Khoi resisted, the settlers resorted to warfare. After several decades many of the San and the Khoi had been transformed into a destitute class whose members could only survive through accepting the role of servant or slave to the white colonists (Magubane 1979; Magubane and Mandaza 1988; Omer-Cooper 1987).

In 1806 Great Britain, to facilitate trade with its Asian interests, seized Holland's Cape Colony. About 5,000 English settlers arrived in 1820. Many Afrikaans-speaking inhabitants resented British domination and the increasing use of English in the colony. Furthermore, young Afrikaners who sought to establish large farms—of 1,000 or more acres—found their goal to be less attainable as the Cape became more heavily populated. Finally, in 1834 many Afrikaners were outraged at the British abolition of slavery. Thousands decided to head for other territories as yet free from British control. A series of large settler expeditions, collectively referred to as the Great Trek, set out from the Cape from 1836 to 1856. The heavily armed wagon trains generally avoided the most densely populated areas and well-organized African groups, such as the Xhosa along the coast, and turned into the interior to regions that had recently been partially depopulated by warfare among the Africans. English merchants provided equipment, weapons, and ammunition the trekkers used to defeat, dispossess, and subjugate the inhabitants of the territories they invaded (Magubane 1979; Wheatcroft 1986).

Eventually, those Afrikaners who trekked (most had stayed at the Cape) succeeded in establishing two land-locked Afrikaner states independent of British rule, the Orange Free State, between the Orange and Vaal rivers; and the much larger Transvaal Republic (also called the South African Republic), to the north of the Vaal. The British, in part discouraged by the potential cost of militarily subduing and then administering the republics, were temporarily content to tolerate their existence. The discovery of diamonds at British-controlled Kimberley, near the border between Cape Colony and the Orange Free State, in 1867 and the economically much more significant discovery of vast gold deposits in the Transvaal in 1886 prompted Britain's leaders to seek the incorporation of the Afrikaner republics into a united South Africa, along

with the Cape Colony and the colony of Natal on the eastern coast, under a pro-British regime.

Thousands of Britons arrived in the Transvaal to mine gold. It soon became clear that the ore, though abundant, was of generally moderate to poor quality, meaning that enormous quantities had to be extracted and processed. Furthermore, much of the gold was located far below the surface, necessitating the construction of expensive deep mines. The exploitation of the gold was to require major capital investments and cheap, plentiful labor to ensure large profits.

British miners and businesspeople, who by the 1890s were generating most of the Transvaal's export income, were referred to as "outlanders" and were not allowed to vote. British authorities rejected a compromise for an eventual extension of the vote to British residents of the Transvaal and provoked war with the republics in 1899. Mounted Boer guerrilla fighters numbering up to 40,000 waged an effective resistance, forcing the commitment of a quarter of a million British troops to the conflict. British authorities forcibly removed Afrikaner farm families to concentration camps, where 25,000 women and children perished from disease, and destroyed many farms to deprive guerrillas of sustenance. The British also detained the Boers' African servants and workers in separate concentration camps, where similar numbers died (Omer-Cooper 1987).

Many Africans denied provisions to Boer troops and even at times attacked Boer commandos, anticipating that British victory would result in the extension of political rights to nonwhites. African opposition was instrumental in forcing the Boers to accept British peace terms (Omer-Cooper 1987; Warwick 1983). But in an attempt to convince the Boers to agree to the 1902 peace proposal, the British promised not to grant political equality to nonwhites, thus betraying African loyalty and wartime sacrifices (the Boers often executed Africans who aided the British). British authorities even arrested native Africans for violating the Transvaal's laws by burning their mandatory "work passes" and obliged them to continue working at low wages in the mines, owned largely by British interests (Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987; Wheatcroft 1986).

In 1905 the Liberal Party won control of the British parliament from the Conservatives and proposed a policy of reconciliation with the Boers in which the formerly independent republics would quickly be returned to self-government within the framework of a union with the Cape and Natal colonies. The constitution of the Union of South Africa, approved by 1910 by the legislatures of the four states and the British parliament, limited the vote to white males except in the Cape, where certain economically prosperous nonwhite men retained the franchise (these constituted at the time about one-seventh of all Cape voters). British Liberals apparently adopted the optimistic but incorrect view that the Cape system would serve as a model to the three

of Natal on the eastern coast, under a pro-British Transvaal to mine gold. It soon became clear that the gold was generally moderate to poor quality, meaning that it was difficult to extract and processed. Furthermore, much of the gold was lost in transit, necessitating the construction of expensive railways. It was to require major capital investments and profits.

By the 1890s were generating most of the income and were not allowed to vote. This promise for an eventual extension of the vote was not kept and provoked war with the republics in 1899. The Boers, numbering up to 40,000, waged an effective resistance, forcing the British to send a million British troops to the conflict. British farm families were sent to concentration camps, where they died from disease, and destroyed many farms to destroy the Boers' African servants. The British also detained the Boers' African servants in camps, where similar numbers died (Omer-Cooper 1987).

The Boer troops and even at times attacked Boer towns. This policy would result in the extension of political power to the Boers was instrumental in forcing the Boers to accept British rule (Warwick 1983). But in an attempt to conciliate the Boers, the British promised not to grant the Boers African loyalty and wartime sacrifices (Omer-Cooper 1987). British authorities even arranged for the Boers to work at low wages in the mines, owned by the British (Omer-Cooper 1987; Wheatcroft 1986). One of the British parliament from the Conservative Party returned to self-government within the Natal colonies. The constitution of the Union of South Africa, which included the four states and the British colonies, was drawn up except in the Cape, where certain economic and political franchises (these constituted at the time of the franchise) were apparently adopted the option of the system would serve as a model to the three

other members of the union. Instead, white South African leaders eliminated nonwhite Cape voting rights by denying the vote to Cape indigenous Africans in 1936 and Cape residents of mixed race in 1956 (Radu 1987). Thus the measures taken by the British in resolving the Boer War resulted in the establishment of a virtually all-white state structure, which both constituted a major continuous cause for nonwhite mass discontent and provided a motivation for overthrowing the white regime, a motivation that conceivably could unify nonwhite population groups in a revolutionary effort.

At the point of formation of the Union of South Africa, mining and other major developing industries, along with the professions, were dominated by whites of British ancestry. Although some Afrikaners were involved in trades or other businesses, they were predominantly farmers. But as a result of the devastation of the Boer War and later taxation, thousands of Afrikaners were forced to sell or abandon their farms, often to expanding agribusiness interests, and seek employment in the mines or in the urban industries. This massive movement of thousands of former Afrikaner farmers from the countryside to the mining and urban areas after the Boer War was called the Second Great Trek. Thus much of the Afrikaans-speaking majority of the white population (approximately 60 percent of whites) came to constitute an impoverished working class. These Afrikaners were especially prone to maintaining their ideology of racial superiority both as a source of psychological status and as a justification for preventing nonwhites from competing economically on an equal footing with whites or from having access to political power (Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987; Thompson 1985). Afrikaner leaders attempted to gain control of South Africa's new government by convincing all Afrikaners, who were a majority of the white voters, to support the (Afrikaner) Nationalist Party, founded in 1914.

The British, in general, tended to be more liberal than the Afrikaners, as reflected by the extension of the vote to some nonwhites in the Cape Colony. British missionaries converted many Africans to Christianity and provided educational opportunities for limited numbers. But certain British colonial authorities not only held a personal belief in white racial superiority but also took actions at various points to crush nonwhite opposition and capacities for self-sufficiency. These included the British-precipitated Zulu War in the 1870s, which (though later condemned in England, especially after initial Zulu victories resulted in the deaths of many British soldiers) led to the subjugation of the Zulu and their availability as laborers for various white-owned industries. Later British authorities imposed taxation measures that coerced hundreds of thousands of indigenous Africans to seek employment in mining, industry, or other jobs at which they could earn the money to pay taxes and otherwise survive in the increasingly white-structured economic environment (Omer-Cooper 1987).

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

After 1910 a national parliament elected exclusively by whites, except in the Cape Province, governed South Africa as a member of the British Commonwealth. Early parliaments were dominated by parties that generally promoted reconciliation among the nation's whites. However, during World War I thousands of Afrikaners protested against South Africa's alliance with Britain and its seizure of German-occupied Southwest Africa (Namibia). After the war, which drew many more black South Africans into the industrial labor force and, consequently, into competition with whites, many white workers, objecting to their own poor working conditions and to advances by nonwhites, staged strikes and even violent protests. Government forces killed scores of white workers. Partly as a result, the white workers' Labor Party formed an alliance with the National Party (then supported largely by Afrikaner farmers and businesspeople) and during the 1920s helped pass a series of laws further restricting the rights of nonwhites. The Labor Party, however, was soon weakened by internal conflict between members who proposed cooperation with nonwhite workers and those who refused. The National Party continued to gain support under the leadership of a former official of the Orange Free State, J. B. Hertzog.

Hertzog's government (first elected in 1924) took measures to improve employment opportunities for Afrikaner whites, such as the creation in 1928 of the state-owned Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), and assisted other Afrikaner-controlled industries by imposing special protective tariffs. These and other businesses were required to reserve certain types of jobs for whites only and employ specific quotas of white workers. Many Afrikaners, believing that continued political association with Britain would gradually erode Afrikaner culture and perhaps even lead to a liberalization of race policy, favored withdrawal from the Commonwealth. Afrikaner nationalism was embodied in the growth of a covert Afrikaner organization called the Broederbond, which set up secret cells in major economic, cultural, and governmental institutions throughout the nation as well as in the armed forces (Giliomee 1980; Omer-Cooper 1987).

The worldwide Great Depression had a devastating effect on South Africa, worsened by the fact that until 1933 South Africa refused, unlike the rest of the world, to abandon the gold standard. In 1934 Hertzog's National Party and the party supported by many whites of British descent, the South Africa Party, led by a more moderate Afrikaner, Jan Smuts, joined forces to form the United Party, which then enjoyed a large majority in the parliament. Those English-speaking whites who opposed the United Party organized the Dominion Party, whereas those Afrikaners objecting to unifying politically with British interests formed the much more important *Purified*


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MAP 9.1 South Africa (Before 1994)



National Party (later known simply as the National Party), under D. F. Malan (Omeara 1983; Omer-Cooper 1987).

As World War II began, the United Party experienced internal conflict. Hertzog and many of his Afrikaner followers favored neutrality. But Smuts, with his Afrikaner associates and the English-speaking members of the United Party, supported by the smaller Dominion and Labor parties, obtained a majority in the parliament in favor of entering the war on Britain's side. As a result, thousands of South Africans of all races served in the war, although only whites were allowed to bear arms (nonwhites performed support functions). Some Afrikaners espoused pro-German views because they approved the Nazi doctrine of Aryan racial superiority. A number engaged in sabotage of military facilities, and some were incarcerated for the duration of the conflict.

The war caused a tremendous boom in and transformation of the economy. At the onset of the conflict South Africa's wealth was derived primarily from mining. But at the conclusion manufacturing was foremost. The war stimulated South Africa to develop the capacity to build much of the machinery and equipment it had formerly imported. Furthermore, in the absence of the many whites serving in the armed forces, a massive influx of indigenous Africans into mining and urban industry occurred.

After the conclusion of World War II the United Party, under Smuts, was confident of victory in the 1948 election for parliament. However, most Afrikaners and some English-speaking whites had become dissatisfied over certain issues. United Party leaders had proposed permanent urban residency for the Africans, who by that point were extensively employed in industry. Thousands of returning whites feared not only racial integration but also increased economic competition from blacks if the United Party retained power (Lazerson 1994; Omeara 1983; Omer-Cooper 1987). Also Afrikaner farmers blamed the United Party for a shortage of low-cost African agricultural laborers. Others were concerned with the growth during wartime of groups opposed to the racially based political system; they were especially wary of the South African Communist Party, which had increased its influence in the labor movement.

All these factors combined to heighten the popularity of the concept of continued and increased apartheid ("separateness" of the races) championed by Malan's National Party. According to apartheid doctrine, each race and nation has its own distinct cultural identity and has been created to achieve a unique destiny laid down by God. Therefore each race must be kept pure and allowed to develop freely along its own lines because "excessive contact between races, above all interbreeding, would corrupt and destroy the inner potential of both races" (Omer-Cooper 1987, 190). Whites' fear of liberalization of racial policies provided the revived National Party with a narrow victory in the momentous 1948 election.

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THE APARTHEID STATE

Malan's new National Party government immediately moved to implement a series of laws intended to increase and systematize separation not only among the four official "racial" categories of white, colored, Asian (Indian), and black, but also among the major ethnic, or tribal, groups within the huge indigenous African majority. Legislation formalizing apartheid included the Population Registration Act (mandating official racial classification of all South Africans) and the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act. The Suppression of Communism Act, passed in 1950, not only banned the South African Communist Party but also permitted the punishment of anyone working to implement the supposedly "Communist doctrine" of racial equality (Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987). Thus the government created a powerful coercive tool to protect the white-controlled state by severely punishing opponents of apartheid as "Communists" and "traitors."

The 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act restricted indigenous Africans' right to permanent residency in towns and urban areas largely to those who had previously resided and been employed in a particular town for a period of fifteen or more years. The select group of Africans in this category, though, could not move to any other urban area and could be removed from the town if authorities determined they were unemployed for long periods or were judged harmful to the public good. All other indigenous Africans were permitted to reside only temporarily in urban areas (in designated locations usually remote from the white cities) as long as they were employed and had received the necessary clearance. But they officially held permanent residency only in their "tribal homelands."

The South African government had previously, through the 1913 Native Land Act and the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act, allotted 13.5 percent of South Africa's territory as tribal homelands or "Bantustans," which were to serve as the only truly permanent residences for most of the country's population. The ten homelands, which on average had close to half of their supposed populations living in the "white" 86.5 percent of South Africa, included Basotho-Qwaqwa of the Southern Sotho, Bophuthatswana of the Tswana, Ciskei of the Xhosa, Gazankulu of the Shangaana, KaNgwane of the Nguni, KwaNdebele of the Ndebele, KwaZulu of the Zulu, Lebowa of the Northern Sotho, Transkei of the Xhosa, and Venda of the Venda (Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987). Most Bantustans possessed little in the way of mineral wealth or industrial or transportation infrastructure. They functioned primarily as sources of cheap labor for white industry, business, and domestic service, and depositories for the elderly, the infirm, and surplus labor. Many migrant workers were not permitted to bring their families with them to white areas and were often required

to live in barracks-like conditions that fostered alcohol abuse and crime. Hundreds of thousands of indigenous African women were forced to surrender care of their own children to others as the condition of employment as domestics in white homes, where, ironically, they played a major role in raising and tending to their employers' children.

The 1952 Pass Law required indigenous Africans to carry in a single mandatory passbook a personal photograph and information on place of birth, employment, payments of taxes, and record of police contacts.

The 1956 Native Resettlement Act helped resegregate blacks after years of urban expansion had created situations in which previously black areas had become surrounded by white residential developments. Many indigenous Africans were uprooted from these enclaves and forced to take up residency in new government-built townships, such as those southwest of Johannesburg (known by the acronym for South Western Townships, Soweto, eventually inhabited by more than one million people).

Other laws restricted education for nonwhites so that they would be trained only in the skills necessary to serve their tribal kin in the Bantustans and "perform the labouring roles which might be required of them by whites" (Omer-Cooper 1987, 201). By 1961 the National Party government had succeeded in enacting into law all the measures that constituted its original white supremacist form of apartheid. This system not only perpetuated separation of the races but also guaranteed the lion's share of the nation's growing wealth to the white minority, eventually virtually eliminating poverty among whites. The National Party also renamed the nation in 1960 the Republic of South Africa and withdrew it from the British Commonwealth. These events, in a sense, reversed the outcome of the 1899-1902 Boer War.

CHANGES IN THE APARTHEID SYSTEM

After 1959 the apartheid system underwent several modifications. As most former African colonies achieved independence from European domination, South Africa attempted to influence the emerging states through offers of technical assistance and trade. One purpose of the new tactic was to deflect criticism and increasing anti-apartheid animosity emanating from the United Nations. As newly independent African and Asian nations were admitted to its ranks, that body was becoming less dominated by European nations (which in the past had seemed relatively tolerant of South African racism). The white regime also sensed that good relations with the other nations of the continent would provide nearby and ready markets for the exports generated by its growing manufacturing sector.

Greater reliance on manufacturing and increasing technological sophistication, along with white social mobility out of the working class and into white-collar occupations, resulted in changes in the nature of the demands for nonwhite labor. Previously

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
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MAP 9.2 South African Tribal Homelands (Before 1994)



mining and industry had utilized mainly unskilled or semiskilled nonwhites. Now the economy needed larger numbers of skilled nonwhite workers who could reliably carry out their jobs over an extended period. Finally, the increasing internal protests against apartheid since World War II, progressing from peaceful campaigns of defiance to armed resistance, and punctuated by internationally condemned episodes of violent repression, also prompted significant policy alterations (Danaher 1984; 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

The three major innovations engineered by the white regime between 1960 and 1990 included pursuing separate development toward political independence for the tribal homelands, promoting processes intended to result in a more highly skilled and stable nonwhite labor force, and in 1983 enacting a new constitution intended to co-opt Indians and South Africans of mixed racial descent (coloreds) into an alliance with whites and in opposition to the indigenous African majority (Danaher 1984; Greenberg 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

Prior to 1959, the South African government intended that the native homelands would develop local self-government along tribal lines but would remain under the jurisdiction of the white republic. However, theoreticians within the National Party eventually succeeded in winning support for the argument that South Africa could both achieve wider international acceptance and divide or blunt internal opposition by pushing a policy of full independence for the homelands. Publicly the white regime began to assert that it now recognized that indigenous Africans had the capability to organize and govern modern nation-states. But the result of successfully establishing the homelands as independent states would be to transform the basis for economic and political discrimination against indigenous Africans from that of racism to that of citizenship. The millions of indigenous Africans employed in South African industries, businesses, and households would in the future be classified as foreign migrant labor; their lack of entitlement to the rights of South Africans would be based on nationality, not race (Danaher 1984; Magubane 1979; Omer-Cooper 1987).

Furthermore, National Party leaders anticipated that the development of independent homeland government administrations, service bureaucracies, and economic enterprises would provide opportunities for social mobility for educated indigenous Africans blocked from participating in the republic's government or from playing major roles in other institutions, thus minimizing African elite discontent. Additional potential benefits to the white community included the probability that frustrated blacks would in the future target their own homeland governments for protest actions rather than white authorities. Granting independence along tribal lines was also thought likely to heighten competitiveness and hostility among black ethnic groups, thereby presenting whites with a divided and more easily controlled black population, whose tribal animosities might override the motivation to unite against apartheid. As

most of the homelands lacked both industrial infrastructure and known significant mineral wealth and some were actually composed of several noncontiguous parcels separated by the republic's territory, they would remain economically dependent on the white-controlled state and could be easily intimidated by South Africa's overpowering military.

Business leaders reacted to the growing shortage of skilled workers by pressuring the government to open many previously restricted jobs to nonwhites. Furthermore, in seeking a stable and reliable skilled workforce, the white regime by the 1980s had granted many Africans virtual permanent residency outside the homelands by successively allowing them the right to lease houses in segregated urban townships for thirty years and then ninety years, finally permitting them the right to purchase homes. Furthermore, to promote emotional stability among African skilled workers, the regime eventually allowed many to have their families live with them. In 1970 before the stabilization-of-workers program had begun at the Kimberley diamond mines, 86 percent of the workforce was composed of migrants, whereas in 1979, after the new program had been in effect for seven years, 62 percent of the mine workers were stabilized, and only 38 percent were migrants (Ommer-Cooper, 1987).

The need to reduce the incidence of wildcat strikes and in general provide mechanisms through which business and government could communicate with and exercise influence over the increasingly skilled and difficult-to-replace workforce prompted the government to permit the legal existence of black labor unions after 1979, provided they did not engage in "political" activity (Davis 1987; Kerson 1987). To meet the demand for highly trained technicians of all races, segregated nonwhite colleges and universities were expanded, and white universities were opened to those needing courses not available at nonwhite institutions. In 1986 the white regime finally abolished the Pass Law and permitted freer movement of African workers to black urban districts (New York Times, Jun. 27, 1988, A1).

White voters in 1983 approved a new "multiracial" constitution that supposedly offered a "share of power" to coloreds and Indians, to the exclusions of the indigenous African majority. The reorganized three-part legislature included a white House of Assembly, with 166 members; a colored House of Representatives, with 85 members; and an Indian House of Delegates, with 45 members. The president of the republic, selected by an Electoral College composed of 88 members (50 elected by the white executive powers under the new constitution. Individual parliament members were to deal with matters particular to their racial groups and jointly with matters of "common interest" (Danaher 1984, 23), as determined by the president of the republic. Although some viewed the constitution as a step forward, many others considered it a mechanism for preserving white domination and strengthening the coercive capacity of the regime.

Large numbers of mixed race and Indian South Africans refused to register to vote in elections under the new constitution, and of those who did register, only 30 percent of coloreds and 20 percent of Indians actually took part in the first parliamentary elections. The new political system particularly infuriated many members of the totally excluded black population and precipitated the most widespread series of protests since the 1976 Soweto uprising (Danaher 1984; Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID

The defeat of Chief Bamba's 1903 rebellion against taxation and white-supported collaborationist tribal leaders has been widely cited as the last of the traditional wars of resistance against white domination in South Africa. But in 1912, following the rejection of the concept of political equality for nonwhites by the victorious British, an important African movement opposed to white domination was organized, the African National Congress (ANC), originally called the South African Natives' National Congress. This group, established largely by Western-schooled black professionals, businesspeople, and prosperous farmers, whose education was often the product of Christian missionary efforts, was the "first modern, nontribal organization of blacks formed to discuss black interests under white rule" (Davis 1987, 3). The early ANC was resigned to the at-least-temporary reality of white minority rule but was committed to working against laws promoting racial discrimination and for an extension of the benefits of modern education and technology to the larger population. The group proclaimed its support for a future nonracial political system in which all South Africa's peoples would enjoy equal rights in a European-style democratic state. ANC leaders originally hoped that peaceful protest and legal efforts, coupled with anticipated international pressure from Britain, other democratic nations, and the worldwide Christian church, would bring about a reorganization of South Africa along nonracial lines. But during its early years the ANC remained largely an elitist, middle-class group, somewhat isolated culturally from the traditional lifestyles of the majority of Africans (Davis 1987; Omer-Cooper 1987).

During World War II, as South Africa joined the side of the Allies against Nazi Germany with its doctrine of racial supremacy, ANC leaders voted to support the war effort in the expectation that victory would result in a reduction of racism and an extension of political rights at home. The results of the 1948 election, which brought the Afrikaner National Party to power, reversed the small level of wartime liberalization and led quickly to the passage of a series of laws that reaffirmed and systematized racial segregation, also precipitated the more militant younger generation's ascendancy to leadership of the ANC. The youthful activists favored the mobilization of mass protest movements instead of the previous exclusive reliance on negotiation and moral

Mandela 1994). ANC leaders Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo in the late 1940s even proposed expelling SACP members from the ANC. But the post-World War II National Party government's apartheid program and, in particular, its implementation of broad repressive policies under the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, which mandated that anyone working for racial equality could be punished for advocating communism, tended to promote cooperation between the ANC and the SACP.

When the ANC itself was outlawed in 1960, the organization became more dependent on assistance from the SACP. SACP members helped establish the critically important secret leadership network of ANC militants inside South Africa, obtained financial and military aid for the ANC from the Soviet Union and other Communist Party-dominated states, and provided information on the South African government, military, and economic installations that was gathered either by SACP members or by the Soviet Union (Davis 1987; Karis 1986/1987; Magubane 1979). The SACP's characterization of South Africa's system as a form of European imperialist exploitation of Africa appeared increasingly valid to many ANC members, whose peaceful efforts at change were crushed within the country while many capitalist nations cooperated with the white government and refused to help the ANC.

By the end of 1969 the ANC began to accept nonindigenous South African Communists into its ranks, and in 1985 the ANC National Executive Committee was opened to all races. At that time the number of SACP members on the thirty-three-person ANC Executive Committee was estimated to be at least three to as many as twenty-three (Karis 1986/1987; *New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1990, A15; Radu 1987). However, ANC leaders and most informed observers asserted that the ANC represented a broad coalition of interests and ideologies within South Africa, was not controlled by Communists, and publicly called for a multiparty, nonracial political democracy.

The ANC and the Freedom Charter

The ANC and other groups participated in a Congress of the People at Kliptown in June 1955, involving a mass meeting of 3,000 people of all races. Those present voted to adopt a Freedom Charter, which asserted that the wealth of South Africa belonged to all its inhabitants and demanded the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a nonracial democracy. In addition to calling for a more equitable distribution of land, profits, and other forms of wealth and equal access to education and employment opportunities, further goals proclaimed in the charter included:

The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; . . . other industries and trade shall be controlled to assist the well-being of the

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people. . . . The police force and army shall be open to all on an equal basis and shall be helpers and protectors of the people. . . . Free medical [treatment] and hospitalization shall be provided for all with special care for mothers and young children. . . . Peace and friendship amongst all our people shall be secured by upholding the equal rights, opportunities and status of all. (Congress of the People [1955] 1987, 209, 210, 211)

The white regime reacted harshly to the Freedom Charter and the Kliptown interracial effort to undermine apartheid. On December 5, 1956, after months of gathering information on activists, the government arrested scores of leaders of participating groups and accused them of treason. The proceedings of the so-called Treason Trial continued until November 29, 1961, with all the defendants found not guilty. However, the government had succeeded in not only imprisoning key leaders for extended periods but also financially and occupationally injuring those apprehended so as to deter future potential activists.

The ANC and the PAC

Long-standing controversies within the ANC over the issues of multiracial cooperation to end white domination, the role of the SACP in the ANC, and reliance on funding from non-African countries that were dominated by Communist parties resulted in a major defection from the ANC and the establishment in April 1959 of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the second South African liberation group officially recognized by the United Nations (the first was the ANC). The founders of the PAC, which like the ANC supported the eventual establishment of a nonracial government, argued that South Africa must be freed from the bonds of apartheid primarily through black militancy, not through the ANC multiracial cooperation approach, which, according to the PAC, was being subverted by its Communist members and was too greatly influenced by the non-African nations from which it obtained much of its funds and weapons. The PAC advocated the "black nationalist" view that the psychology of black South Africans, theoretically crippled by decades of oppression and humiliation at the hands of whites, could only be rejuvenated by having the nation's blacks "act alone in reclaiming South Africa from white domination" (Davis 1987, 11). The PAC's ideology gained popularity because it enhanced feelings of pride and importance among many young Africans and engendered a special sense of mission. Both the ANC and the PAC planned to launch a campaign against the nation's Pass Law in spring 1960. The leaders of the PAC, however, decided to begin their protest movement on March 21, ten days before the scheduled start of the ANC antipass drive. At Sharpeville on the morning of March 21, a large number of people gathered without their pass documents to await arrest. Some police, possibly fearing for their own safety,

opened fire on the crowd, killing sixty-seven, most of whom were shot in the back: they tried to flee. Police shootings at other locations also resulted in deaths and scores of injuries. The killings precipitated riots by tens of thousands in the black townships outside the white cities and industrial centers they served. On April 8 the South African government outlawed both the ANC and the PAC. Because the ANC had succeeded over a number of years in building an underground network, it was less devastated than the PAC, which, partly owing to its recent creation, had virtually no clandestine organizational structure and was almost eliminated (Adam 1988; Dav

1987; Schlemmer 1988).

The ANC and Armed Resistance

Elements of the ANC, under the youthful leadership of Nelson Mandela, made on last attempt to convince the white government to accept peaceful change. They demanded a national convention of all races be called to draft a new nonracial constitution. When the white regime rejected this concept, the ANC militants reluctantly resolved to abandon their organization's long-held commitment to nonviolent protest and begin a campaign of selective sabotage. Because the shift in tactics was resisted by the older and more moderate members of the ANC, the younger activists formed a semi-independent but ANC-associated military organization called Umkhonto w Sizwe (Zulu for "Spear of the Nation"). The aim of Umkhonto was to carry out sabotage of important transportation, communication, and industrial facilities in order both to inflict injury on the nation's white-owned economy and to frighten off foreign investors, thereby pressuring the government into serious negotiations with the ANC (Davis 1987; Mandela 1994; Omer-Cooper 1987). Members of the South African Communist Party with military experience began to train young South Africans in the use of bombs, grenades, and other weapons and succeeded in obtaining military assistance from the Soviet Union. Western countries, dependent on South Africa for important minerals, such as platinum and chromium, and generally favorably influenced by South Africa's strong anti-Communist stance, refused to provide military aid to the ANC, although by the 1980s several Western European nations were assisting through cash donations and in other nonmilitary ways.

The Umkhonto sabotage campaign was begun on December 16, 1961, to counter the Afrikaner celebration of an 1838 Boer victory over a Zulu army at "Blood River" during the Great Trek. Over several months scores of targets were hit by dynamite bombs or mines, but the damage inflicted was usually slight. Furthermore, the public was generally not informed regarding the political purpose of the attacks or of the tie between Umkhonto and the much better known ANC. In August 1962 Mandela was captured, reportedly with the aid of information supplied to the white South African government by the CIA (*New York Times*, June 10, 1990, A15), and later tried for

seven, most of whom were shot in the back as they fled. Locations also resulted in deaths and scores of thousands in the black townships. By the end of 1963 the Umkhonto sabotage campaign begun by PAC extremists was also smashed. The ANC's leadership concluded that before another large-scale armed assault was attempted, the ANC underground "would have to be purged of counter-espionage agents and made secure" and that a military command center outside South Africa would have to be established to plan, coordinate, and order operations "without fear of capture" (Davis 1987, 21).

Armed Resistance

In the mid-1970s major political changes to the north of South Africa appeared to improve the chances for anti-apartheid movements and certainly had the effect of both encouraging militancy among nonwhites and alarming the white minority. After more than a dozen years of unsuccessful attempts to repress nationalist guerrilla movements in its Angola and Mozambique colonies, Portugal experienced its own revolution. Leftist-oriented Portuguese soldiers, disillusioned by decades of right-wing military dictatorship and the futile and wasteful colonial wars, and in part inspired by the ideology of the African revolutionaries they had struggled against, overthrew their nation's authoritarian regime. The new left-leaning Portuguese government soon granted independence to Angola and Mozambique. In both nations leftist-oriented movements, extremely hostile to the apartheid state to the south, achieved dominance (Mabeko-Tali 2006; Newitt 2006). For the first time, countries geographically close to South Africa appeared ready to lend support to a large-scale revolutionary effort. Within a few more years nationalist guerrilla movements in another nearby country, Zimbabwe (formerly called Rhodesia), succeeded with the aid of international pressure in forcing a negotiated end to the rule of its then approximately 4 percent white minority (Rubert 2006). In the April 18, 1980, election for a national parliament, the ZANU (the Zimbabwe African National Union), the party of the self-proclaimed Marxist and "most radical of the contenders," Robert Mugabe, won a resounding victory (Omer-Cooper 1987, 234). The new government, under black majority rule, declared its commitment to helping to overturn white minority rule in South Africa.

Revolutionary Changes Among South Africa's Neighbors

Prior to the changes in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, a new activist movement had been organized by young blacks at Bloemfontein in South Africa in August 1971. Steve Biko was selected as leader of the new Black Power movement in the United States, was mainly influenced by earlier African nationalist ideology, such as that formulated by PAC BCM, inspired in part by the Black Power movement in the United States, was mainly influenced by earlier African nationalist ideology, such as that formulated by PAC

leaders. The militants of the BCM asserted the need for blacks to lead the anti-apartheid movement but proposed to rely on legal means to attain their goals. This meant that the BCM was to avoid the ANC and PAC campaigns of civil disobedience and their later armed struggles. BCM leaders began "a scrupulously law-abiding education and community action campaign designed to work at the grass-roots level toward building a psychology of self-reliance among blacks" (Davis 1987, 25).

According to the BCM the pressure of a politically aroused, unified, and determined black majority, the anticipated result of the BCM program, would persuade the white government to seriously negotiate a restructuring of South African society. Wherever the BCM set up local organizations, whether community action groups, labor unions, or political education seminars, only blacks were allowed to participate. As the BCM advocated strict legality and seemed to employ its own form of apartheid rather than embrace the supposedly "Communist" method of multiracial cooperation to attain a nonracial state, the white regime temporarily tolerated the development of the movement (Omer-Cooper 1987). The apartheid government may have hoped that the BCM would draw potential recruits away from what it perceived as the more radical and more dangerous ANC and PAC. But the BCM failed to build a significant mass-organizational network, relying instead on a relatively small elite of educated middle-class individuals for guidance. The BCM raised expectations through its leaders' public speeches eliciting black pride and self-confidence and by instilling a belief that sweeping change could be accomplished through the legal structures existing within the apartheid state. Since the group rejected the concept of an extralegal confrontation the protests generated by the mass frustration that resulted when white authorities ignored peaceful demands for change (Davis 1987).

The efforts of the ANC, PAC, and BCM helped motivate a new defiance campaign by the schoolchildren of the massive black township of Soweto in 1976. The protest was directed against a law requiring that black students "not only learn Afrikaans as a language as well as English but accept it as the media of instruction through which they would have to learn other key subjects like mathematics"; many viewed this rule as constituting "an intolerable, artificial obstacle to their struggle for advancement" (Omer-Cooper 1987, 224). In June 1976 Soweto schoolchildren began large-scale protests. When the police used force to suppress the demonstrations, rioting broke out and spread to other towns in the Transvaal as well as to cities in Natal, the Cape, the Orange Free State, and the homelands.

The wave of riots constituted the largest black rebellion in twentieth-century South Africa. Unlike earlier outbreaks, such as that following the 1961 Sharpeville massacre, the Soweto rebellion was not quickly crushed, despite vicious police and military violence, but continued for months. At least six hundred people, mostly young students,

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were shot to death by state forces during the conflict. The white regime arrested hun- dreds of suspected leaders of the protest, dozens of whom died in police custody from supposed "suicides," "hunger strikes," and "unexplained causes" (Brewer 1986). In September 1977 the nationally known leader of the BCM, Steve Biko, was arrested and then beaten to death by police. Thousands of young people, however, fled the townships and South Africa, and many joined ANC guerrilla forces organized in the anti-apartheid states to the north (Brewer 1986; Davis 1987). The Soweto uprisings infused the ANC with a new generation of radicalized youth and intensified mass frus- tration with the white regime and support for violent revolution.

Other young militants were drawn to the surviving elements of the PAC, which shared the black nationalist orientation of the shattered Black Consciousness Move- ment, and formed the Azania People's Liberation Army, many of whose members were quickly arrested, as the PAC had been successfully infiltrated by government agents. The post-Soweto repression crushed all major contenders for leadership of the black opposition—except the longer established and more secretively organized ANC—and persuaded many more nonwhite South Africans "of the futility of above-ground, peaceful opposition" (Davis 1987, 33).

After 1978 "the story of the black military opposition in the Republic is largely the story of the ANC and its allies" (Davis 1987, 33). The ANC in the early 1980s was able to commence a relatively sustained guerrilla effort, beginning with bombings of major South African oil facilities. The dominant view within the ANC was that al- though armed resistance could not result in a military victory in the near future, given the strength of the white regime's army and security forces, it could increase the costs of maintaining apartheid and, along with other factors, help pressure Pretoria into se- rious negotiations toward establishment of a nonracial democracy (Adam 1988).

Opposition to White Domination in the 1980s

The 1983 adoption of the new multiracial constitution by the white minority, which was widely interpreted as an attempt to co-opt the colored and Indian minorities while maintaining control firmly in the hands of whites, precipitated a massive in- tensification of protest. A major new—initially legal—anti-apartheid organization was established in August 1983, when 12,000 delegates convened in Cape Town to form the United Democratic Front (UDF, after 1988 referred to as the "Mass Dem- ocratic Movement" in an effort to circumvent government repressive measures) to oppose the approaching white referendum on the multiracial constitution. The or- ganizational concept of the UDF involved the notion of linking the many local anti- apartheid groups together through a countrywide board of directors that could set national policy objectives, suggest tactics, and offer coordination. "By the end of 1986, some seven hundred community bodies had affiliated with the umbrella-like

UDF," including civic organizations, "women's groups, labor unions, youth leagues, and religious councils" (Davis 1987, 87).

Although the UDF declared itself independent of the illegal African National Congress, the UDF's goals for the future of South Africa appeared to be almost identical to those of the ANC. Most of the UDF's member groups supported the ANC and accepted the Freedom Charter, and several national and local leaders of the UDF acknowledged at least past membership in the ANC. The UDF differed from the ANC in terms of its publicly accepted range of tactics, which excluded violence. However, in 1988 the white government declared the UDF, then claiming three million members in more than six hundred affiliated community organizations, illegal (*New York Times*, Feb. 25, 1988, A1). In addition to the UDF, a major new union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), was established at Durban in December 1985. Similar in structure to the UDF, COSATU also declared its independence of the ANC, while expressing many of the same goals, and "announced socialist aims and principles" (Davis 1987, 102). Within several months thirty unions, representing 600,000 workers, had joined COSATU (membership would reach approximately one million by 1990), the largest union association in South Africa's history.

ANC leaders decided that rather than attempt the difficult task of organizing large numbers of South Africans directly into the illegal ANC, they would "federate" with like-minded legal organizations. In return for the cooperation and support of the UDF, COSATU, and associated groups, the ANC had to accept the significant degree of ideological variation characterizing the allied organizations, a decentralized authority structure, and a possibly reduced role for the ANC itself in the anti-apartheid struggle. But federation presented the possibility of genuinely united, massive participation in a coordinated effort to overturn white domination through measures including labor strikes, boycotts of white businesses, and military actions involving the sabotage of key economic installations as well as violent attacks on the military instruments of white oppression.

The ANC also called on nations trading with South Africa to boycott the republic and to convince or coerce their citizens to remove their investments from South Africa or from companies doing business in South Africa to help damage the economy and force change. The ANC hoped that its supporters would make the black townships ungovernable for the white-approved, often collaborationist township councils (whose members achieved power through elections in which generally less than 20 percent of those eligible voted) and that the townships could be turned into relatively secure bases for ANC activities. By 1986 many councils had been effectively replaced by local popular committees typically favorable to the ANC. The African National Congress and allied groups in the 1980s were estimated to enjoy the backing

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of about 50 percent of the black population (40 percent of the overall South African population), making it the single most widely supported political group in the nation (Davis 1987).

One rough gauge of the relative strengths of the ANC and the PAC in 1990 was size of the labor union federations affiliated with each organization. The Congress of South African Trade Unions, whose leaders tended to identify with the aims of the ANC, claimed approximately 1 million members, while the pro-PAC National Council of Trade Unions had about 150,000 (*New York Times*, Mar. 4, 1990, A14). A further indication of popular allegiance to the ANC was the fact that an estimated 70 percent of indigenous African workers participated in the nationwide strike called by the Mass Democratic movement to protest the 1989 South African elections (*U.S. News and World Report*, Sep. 18, 1989, 52).

Support for the ANC and other organizations working for change was motivated not only by widespread opposition to apartheid but also by economic hardships. In the 1980s white per capita income was more than four times that of Indians or individuals of mixed racial ancestry and over eight times that of indigenous Africans (See-dat 1987a; 1987b). Unemployment among indigenous Africans was over 20 percent. Undernourishment of indigenous African children was estimated at 10 to 30 percent (Le Roux 1988).

Inkatha

A major rival to the ANC and its allied groups among the Zulu in Natal Province was Inkatha yeNkululeko yeSizwe (National Cultural Liberation movement). Its most prominent figure was Chief Gatsa Buthelezi, head of the most populous homeland, KwaZulu, to which more than 6 million black South Africans were assigned, whether residents there or working in white areas. Inkatha, a Zulu cultural organization revived by Buthelezi in 1975, had 100,000 members by 1977 and claimed 1,700,000 by 1990. Despite the fact that Inkatha was opened to participation by non-Zulu blacks in 1979, the organization continued to draw mostly from Zulus living in rural areas in KwaZulu or other parts of rural Natal. Inkatha's "political culture was dominated by the personality cult surrounding Buthelezi's populist leadership, and by the traditions of Zulu power" (Davis 1987, 107).

While formally opposing apartheid, Buthelezi and other Inkatha leaders criticized the ANC for, in their view, advocating "socialism" as opposed to "free enterprise"; for demanding a one person, one vote democratic political system for South Africa instead of being "flexible" enough to consider other forms of sharing power with whites; and for resorting to armed resistance rather than continuing to utilize nonviolent means to pressure the white regime to accept reforms. Buthelezi also rejected ANC

calls for other nations to disinvest in South Africa as a way of helping to coerce the white minority economically to enact positive changes; he instead promoted foreign investment in order, in his view, to further develop the nation's economy and thereby provide more jobs and opportunities for nonwhites. In opinion surveys conducted during the 1980s, the KwaZulu chief's followers, much to the pleasure of the white government, reflected their leader's relative conservatism: Generally only small percentages of pro-Inkatha blacks favored the use of strikes, divestiture, or violence against the white regime in comparison to large majorities among ANC-UDF supporters (Bernstein and Godsell 1988; Davis 1987).

Buthelezi's position of leadership in KwaZulu was, in part, the result of the white regime's homeland policy, intended to separate blacks not only from whites, coloreds, and Indians, but also from other indigenous Africans by emphasizing tribal differences. In KwaZulu, where unemployment levels were high, the jobs and opportunities for economic and social mobility that Buthelezi could provide to thousands, both through his control of the homeland administration and through his influence over Inkatha's staff hiring, constituted a major patronage-dispensing base of his power. Unlike several other homeland leaders, however, he had refused to accommodate white demands that he accept full independence for the several geographically separated territories that together constituted KwaZulu. Instead he proposed an experiment in which Zulus, Natal Indians, and coloreds would have some role, along with whites, in the governing of Natal Province. Buthelezi's opposition to total independence for KwaZulu partially shielded him from being perceived as simply a puppet of white rulers. His prestige was further enhanced by the coverage his public statements received in the white media, which portrayed him as a relatively responsible and reasonable adversary and advocate of black aspirations.

Comparatively favorable white attitudes toward Buthelezi in part resulted from his rejection of ANC violence: He instructed his followers to "avoid at all costs being made cannon fodder by people who want to use our corpses to stand on in order to be seen as leaders" (Davis 1987, 108). But seemingly in contrast with his condemnation of armed attacks directed at the white regime or its agents, Buthelezi's Inkatha became widely known as an organization whose members were willing to use violence against supporters of the ANC (*New York Times*, Apr. 22, 1990, A3; Aug. 22, 1990, A7). Inkatha's influence in the 1980s and early 1990s was limited primarily to Natal Province and other locations with large numbers of Zulu immigrants from rural backgrounds, whereas the ANC and its allied organizations enjoyed wide support in non-white urban areas throughout South Africa. In July 1990 Buthelezi announced that Inkatha was being reorganized as a political party, the Inkatha Freedom Party, in anticipation of participation in a reformed South African political system (*New York Times*, Jul. 15, 1990, A5).

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White Opposition to Aspects of Apartheid

Several significant groups within the white community expressed support for an end to aspects of the apartheid system. Major elements of the nation's white business community, responding to the economy's need for an expanded, stable, skilled workforce, convinced government officials to alter legal codes in order to achieve this goal. The changes included opening new occupational categories to nonwhites, legalization of indigenous African labor unions, and the 1986 repealing of the Pass Laws (Bernstein and Godsell 1988). Some business leaders asked the government to negotiate with the ANC, and several called for the establishment of a nonracial democracy.

Another source of white opposition to apartheid was the Progressive Federal Party, which, drawing support disproportionately from middle- and upper-middle-income whites, had for thirty years fought for greater civil and political rights for the nonwhite majority. In April 1989 this group joined with two smaller political parties to create a united left-wing opposition to the National Party government. The result was the new Democratic Party, which in the 1989 national election won about 20 percent of the vote and 33 positions in the 166-seat white parliament (*New York Times*, Sep. 8, 1989, A8). The Democratic Party advocated "a true democracy which rejects race as its basis and protects the human dignity and liberty of all its citizens" (*New York Times*, Apr. 9, 1989, 6).

A third element of white society, the South African Dutch Reformed Church, which long helped provide ideological justifications for white domination, officially moved to oppose apartheid. In 1986 leaders of the church, which at that time included 80 percent of white legislators among its 1.7 million members, declared racism to be a sin "and opened its membership to Christians of all races" (Berger and Godsell 1988b, 298).

COUNTERINSURGENCY STRATEGIES OF THE REGIME IN THE 1980S

In attempting to cope with democracy movements white leaders developed a comprehensive strategy. The plans included coordination of governmental policy, the economy, mass media, the military, and police in such a way as to sustain or increase divisions among the black majority, co-opt nonwhite elite elements by providing them with channels of economic and social mobility, and commit selective violence against rebellious groups or individuals.

The 1983 constitution vested potentially dictatorial powers in the president, who was therefore able to act decisively in "emergencies" regardless of any divisions within the white establishment. A major split within the white elite existed between the "moderates" (mainly members of the National Party, which had engineered the 1983

supposedly power-sharing multiracial constitution and won 48 percent of the vote in the 1989 election and ninety-three seats in the white parliament) and the "conservatives" (largely associated with the Conservative Party, the product of a schism in the National Party), who were generally opposed to any concessions to nonwhites (Brewer 1986; Davis 1987). The Conservative party obtained 31 percent of the vote in 1989 and thirty-nine parliamentary seats. The Conservative Party drew support disproportionately from lower-middle-class and lower-income whites, many of whom probably felt that their economic interests and status in society would be threatened by a weakening of the apartheid system (Schlemmer 1988). The primary disagreement among most white leaders during much of the 1980s appeared to be not over the issue of whether to prevent the advent of black majority rule but rather of how to prevent it: through emphasis on the co-opting reforms advocated by the moderates or through the repression stressed by the conservatives. In general, the white elite recognized the necessity of reducing apartheid barriers in the labor market in order to ensure future economic growth, but "in the social domain, and more emphatically in politics, racial division and white racial hegemony" were to be maintained (Berger and Godsell 1988b, 281).

The South African Defense Force (SADF) was capable of quickly mobilizing more than 70,000 men at any one time and more, if necessary, from its sizable reserves (almost all white men were required to undergo military training). Through much of the 1980s about 5 percent of the regular SADF personnel were nonwhites, often organized into units separated on the basis of tribal membership, in part in order to ensure that military service reinforced rather than reduced the significance of ethnicity. Recruits for the nonwhite units, carefully screened to admit only those with antileftist views or with strong tendencies toward tribal identification or other antirevolutionary political attitudes acceptable to white officials, were attracted to military service by significant financial incentives within the context of high nonwhite unemployment rates (Davis 1987). The South African Defense Force was supplemented by 75,000 police, approximately half of whom were white and half nonwhite (*New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1991, A9).

After signs of nuclear blasts were detected in the South Atlantic during South African naval exercises, followed by evidence of radioactive fallout, many observers concluded that South Africa must possess at least a small number of nuclear explosive devices. Military pressure against neighboring black revolutionary states, including incursions by South African troops and support for groups opposing leftist African governments, contributed to forcing several pro-ANC countries to deny the ANC bases on their territories (Davis 1987; Nolutshungu 1988). In return South Africa pledged to cease its hostile actions and reduce aid for counterrevolutionary forces.

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REFORMING APARTHEID

The ANC, supported by the Organization of African Unity nations, called for "negotiations and elections leading to majority rule in South Africa" (*New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1989, A8). ANC conditions for talks with the white government included Pretoria lifting the state of emergency, releasing political prisoners, legalizing all anti-apartheid political organizations, withdrawing troops from the black townships, and halting trials and executions. In contrast, the predominantly Afrikaner Conservative Party was the only major political group that advocated the 1950s form of apartheid. Leaders of the National Party stated during the 1989 election campaign that they were committed to moving the nation further away from its original apartheid system.

President F. W. de Klerk announced that the National Party intended gradually to alter the nation's political system towards wider power sharing among the country's racial groups (*African News*, Aug. 1989, 14). But he also said this would not lead to indigenous African majority rule (*New York Times*, Jul. 23, 1989, E2).

Many South Africans, however, rejected any system other than one that would guarantee absolutely equal rights of political participation. Critics of the government asserted that ending apartheid also required ending exclusive white control of the security forces and major economic institutions. Many believed that greater economic equality could only be achieved if a postapartheid government intervened to break white minority domination of the economy. This could open new opportunities for nonwhites in current state-owned industries and ones that could be nationalized in the future. Such a program would be analogous to the government effort to raise the economic status of the Afrikaners in the British-dominated South African economy in the decades immediately following the Boer War.

The South African government, however, began to sell state-owned corporations and facilities to private concerns and individuals, including its Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) in 1989. The result of the process would be to place in the hands of affluent whites industries and other capital that would have been owned collectively by all South Africans. By fall 1990 the ANC, COSATU, and other major anti-apartheid organizations had vigorously condemned the regime's privatization of state property; it was viewed as an attempt to deprive a future, democratically elected, nonracial government of the ability to distribute resources and economic opportunities more equitably (*New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1990, A10). Some anti-apartheid activists feared that white leaders would attempt to co-opt middle-class indigenous Africans into a new ruling coalition. This coalition would then be able to economically and politically dominate and exploit the almost exclusively nonwhite industrial and agricultural working classes.

The dismantling of apartheid laws was of limited significance to impoverished people unless accompanied by governmental measures to redistribute resources. For example, the repeal of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which had given 87 percent of the land to the white minority, was of questionable value to millions of people from whose parents the territories were taken but who did not have the means to buy property. The majority could only benefit significantly if additional government action provided them with land parcels either free or at very low cost. Those advocating a full departure from the system of white domination, however, had to confront the dilemma of improving the conditions of the nation's majority without alienating large numbers of whites who possessed technical knowledge, managerial skills, and investment capital that would be essential to the nation's future development.

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and any system other than one that would allow full participation. Critics of the government demanded ending exclusive white control of the economy. Many believed that greater economic apartheid government intervened to break it. This could open new opportunities for businesses and ones that could be nationalized in line with the government effort to raise the level of the British-dominated South African economy after the Boer War.

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In February 1990 the National Party administration of F. W. de Klerk took a major step toward the resolution of South Africa's civil conflict by releasing the famous ANC leader Nelson Mandela, after more than twenty-seven years of imprisonment (*New York Times*, Feb. 12, 1990, A1). The government also legalized the previously banned African National Congress, the South African Communist Party, and other anti-apartheid organizations. In March 1990 Namibia, the country between South Africa and Angola, achieved independence after seventy-five years of South African occupation (*New York Times*, Mar. 21, 1990, A1).

Once out of prison, Nelson Mandela was elected by ANC officials as deputy president of the organization (the president was the ailing Oliver Tambo). After substantial discussions with other ANC leaders, Mandela called for continued international economic sanctions against South Africa until the establishment of a democracy with equal rights of political participation for all the nation's peoples. Although also demanding a restructuring of the economy, Mandela noted, especially during his June 1990 visit to the United States, that economic reform need not necessarily involve extensive nationalizations if other measures could ensure the desired benefits of improving the welfare and protecting the interests of the nonwhite majority (*New York Times*, Jun. 22, 1990, A20; Jun. 27, 1990, A11).

Mandela provoked some measure of controversy by reconfirming the ANC's friendly relations with Cuba, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the ANC's alliance with the South African Communist Party. These governments and organizations had long provided valuable assistance to the ANC's struggle against racism in Africa. The ANC expressed particular gratitude for Cuban efforts not only in aiding the ANC but also in combating white South African intervention in Angola and in helping to achieve independence for Namibia.

President de Klerk offered to negotiate a new constitution that would provide national political power for indigenous Africans. And as talks progressed, the ANC in August 1990 announced the suspension of its armed struggle (*New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1990, E4). But de Klerk and other National Party leaders consistently refused to accept the ANC's demand for a totally nonracial, one person, one vote democracy.

THE DISMANTLING OF APARTHEID

The various participating parties during years of negotiations for a new political system pushed for often-conflicting goals (Grundy 1993; Jost 1994). The ANC held out for a nonracial democracy at the national level and a strong central government capable of organizing and carrying out policies to provide dramatic improvements in education, housing, and economic opportunities for the country's nonwhite majority. The

National Party, Inkatha, die-hard Afrikaner nationalists, and tribal homeland authorities tended to demand a federal system that would be characterized by relatively strong provincial government powers capable of defending local and minority interests. These groups also pushed for a division of the country into a larger number of smaller provinces in which locally concentrated ethnic minorities could exercise influence or even dominance.

Inkatha leaders demanded and received continuation of the Zulu hereditary monarchy as part of the price for their participation in elections. All parties to negotiations appeared concerned with safeguarding the economic benefits enjoyed by the more privileged groups, classes, and elites in South African society, evidently as a way of deterring any large elite segment from either organizing significant mass opposition to a final agreement or leaving the country and depriving it of their valuable resources and skills (*New York Times*, May 15, 1994, 14; Jun. 4, 1994, 1; May 8, 1995, A19).

During the negotiation process, violence and political and economic protests continued. Thousands died in lethal attacks between Inkatha and ANC supporters. Evidence arose that elements within South Africa's white military and police leaderships assisted Inkatha extremists in carrying out and escaping punishment for massacres of ANC sympathizers (*New York Times*, Mar. 19, 1994, 1; Mar. 20, 1994, 10; Feb. 20, 1995, A7). White nationalist fanatics planted bombs and assassinated some ANC leaders, in particular Chris Hani in 1993, who had led the ANC guerrilla group, Spear of the Nation, and was serving as chairperson of the South African Communist Party.


The ANC's future development and policy objectives may have been significantly affected by the loss of these leaders. However, the ANC's position in negotiations was strengthened by its popular support and by economically damaging strikes by the Congress of South African Trade Unions in support of ANC demands (Jost 1994).

Negotiations finally resulted in agreement on a temporary five-year constitution for South Africa under which the 1994 elections could be held. The temporary constitution was structured so as to ensure that the 1994 elections would result in a government of national unity that would, ideally, be a manifestation of democratic process and capable of moving toward significant social change while avoiding extreme measures and reducing internal domestic conflict. The constitution divided the country into nine provinces from the original four, primarily by subdividing the former Transvaal and Cape Provinces. The new legislature consisted of a National Assembly with four hundred members and a National Council of Provinces of ninety. National Assembly seats were awarded on the basis of the proportion of popular vote received by each political party (Jost 1994). The citizens of each of the nine provinces elected ten members of the National Council of Provinces. The National Assembly was to carry out the function of selecting the president. The constitution provided for multiple deputy presidents, one for each political party that received at least 20 percent of the

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MAP 9.3 South Africa (After 1994)



popular vote. The president was to have a twenty-seven-member cabinet, with any party that received at least 5 percent of the popular vote entitled to at least one cabinet position.

All tribal homeland governments, including the supposedly independent homeland states, were eliminated, and their bureaucracies were incorporated into the new South African government. Similarly, the anti-apartheid guerrilla armies were merged with the much larger South African Defense Force (Nathan 1994). According to the temporary constitution, constitutional amendments or a whole new constitution had to be approved by either a two-thirds vote of the legislature or a 60 percent approval by direct popular vote. The temporary constitution also included a basic bill of rights.

In the 1994 election the ANC received approximately 63 percent of the popular vote, the National Party 20 percent, Inkatha Freedom party about 10 percent, and other parties 7 percent, including about 1.5 percent for the PAC. The parliament selected Nelson Mandela of the ANC as president; Thabo Mbeki, also of the ANC, as first deputy president; and F. W. de Klerk of the National Party, the former president, as second deputy president (*New York Times*, May 3, 1994, A1; May 11, 1994, A1).

President Mandela and his government, facing the massive inequalities and over 40 percent unemployment among indigenous Africans, proposed a five-year Reconstruction and Development Plan. The plan called for the government to provide a minimum of ten years of free education for all children, the creation of 2.5 million public works jobs, the building of one million new homes, the electrification of another 2.5 million residences, and the redistribution of about 30 percent of the country's arable land (*New York Times*, Apr. 21, 1994, A10; Jul. 29, 1994, A6; Aug. 19, 1994, A3).

To accomplish these goals through peaceful democratic methods within the context of the post-Cold War "new world order," the ANC leadership encouraged foreign investment and even entertained the possible economic and efficiency benefits of privatizing certain state industries. This shift in ANC as well as SACP policies most likely reflected the fact that by the mid-1990s virtually all the wealthy advanced nations of the world with whom South Africa traded and from whom South Africa received technological and other assistance were firmly committed to capitalist economic systems and trade relations. South Africa, therefore, even though governed by the ANC with SACP participation, was strongly influenced to structure its economy according to the rules of capitalist economic development.

The apparent modifications in the ideology of the former liberation movement and the gradualism and moderation of its reconstruction and redistribution plans led some critics within the ANC to openly question whether the anti-apartheid liberation movement had taken over white South Africa or whether white South Africa and the international capitalist system had taken over the liberation movement.

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On May 8, 1996, more than 85 percent of South Africa's national legislators voted to adopt and gradually implement over a three-year period a new constitution that retained several major features of the 1994 interim constitution, such as the four- hundred-member National Assembly and the ninety-member National Council of Provinces (*New York Times*, May 9, 1996, A1). While assigning to the nine provincial governments exclusive control over provincial planning, sports, recreation, and roads, the new charter provided for a strong presidency and central government and dis- pensed with reserving cabinet positions for all parties that received at least 5 percent of the vote. The new constitution included a Bill of Rights, which not only guaranteed freedom of speech, movement, and political activity and banned discrimination on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, age, pregnancy, or marital status, but also supported every citizen's right to adequate housing, food, water, education, and health care.

SOUTH AFRICA AFTER APARTHEID

Economy

South Africa possessed not only enormous natural resources but also well developed energy, transportation, communications, and financial sectors similar to those in the most developed nations. However, much of the rest of the economy resembled that of poor developing societies. Inequality was extreme; South Africa had the second highest Gini index of income inequality in the world, 65, in 2005 (CIA 2010). The Gini index had actually been lower in 1994, 59.3, when apartheid ended and the ANC came to power. In the first decade of the twenty-first century about half the population lived in poverty. Unemployment in 2009 was about 24 percent. GDP growth was estimated at 5.5 percent in 2007, 3.7 in 2008, and -1.8 in 2009 (CIA 2010). The neoliberal capitalist economic system inherited from the apartheid era and basically continued under the ANC government seemed incapable of reducing poverty without much higher growth rates. According to Antoinette Handley, in 2004 "Black Africans, who made up 75 percent of the population, are generally considered to own between 2 percent to 7 percent of capitalization in terms of stock shares" (2004, 200). Unsurprisingly, those best prepared to benefit from the postapartheid system were individuals with already high educational levels and other predemocracy advantages, largely because of their privileged backgrounds.

The ANC governments after 1994 did attempt to alleviate the worst economic sources of misery and social discontent. They tripled the number of recipients of social grants (child support, old age assistance, disability aid) and established seven hundred new health clinics (Lawson 2005, 159-60). They also increased the availability of housing, electricity, and clean water. According to Handley (2004, 198-99), "the percentage

inequality, improve lives more significantly, and cope more effectively with important problems like the AIDS epidemic that the total number of people voting declined by 3.5 million. (In fact, the ANC actually received 1.6 million fewer votes than it did in 1994.) Thabo Mbeki of the ANC replaced Mandela as president of South Africa.

In the 2004 election, the percentage of the vote going to the ANC increased further to 69.7 percent, and its actual vote total increased by about 279,000 over 1999. President Mbeki was reelected. But the total votes cast for all parties declined by about 360,000. Public opinion surveys indicated that people were least satisfied with the government's performance in creating jobs and combating crime but somewhat more satisfied with improvements in health care and education. The percentage of votes going to the National Party (called the New National Party in this election) declined to about 1.7 percent. This poor result led to its disbanding in 2005.

Within the ANC serious divisions arose over AIDS policy, inequality, unemployment, and whether to further privatize state-owned enterprises. Some opposed what they viewed as the emergence of a ruling alliance between the small minority of well-to-do indigenous Africans and wealthy whites, who overwhelmingly possessed the shares of South Africa's privately owned companies and dominated the economy. Under the neoliberal economic model, rather than having the state own and operate major companies to bring more jobs and benefits to the poor, small numbers of non-whites were allowed to acquire partial ownership in private corporations (IRIN Nov. 11, 2004). COSATU leaders criticized this so called "empowerment" as doing virtually nothing to improve the well-being of the majority of South Africans, but instead benefiting and making wealthy only a small percentage of elite black South Africans, including some members of the ANC. COSATU and the SACP accused moderate members of the ANC of abandoning the interests of most of the voters and pursuing policies that allowed only a tiny fraction of black South Africans to share in the affluence apartheid had previously reserved only for white elites. President Mbeki was accused of not doing enough to protect and help South Africa's workers who were so essential to the creation of the democratic system and the victory of the ANC and of at first ignoring and then ineptly responding to the AIDS crisis.

In September 2008, the ANC-dominated legislature replaced Mbeki with former trade union leader Kgalema Motlanthe (Bearak 2008) as interim president until the national election of 2009. In the 2009 election many members of COSATU and the SACP favored Jacob Zuma, an ANC leader of Zulu ancestry, whom they hoped would do more to create jobs and reduce poverty. Prior to the election, the ANC, now dominated by Zuma supporters, replaced 133 sitting parliamentarians with other candidates on its candidate list (Johnson 2010, 200). But Zuma, who had been accused but not convicted of corruption and rape, was considered a flawed option by many members of the ANC as well as other South Africans. Some, including a number of Mbeki

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supporters, defected from the ANC to start a new party called the Congress of the People (COPE). In the election held on April 22, 2009, the ANC received 65.9 percent (264 seats in the National Assembly), the Democratic Alliance 16.7 percent (67 seats), COPE 7.4 percent (30 seats), the Inkatha Freedom Party 4.6 percent (18 seats), and other parties 5.4 percent (21 seats) (CIA 2010). Zuma was then elected president of South Africa by the National Assembly, receiving 277 votes. The ANC in 2009, how- ever, received a lower percentage of the vote than it had in 2004. In fact, its percentages and actual vote totals fell in seven provinces. Only in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal did a surge in Zulu votes for Zuma result in provincial increases for the ANC (Johnson 2010, 201).

Continuing Economic and Social Problems

In addition to the AIDS disaster, South Africa after the election of Zuma faced several other enormous problems. Although the new president promised to rapidly address the concerns of labor unions and the poor, his government was hindered by the world- wide recession emanating from the United States and Europe (Dugger 2009c). In June 2009 the government announced that between April 2008 and April 2009 factory out- put declined a record 21.6 percent. Hundreds of thousands lost their jobs, and the official unemployment rate reached 23.5 percent. Some of Zuma's supporters urged him to extend the country's social assistance programs, even though in 2009 more than a quarter of the population already received welfare funds (Dugger 2009c). Many also favored shifting away from a race-oriented approach of trying to increase black presence in management and executive positions to a more class-based strategy of ex- panding job opportunities for South Africa's millions of unemployed poor. The short- age of jobs was viewed as a major reason for violence between poor South Africans and refugees from other African nations such as Zimbabwe (Dugger 2009a).

Another continuing problem for South Africa has been the so-called brain drain as highly educated South Africans with valuable skills leave the country. As often oc- curs in periods of significant sociopolitical change, people uncomfortable with the new circumstances in their society seek to leave. This potentially damages a nation's economy because investments in developing highly skilled individuals are lost to other societies. A significant minority of skilled white South Africans left the country after 1994, often for destinations such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. However, because of limited job opportunities or concern over crime, corruption or other problems, many well-educated Black and Indian South Africans also left the country. Mattes and Mniki (2007) reported results of a national survey of 4,784 highly educated South African young people showing that many were considering emigrating to have better lives for themselves and their families. Further- more, a 2010 survey of 900 South African young people found that while about 33

percent of white and Indian youth wanted to leave the country, 42 percent of black middle class youngsters also wanted to leave (Naidoo 2010).

A further issue was the employment of many former members of South Africa's armed forces by private military or security firms around the world, perhaps 2,000 to 4,000 in Iraq alone (Nullis 2006). In response, the South African National Assembly on August 30, 2006, passed the Prohibition of Mercenary Activity and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill, which required that all South Africans wanting to work abroad in military or security type jobs in effect get government permission (BBC News, Aug. 30, 2006).

Despite the serious ongoing problems, South Africans celebrated their country's hosting of the 2010 World Cup, during which the top thirty-two men's soccer teams from around the globe arrived to compete for the world championship. Many hoped that this time in the global spotlight would lead to increased foreign investment, trade, and tourism and provide a boost to economic development.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The white-dominated state in South Africa had its origin in the Dutch settlement of the Cape in the seventeenth century. Afrikaners justified their conquests and confiscations of the wealth of indigenous peoples as a religious mission: Whites were acting to fulfill God's plan for a Christian South Africa. After gold deposits were discovered in the Transvaal, the British conquered the Boers and unified South Africa into a single white-dominated state.

Afrikaners, many impoverished by the effects of the Boer War or British economic policies, constituted the bulk of the white working class, which intensely feared social and economic integration with the country's nonwhite masses. Afrikaner nationalism, inflamed by the migration of tens of thousands of blacks to urban areas during World War II and into jobs previously reserved for whites, achieved the unity necessary to win the national elections in 1948. Over the next twelve years the apartheid system was formally established. It confirmed past segregationist policies and reversed much of the limited integration that had previously occurred. Despite numerous internal and external pressures, the white regime continued to endure because of several factors: the support of the large majority of whites; a well-trained, technologically advanced military; a successful policy of selectively co-opting, dividing, or repressing elements of the nonwhite majority; and the cooperation, sometimes covert, of major Western powers in need of South Africa's important mineral resources.

South Africa's system of white domination provided a key factor for the development of a successful revolutionary movement, the motivation for the huge nonwhite

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ously occurred. Despite numerous internal
continued to endure because of several fac-
whites; a well-trained, technologically ad-
lectively co-opting, dividing, or repressing
he cooperation, sometimes covert, of major
important mineral resources.

ation provided a key factor for the develop-
ment, the motivation for the huge nonwhite

majority to join together in a mutual effort to establish a truly representative, nonracial
government. But the achievement of the necessary degree of unity was impeded by
divisions over issues such as whether goals should be pursued violently or through
nonviolent methods, or whether the movement should demand a one person, one
vote democracy or should settle for some form of power sharing that would allow
whites to retain a disproportionate control of government. Other divisive concerns
included persisting tribal rivalries and the degree of socialization of the postapartheid
economic system.

Mass discontent among the majority of South Africans had its obvious origin in
the European conquests and seizure of the nation's wealth. Traditional forms of rebel-
lion against white invaders, such as those of the Xhosa and the Zulu, were unsuccessful.
Although European exploitation of the country's resources improved the living con-
ditions of many nonwhite South Africans relative to the residents of other African
states, the distorted levels of inequality between whites and nonwhites and the hu-
miliation imposed by various aspects of the racially oriented political, economic, so-
cial, and cultural systems constituted powerful sources of modern discontent.

South Africa was distinguished in part by the fact that its educated elites were sep-
arated along racial and ethnic lines. Although by the time of the 1989 parliamentary
elections the majority of white political leaders (those of the National and Democratic
parties) at least publicly supported an end to the 1950s-style apartheid system, an
even larger majority of white political leaders (those of the National and Conservative
parties) resisted the creation of a political system that would allow the possibility of
indigenous African majority rule.

Nonwhite educated elites organized a series of movements to end white minority
rule. Virtually all of these, inspired by somewhat varying ideologies, initially attempted
to use legal means or at least methods of nonviolent civil disobedience to motivate
whites morally to negotiate reform. When they appeared to be gaining strength, such
movements were crushed by the white regime, convincing many that South Africa
would change only in response to the use of revolutionary violence. In the 1960s and
the 1970s leaders of the black nationalist Pan-Africanist Congress and Black Con-
sciousness Movement argued that only the efforts of the black population acting alone
could result in a simultaneous dismantling of the racist system and a restoration of
psychological strength (pride and positive self-esteem) among indigenous Africans.

Another movement against apartheid was made up almost completely of Zulu
membership. Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha organization never provoked violent white re-
pression, since its goals, at least in the short run, appeared consistent with the white
aim of maintaining not only racial separation but also tribal disunity among blacks,
and since it opposed the concept of armed revolution. Though powerful in KwaZulu

and Natal and often a significant force in areas with large numbers of Zulu immigrants, Inkatha remained mainly a regional organization following an ideology and a leader viewed as collaborationist by many South Africans.

The African National Congress, along with its allied groups, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions, was the strongest, best organized, and most widely supported of the anti-apartheid groups. The original members of the group, founded in 1912, attempted to appeal to successive white governments on philosophical, religious, and moral grounds to grant concessions to the nonwhite majority. The ANC advocated the goal of a nonracial, one person, one vote democracy, and eventually attempted to achieve this goal through an interracial movement. The political tactics employed by the ANC until the 1950s were generally peaceful, legal, and nonconfrontational. But following the perceived betrayal of ANC support for South Africa's role in the World War II struggle against German Nazi racism, the younger generation of ANC militants, led by individuals such as Nelson Mandela, decided to organize campaigns of mass civil disobedience in defiance of racist laws. After several such efforts were repressed in the 1950s, plans were laid for the development of an ANC underground network and the organization of a revolutionary armed force to employ selective violence against the white regime.

Foreign involvement in South Africa historically served primarily to assist the survival of the racially organized, white-dominated state. The British declined to push for a nonracial democratic system after their victory over the Boers in 1902 not only because of a desire to end self-destructive violent conflict within the white community but also to ensure a continuous supply of cheap nonwhite labor for British enterprises. Throughout most of the twentieth century Britain, other Western European nations, and the United States continued to trade with South Africa and overtly or covertly supply weapons or weapon technologies to the white regime in exchange for the republic's strategically important mineral resources and its hostility toward Communist Party-led states or movements (Cran 1979). Until the latter part of the twentieth century, when a genuine and significant commitment by much of the international community to end apartheid developed, only countries dominated by Communist parties and a few liberal Western European nations and African states provided significant aid to anti-apartheid revolutionary forces.

At the beginning of the 1990s several factors precipitated a rapid political transformation of South Africa. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR reduced the fear of leftist elements in the ANC both among major leaders of the white South African National Party and among foreign powers that once dreaded the possibility that South Africa's critical resources might fall into unfriendly hands. Trade restrictions imposed by many nations against South Africa's white government and strikes by large numbers of nonwhite South African workers economically pressured

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South Africa's business community and state officials to enter into an agreement with the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups to politically democratize the country. After years of negotiations, a transitional political system permitted the election of an ANC majority to a new parliament and the election of the country's first nonwhite president, Nelson Mandela.

After the end of apartheid, nonwhite South Africans had the legal right to enjoy previously denied freedoms. But millions lacked the economic means to do so to any substantial degree. ANC-led governments significantly expanded electrical and sani- tation services and the availability of education, health care, and housing. But even after the fourth postapartheid election, approximately one-half of the population ap- peared to live in poverty, and about one-quarter lacked jobs. The level of income in- equality was enormous, especially striking given the leftist history of the ANC and the fact that a significant minority of its members were also members of the South African Communist Party. Moreover, South Africa faced an immense AIDS epidemic. The country's economic policies and growth rates had proven inadequate to effectively cope with the nation's range of serious problems.

Significant divisions developed within the ANC over a number of issues. Various groups criticized the neoliberal economic policies pursued after the end of apartheid, the increase in inequality, persisting high levels of unemployment, widespread cor- ruption of public officials, and inept handling of the AIDS crisis. In particular, the strategy of "empowering" blacks by giving small numbers high-paid managerial posi- tions or allowing them to obtain ownership shares (equity) in private companies seemed to accomplish little more than make a tiny proportion of indigenous Africans rich. COSATU and the SACP called for placing greater emphasis on developing poli- cies that would significantly reduce unemployment and inequality. Internal conflicts led to the ousting of Nelson Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki. Jacob Zuma, elected president in 2009, pledged to do more to help the country's poor.

Around the world people continued to be inspired by and admire South Africa's anti-apartheid movement and the sacrifice and charismatic qualities of its central lead- ers, especially Nelson Mandela, and looked forward to new efforts to address the coun- try's ongoing challenges.

SOUTH AFRICA: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

- 1652 Dutch begin settlement and conquest of South Africa
- 1806 Britain assumes control of the Dutch settlement
- 1836-1856 Great Trek of many Afrikaners inland to establish independent Boer republics
- 1899-1902 British wage and win Boer War

- 1910 Union of South Africa established
- 1912 African National Congress (ANC) founded
- 1913 Native Land Act limits access to land for large majority of South Africans
- 1914 Afrikaner National Party founded
- 1948 National Party wins elections and begins process of reinforcing separation of races, which it calls "apartheid"
- 1950 Suppression of Communism Act and the Group Areas Act (limiting people's residences and businesses to their racial areas)
- 1952 ANC and South African Indian Congress launch Defiance Campaign
- 1955 Congress of the People proclaims Freedom Charter
- 1959 Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) established
- 1960 Sharpeville Massacre; ANC and PAC declared illegal
- 1961 ANC organizes Spear of the Nation and launches limited armed resistance
- 1962 Mandela arrested and eventually sentenced to life in prison
- 1976 Soweto uprisings
- 1983 Multiracial constitution approved by white voters; United Democratic Front organized
- 1984 Sustained protests against constitution begin
- 1985 Congress of South African Trade Unions organized
- 1989 F. W. de Klerk becomes president of South Africa and pledges to end apartheid
- 1990 Mandela released from prison; antiapartheid organizations relegalized; ANC ends violent resistance to South African regime; government leaders announce plans to develop a new constitution; repeated violent conflict between ANC and Inkatha supporters
- 1994 ANC wins first fully democratic elections in South Africa; Nelson Mandela elected president
- 1996 New South African constitution adopted
- 1999 Second postapartheid election won by the ANC with a larger percentage of the vote, but voter participation declines significantly; Thabo Mbeki of the ANC succeeds Nelson Mandela as president of South Africa
- 2004 Third postapartheid election won by the ANC with an even larger majority of the vote; Thabo Mbeki reelected president
- 2005 National Party disbands

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- 2008 Thabo Mbeki replaced; Kgalema Motlanthe becomes interim president
- 2009 ANC wins election; Jacob Zuma becomes president
- 2010 South Africa hosts the World Cup

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SELECTED DVD, FILM, AND VIDEOCASSETTE DOCUMENTARIES

See "Purchase and Rental Sources" at the end of this volume for information on how to obtain the following resources and for full names of media companies and other organizations listed here as abbreviations.

Amandla! A Revolution in Four Part Harmony. 2002. 103 min. Indie. The power of music in the revolution against apartheid.
Apartheid in South Africa, 1957. 2009. 35 min. DVD. Amazon.com.
Apartheid's Last Stand. 1993. 60 min. Video. PBS. Dismantling of apartheid and social conflict in South Africa.
Biko: Breaking the Silence. 1988. 52 min. Video. AFSC, SAMC. Describes the life of Steve Biko and the impact on South Africa of the Black Consciousness Movement he led.
Chain of Tears. 1989. 50 min. Video. SAMC. Describes the impacts of war and violence on the children of South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique.
Changing This Country. 1988. 58 min. Video. SAMC. Describes how South African labor unions organized to combat exploitation and became the most powerful internal opposition force against apartheid.
Children of Apartheid. 1987. 50 min. Video. AFSC, SAMC. This documentary, narrated by Walter Cronkite, explores the contrasts between and divisions among white and nonwhite youth in South Africa.
Classified People. 1987. 55 min. Video. AFSC. Explains how racial classification in South Africa affected many aspects of how people lived and interacted.

Cry of Reason: An Afrikaner Speaks Out. 1987. 58 min. Video. AFSC, SAMC. Describes the extraordinary transformation of a clergyman who, after living and preaching among South Africa's pro-apartheid wealthy elite, left his affluent congregation to join the anti-apartheid movement and establish a new nonracial ministry.

The Deadline. 1996. 52 min. FRIF. Development of the 1996 constitution of South Africa.

Good Guys, Bad Guys. 1998. 46 min. CNN Cold War Series, Episode 17. Truman Library. Cold War conflict in the Third World, including Angola, and South African and Cuban military involvement there.

Land Affairs. 1995. 26 min. FRIF. Indigenous South Africans demand return of land owned by whites.

The Long Walk of Nelson Mandela. 120 min. PBS. Life of the legendary anti-apartheid leader and first president of postapartheid South Africa.

Maids and Madames. 1986. 52 min. Video. AFSC, Filmmakers. Describes the relationships between white women and the more than one million indigenous African women who work for them as domestic servants, typically forced to leave the raising of their own children to others while caring for their employers' offspring.

Mandela: Free at Last. 1990. 79 min. Video. AFSC. Mandela's life and struggle in the context of apartheid and the poverty and hardships of the large majority of South Africans.

Mandela's Fight for Freedom. 1995. 150 min. DCTV.

Mandela: Son of Africa, Father of a Nation. 1997. 118 min. Indie or Amazon.com.

Nelson Mandela: Journey to Freedom. 50 min. AETV.

Regopstaan's Dream. 2000. 52 min. FRIF. Indigenous people struggle to regain their lands.

Rights and Wrongs: South Africa. 1994. 26 min. Video. AFSC. Mandela's election and continuing social conflicts.

Samora Machel, Son of Africa. 1989. 28 min. FRIF. Interview with Samora Machel, leader of the Mozambique Revolution.

Spear of the Nation: History of the African National Congress. 1986. 50 min. Video. SAMC. Documentary of the development of the ANC and its changing and varied means of opposing apartheid.

White Laager. 1978. 58 min. DVD. AFSC. Documentary on the white settlement of South Africa, the development of Afrikaner nationalism, and the establishment of the apartheid system.

World Revolutions for Students: The South African Anti-Apartheid Movement. 2005. 23 min. LVC.