

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

RECENTLY, the president of the United States asked the president of Brazil, "Do you have blacks, too?"¹ Unbeknownst to President Bush and many other North Americans, that South American country currently has more than three times as many inhabitants of at least partial African origin as the United States. Both the United States and Brazil were colonized by a European power that dominated militarily weaker indigenous populations and eventually instituted systems of slavery that relied on Africans. In the Brazilian case, European colonists and their descendants enslaved and imported seven times as many Africans as their North American counterparts. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both countries also received millions of immigrants from Europe as they sought to industrialize. Since then, the light-skinned descendants in the United States and Brazil have come to dominate their darker-skinned compatriots through discriminatory practices that derive from a racial ideology, creating what sociologists call racially stratified societies. Both societies have experimented with affirmative-action policies to promote blacks and members of other disadvantaged groups, beginning in the 1960s in the United States and only recently in Brazil. However, the major similarities between these two large multiracial countries regarding race may end there. For one, the vast majority of persons in the United States with any African origin are categorized as black. In Brazil, large numbers of persons who are classified and identify themselves as white (*branco*) have African ancestors, not to mention the brown (*pardo*, *moreno*), mixed race (*mestiço*, *mulato*), and black (*preto*, *negro*) populations. Unlike in the United States, race in Brazil refers mostly to skin color or physical appearance rather than to ancestry. This difference, and many others regarding race matters, between the two countries derives from two distinct ideologies and systems of modern-day race relations. Although both racial systems are rooted in the ideology of white supremacy, their respective racial ideologies and patterns of race relations evolved in radically different ways as they responded to distinct historical, political, and cultural forces.

W.E.B. Du Bois arguably set the stage for the study of race relations in the first decade of the twentieth century when he declared the color line

one drop

captures the extent to which

as the problem of the century. However, that assertion was clearly based on the bifurcated U.S. model, where blacks and whites were understood to be clearly separate groups. Had Du Bois witnessed the Brazilian case, he may have perceived that racism and discrimination were important social problems there, but he is unlikely to have identified the color line as the central problem. Also, Du Bois noted that blacks were exceptionally excluded from North American democracy; but for most of the twentieth century, there was no democracy in Brazil. Most of the population, including many whites, was excluded from access to even basic rights and subject to authoritarian domination.

Since Du Bois, the relation of blacks and whites in the United States has continued to serve as the paradigmatic case for the sociological understanding of race. Theories derived from the U.S. case are often then illegitimately applied to interpret other cases. In particular, mechanisms affecting race relations in the United States are often assumed to exist in other places like Brazil. But that is clearly not the case, as I will demonstrate in this book. Race is an important organizing principle in both Brazil and the United States but in very different ways. In the interest of building a universal sociology of race relations, I hope that this study will encourage a reexamination of sociologists' common conceptions of race relations, which too easily get translated into general knowledge despite their narrow empirical base.

In the last several decades, race relations have become a central area of sociological study which has uncovered a considerable body of evidence for understanding them. However, comparable evidence for Brazil continues to be relatively weak, largely because the small Brazilian social-science community considered the subject unimportant for that country. While a history of blatant and legal racism has undoubtedly contributed to making race an important area of study in the United States, racism in Brazil has generally been more subtle, and legal racial segregation has not existed since slavery. Indeed, the dominant assumption from Du Bois' time until recent years has been that race does not really matter in Brazil.

Such differences and similarities about race in the two countries have become common knowledge, but analysts are less certain of how other features of the two race systems compare. For example, analysts often note the existence of racial inequalities in Brazil as in the United States, but these are too easily explained as simply a product of racist practices that exist despite the absence of formal segregation. On the surface, that may be true, but there is much more to it than that. While it is becoming increasingly clear that racism is a universal phenomenon, it is less accepted that its manifestations may vary widely. Are the nature and levels of racial inequalities the same? Surely, history, politics, class structure,

culture, and ideology are very distinct between the Brazil and the United States. Should these not have also affected the development of a distinct system of race relations?

Most notably, racial ideologies between the two countries contrast sharply. How did such distinct ideologies come about? Do they affect the social manifestations of race relations or merely their interpretations? A special problem in comparisons of race in Brazil and the United States has been the disentangling of ideology from social analysis. To what extent is research on race simply a reflection of the ideology? Do ideologies not have elements of truth? How much do they distort reality? Ideology also affects interpretations of sociological analysis. In other words, how do analysts present comparisons in ways that are compelling and make sense to both Brazilian and North American readers?

North American sociology has developed evidence-based theories for explaining the persistence of racism and racial inequality despite the end of formal segregation. For example, a key sociological text argues that racial residential segregation, which continues today in practice despite civil-rights reforms, forms the major basis for contemporary black disadvantage and other dimensions of race relations in the United States.² It posits that the physical and social distance between blacks and whites, along with the strong social norms that maintain that distance, accounts for high levels of racial inequality. Conversely, it hypothesizes that without extreme segregation, racial discrimination and inequality will subside. Segregation is thus thought to be the linchpin of U.S. racial domination.³ The same may not be true for Brazil, at least if we are to believe its racial ideology. According to that ideology and to most of the research on the subject, residential segregation in Brazil is believed to be simply class based, and race is simply not an independent factor.

RACE MIXTURE AND EXCLUSION

Segregation between blacks and whites is a well-known fact in the United States. Segregation was long formalized through the legal and policy apparatus, and as many scholars have pointed out, urban residential segregation continues to demarcate rigid boundaries between blacks and whites. At least prior to the civil-rights reforms, segregation was the dominant ideology behind race relations. Whites dealt with blacks largely by maintaining considerable social distance from them, whether through avoidance in residence, marriage, friendships, or elsewhere. Just as importantly, the practice and ideology of racial segregation came to be known in Latin America as a defining feature of North American culture.

Social mobility
...captures the extent to which the

Latin Americans—especially Brazilians—thought that their culture made them morally superior, at least regarding issues of race.

Rather than segregation, race mixture or miscegenation (in Portuguese, *mestiçagem* or *miscegenação*) forms the foundational concept of Brazilian racial ideology. Race mixture represents a set of beliefs that Brazilians hold about race, including the belief that Brazilians have long mixed across racial lines, more so than in any other society, and that nonwhites are included in the Brazilian nation. Miscegenation has long been a defining metaphor of the Brazilian nation, although it initially provoked anxiety and fear among the elite, as in the United States. Although race mixture may not necessarily reflect the reality of Brazilian social behavior, the concept has been fundamental for understanding Brazil's race relations, on Brazilian terms. As Da Matta (1991) claims, understanding Brazil requires U.S. or other non-Brazilian readers to dismiss notions that Western societies are generally guided by ideas of purity. For him, Brazilians celebrate ambiguity, whereas North Americans seek to define clearly. In this sense, miscegenation represents the former and segregation the latter.

Like Brazil, many other Latin American countries hold dearly to their ideologies of *mestizaje*, the Spanish equivalent of race mixture. Those nations have melded racial differences into a single homogenous entity, creating an improved hybrid race of Mexicans, Dominicans, Venezuelans, and so on. However, accounts of Latin American race mixture tend to be romanticized versions that often became widely accepted as state-sanctioned visions of nationality or peoplehood in Latin America. Latin American elites have long prescribed their form of *mestizaje* as the formula for a positive system of human relations, free of the racial cleavages found in North American society. Even well-known Latin American scholars have been known to proclaim the virtues of presumed miscegenation in the region. In the United States, Latino scholars have also prided themselves on their racial *mestizaje*, as if their own histories provide a positive example for U.S. race relations. However, these supporters of *mestizaje* often fail to note that throughout Latin America it was built on white supremacist ideologies and has been unable to prevent the racial injustices that are increasingly uncovered throughout Latin America. Today, many sociologists have come to a consensus that race mixture represents little more than metaphor.

Brazilian academics and journalists have increasingly used the term "exclusion" to refer to the status of blacks and poor persons in their society. Exclusion is a well-known term in Latin America, with origins in Europe where it is also widely used. Exclusion, or social exclusion, refers to the "lack of social integration which is manifested in rules constraining the access of particular groups or persons to resources or limiting their access to citizenship rights."⁴ Social exclusion is thought to be par-

ticularly appropriate for describing Brazilian society because one-third of all Brazilians live in poverty, and most are not white. ✓

The exclusion of blacks has thus become an important counterideology to the positive interpretation given to race mixture. Like Brazil's black social movement, which has long promoted the counterideology, a new generation of scholars largely holds that racism is pervasive throughout Brazilian society. Like the race-mixture ideology, that counterideology is dangerous to social analysis because it may also blind analysts to reality. Some have wholly accepted the counterideology and go as far as to say that segregation is similar to that in the United States in practice, despite the lack of any postslavery history of its formal manifestation. However, rejecting the ideology hypothesis does not require us to accept the counterideology. Accepting ideology or counterideology is especially tempting where the evidence about race relations is weak.

Like ideologies and counterideologies generally, racial ideologies often reduce our understanding of race relations to simple unidimensional assumptions. According to ideology, at least, exclusion is the antithesis of miscegenation. Rather, miscegenation in Brazil connotes racial inclusion, not exclusion. Latin American concepts of race mixture hold that blacks, Indians, and whites socialize, reside together, and biologically mix to the point that racial distinctions become unimportant. But is there any truth to this? If so, how can there be both exclusion and miscegenation? Exclusion and inclusion refer to extreme points on a continuum of bad versus good societies; in the case of race, bad versus good race relations. But it is common to hear Brazilians speak of their country as being the world's most miscegenated country and the world's most unequal country, in the same breath. Does that imply that there has been so much mixture that only class is important, whereas race no longer makes a difference? Or does it mean that Brazilian society is racist and stratifies by race, and miscegenation is merely ideological or characteristic of an earlier historical period? What about those white Brazilians who claim to find blacks and mulattos in their family albums? How common is this? Are such ancestors merely historical remnants? Or are such findings overstated to project a culturally desirable pedigree of miscegenation?

Contemporary analysts of Brazilian race relations seem to have discarded the possibility that race mixture and racial exclusion can coexist. If white Brazilians are so racist, then why would they mix with nonwhites? Scholars argue that racial inequality and racism are so ubiquitous that they pervade all dimensions of Brazilian life. Miscegenation, some argue, occurred only among social unequals during slavery, and today occurs only for the sexual pleasure of whites but not in serious relationships. But what of all that common wisdom that miscegenation is widespread? Does it have no basis in fact? What of the earlier academic literature

Social mobility captures the extent to which race relations are changing.

based on careful fieldwork which argued that Brazilian society was clearly more inclusive than the United States? Were those scholars completely wrong? Or did any inclusiveness that existed then disappear? Why would they make such an argument? Is there any evidence to support the existence of social inclusion for nonwhites anywhere, or were those scholars merely overtaken by the powerful ideologies of race mixture?

Today's social analysts have arrived at surprisingly distinct conclusions about Brazilian race relations compared to those of an earlier generation. Current scholars emphasize exclusion; past scholars emphasized race mixture. These two generations of scholars accepted either racial exclusion or inclusion as truth while ignoring or discrediting the other. Rather than considering the possibility that both racial inclusion and exclusion may coexist, the current generation of scholars has treated that possibility as the confusion of reality with popular beliefs. Those who have argued that Brazilian society is more racially inclusive and characterized by race mixture or hybridity, have also theorized that racial inequalities and discrimination are leftover from slavery but are transitory. On the other hand, the current consensus defends the exclusivity argument and asserts that racial inclusivity, or miscegenation, is merely a popular belief that is not supported by reality.

The evidence used by the current generation is based largely on official statistics that have demonstrated high levels of racial inequality. Furthermore, these academics have marshaled plenty of evidence of discrimination to support their view. But have current scholars examined race relations widely enough and asked all the right questions? Has all the proper evidence been brought to bear? For an ideology of inclusion to be so pervasively accepted for so many years would seem to require some evidence, however limited, of its existence. What is it about the Brazilian system that supported arguments about racial inclusivity? And if there is any support for them, how can inclusiveness coexist with exclusiveness? For me, this remains the enigma of Brazilian race relations.

TWO GENERATIONS OF RACE-RELATIONS RESEARCH

A common categorization in the history of thought about Brazilian race relations maintains that there have been three main stages of thinking about Brazilian race relations. Roughly speaking, these three respective currents claimed that (1) there is little or no racial discrimination but rather great fluidity among races; (2) racial discrimination is widespread but transitory; and (3) racial discrimination is persistent and structural.⁵

While most authors are easily categorized into one of these three schools of thought, others present a mixture of these ideas or have changed their views over the course of their careers. Also, the chronological order of important contributions is not always linear but often the outcome of multiple academic debates, partially determined by the nationality of the scholars. For the purposes of this book, I generally accept this division but collapse the latter two stages into one. Thus, I characterize scholarly perspectives on Brazilian race relations as comprising two generations. The first defended racial democracy, in which Brazil is uniquely inclusive of blacks; the second challenged racial democracy, arguing that Brazil is characterized by racial exclusion. According to the first school of thought, there is little or no racism in Brazil; for the second, racism is pervasive.

The idea of miscegenation as a positive aspect of Brazilian race relations was fully developed by Gilberto Freyre in the 1930s, and some form of this perspective was defended by North American Brazilianists, including Donald Pierson, Marvin Harris, Charles Wagley, and Carl Degler, until the 1960s, and in the case of Degler, as late as 1972. Freyre and his followers believed that any existing racial inequality was an artifact both of the enslavement of blacks and their adherence to traditional cultural values, but they predicted that it would soon disappear. For them, racial differences were fluid and conditioned by class, and racial discrimination was mild and largely irrelevant. Specifically, Harris (1952) and Wagley (1952) concluded that class, rather than racial, discrimination underlies Brazil's hierarchical social relations, even though racial prejudices and stereotypes were often voiced. In general, these scholars agreed with Freyre that "being" Brazilian implied a metaracial character, which muddled racial distinctions through extensive miscegenation.

This view would be radically challenged in the late 1950s, when Brazilian sociologists, led by Florestan Fernandes, would conclude that racial democracy was a myth. Funded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to document, understand, and disseminate Brazil's presumed secret of racial harmony in a world then marked by the horrors of racism and genocide, Fernandes would surprise his sponsors by sharply disagreeing with Freyre and his North American counterparts on the UNESCO project. Fernandes concluded that racism was widespread in Brazilian society, although he blamed slavery and its social and psychological effects on blacks themselves for their inability to compete with whites in the newly industrializing labor market. Moreover, he believed that even though racial prejudice and discrimination were functional to slave society, they were incompatible with the competitive order established by a capitalist class society. As a result, he predicted racism would disappear with capitalist development, although

whites would seek to maintain their privileged positions for as long as possible.

I attribute most of the disagreement between the two generations of race-relations scholars to their separate research emphases. The first generation focused on sociability and social relations, mostly among class equals, while the second generation emphasized inequality and discrimination. I refer to these two dimensions as vertical and horizontal social relations, respectively. The North American scholars in particular tended to follow Gilberto Freyre's emphasis on horizontal relations. Many of these scholars, including Wagley and Harris, were anthropologists, but they also included sociologists like Donald Pierson (1942). For Pierson, a student of the emerging Chicago school of sociology, segregation and intermarriage were believed to be appropriate indicators of adaptability or integration of minority groups in society. This was the dominant tradition in North American sociology. They assumed that integration would lead to eventual assimilation, where the dominant and previously subordinate racial groups would become similar and racial differences would disappear. Researchers of this school found horizontal relations to be harmonious and integrative compared to the United States, thus predicting an optimistic future for the descendants of Brazilian slaves. These scholars found any racial hierarchy, conflict, or exploitation in Brazil to be unproblematic or transitory.

By contrast, Fernandes and his Brazilian UNESCO contemporaries focused mostly on the vertical relations of racial inequality. To the limited extent that Fernandes and his followers mention horizontal relations in their work, they emphasized the distance between whites and blacks. The subjects of miscegenation and the mulatto, which were of major interest in the earlier literature, are generally ignored by Fernandes. Guimarães (1999) claims that, like other *Paulistas* (residents of São Paulo state), Fernandes never saw miscegenation as a value but rather was motivated by social equity and development concerns. Southern Brazilians held the notion that true Brazilians were mostly white and valued being part of a European, rather than a *mestizo*, nation. As the primary destination of mass European immigration, São Paulo had become an ethnic mosaic and blacks were a stigmatized minority. Moreover, a disdain for miscegenation and for mixed racial categories may have come from Fernandes's close association with the black movement. Like Abdias do Nascimento, a black activist writer, Fernandes associated miscegenation with a whitening campaign to eliminate blacks from the Brazilian population. Thus, Fernandes not only ignored any practice of miscegenation, but he rejected it as simply an ideology for legitimizing racial discrimination.

Carl Degler's explicit comparison of race relations in Brazil and the United States was especially influential in the latter. As the winner of a

Pulitzer Prize, Degler's work influenced North American understandings of race in Brazil more than any other source. Writing in 1972, during the more optimistic days of the U.S. civil-rights movement, Carl Degler (1986) mixed first- and second-generation interpretations in his book. Although Freyre and his followers were already in disrepute, Degler, a self-described follower of Harris, concluded that race made little difference for mulattos but generally agreed with Fernandes that the smaller number of Brazilian blacks suffered the burdens of racism. Thus, Degler claimed that the primary difference regarding race relations between the two countries was the existence of a "mulatto escape hatch" in Brazil, which allowed mulattos to overcome racial disadvantage by avoiding classification as black but also weakened the possibility of black solidarity.

After a fifteen-year hiatus in Brazilian race research due to repression by the military government, the study of race resurfaced with the completion of Carlos Hasenbalg's 1978 Ph.D. dissertation at the University of California, Berkeley. Unlike Fernandes but like the thinking emerging within Berkeley's department of sociology, Hasenbalg concluded that racism was compatible, not incompatible, with the development of Brazilian capitalism. Hasenbalg believed that racial domination and the subordinate status of blacks would persist because racism had acquired new meanings since abolition and would continue to serve the material and symbolic interests of dominant whites through the disqualification of nonwhites as competitors. By relying extensively on government statistical data, Hasenbalg and Nelson do Valle Silva produced a series of studies about racial inequality in income, education, occupation, and infant mortality throughout the 1980s. With their studies, there remained little academic doubt about the existence of racial inequality and discrimination in Brazil. Interestingly, Silva also produced several statistical studies on intermarriage and racial classification. Some of Silva's findings seemed to support the first generation's findings, but he downplayed any such support as his body of work was neither comparative nor integrated into their general theoretical conclusions. Rather, Hasenbalg and Silva's work is remembered for greatly strengthening the dominance of the second-generation perspective.⁶ Unfortunately for North Americans, little of this second generation of work would become available in English, and thus Degler's 1972 book would continue to be the standard reference in the United States for nonspecialists in their understanding of race in Brazil.

In sum, the stages of Brazilian racial ideas were not discrete but overlapping, with elements of previous stages sustained in subsequent stages. Racial democracy had been seriously challenged beginning in the 1950s by São Paulo academics, while some form of the racial-democracy concept continued to be defended by U.S. academia well into the 1970s.

Popular and elite support for the idea of racial democracy ended in the 1990s. Although some of its elements continue to survive in current discourse and indeed are held by some members of society. Much of the old popular discourses become grafted into the new. Surely, many of these discontinuities can be explained by differences in academic contexts, ideology, and political interests in maintaining or challenging the racial-democracy discourse. Differences between U.S. and Brazilian scholarship could also be explained by distinct conceptions of what constitutes racism and discrimination in the two countries. Additionally, a significant language barrier and limited translation prevented satisfactory mutual appreciation and awareness of a growing literature by academics in both countries.

BRAZIL ON THE AGENDA OF AN INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY OF RACE

This issue of race in Brazil has recently gained a prominent place in the work of internationally eminent sociologists Herbert Gans and Pierre Bourdieu. Interestingly, their respective interpretations of Brazil are nearly contradictory. While this may largely be due to their misunderstanding about a reasonable range of the literature, it is also unfortunately due to the literature itself, in which serious analysts of Brazil have reached opposite conclusions. Despite very limited comparative evidence, Gans (1999) confidently argues that sociological outcomes between the United States and Brazil are similar:

Brazil has not passed civil rights legislation; racial stratification, discrimination and segregation have persisted but only through the class system; a high rate of illiteracy has enabled whites to virtually monopolize the higher class; intermarriage has taken place mainly among blacks and black-white "biracials"; "biracials" gain little socioeconomic advantage from their lighter skins; and the darkest-skinned blacks are forced into slums and prisons as in the United States. (377)

On the other hand, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and his U.S.-based colleague Loïc Wacquant (1999) argue that, unfortunately, analysts have merely transposed U.S. conceptions of race onto Brazil, despite the empirical realities:

Carried out by Americans and Latin Americans trained in the USA, most of the recent research on racial inequality in Brazil strives to prove that, contrary to the image that Brazilians have of their own nation, the country of the "three sad races" . . . is no less racist than others. (44)

They go on to discredit an influential book by a North American scholar for misunderstanding Brazilian race relations and blame U.S. foundations for exporting the U.S. model.

Although Gans and Bourdieu reach distinct conclusions, both are guided by the question of whether Brazilian race relations are better or worse than black-white relations in the United States. While they both agree that U.S. black-white relations are deplorable, Gans believes that things are no better in Brazil, while Bourdieu and Wacquant strongly imply that Brazil is less racist. Their contrasting results do not derive from a careful or systematic understanding of the Brazilian racial system. Indeed, there seems to be little familiarity with Brazil, as far as I can tell. What seems clear is that both sets of authors, in the absence of a clear understanding, project their own alternately pessimistic or optimistic image of Brazil onto their sociological analysis. Unfortunately, the literature on race relations in Brazil allows them to have their choice.

Although we might expect more from such notable sociologists, perhaps one cannot blame Gans and Bourdieu for errors of fact because neither is a student of Brazilian society. One might wonder why they took a stab at trying to interpret race in Brazil. Apparently, they both recognized that Brazil was an important case for understanding race. For whatever reason, it is interesting that these authors based their poorly founded conclusions on particular stages in the debate on Brazilian race relations. Judging from their citations, Bourdieu and Wacquant rely on the early generation of scholarly work that largely defended racial democracy. They use this work as their gold standard from which to judge all subsequent literature. Gans, by contrast, bases his observations on more recent work that reduces racial democracy to being merely ideology or myth and claims that racism is widespread in Brazil. Thus, Bourdieu and Wacquant apparently find the first stage of research more compelling and choose to use it to discredit the second stage, misreading (or failing to read) key texts and imputing false conclusions.⁷ By contrast, Gans selectively uses the second stage of research while ignoring the first stage.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED ANALYSIS OF BRAZILIAN RACE RELATIONS

My goal in this book is to reexamine the arguments presented by both generations of scholars. To this end, I examine a wider range of interracial relations and behaviors in Brazil in comparative and historical context. I thus attempt to provide a more integrated and wide-ranging account of Brazilian race relations than has been presented in the past and try to flesh out the contradicting interpretations of two generations

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of scholars. By taking advantage of Brazil's excellent data on race and a host of socioeconomic measures, I employ a set of well-developed social science methodologies and indicators of interracial behaviors to examine a broad range of race-relations issues. Unlike my predecessors, I approach these issues by acknowledging the possibility that some form of both inclusion and exclusion, however limited, may exist.

The idea of racial exclusion reflects a consensus position in the contemporary analysis of race relations in Brazil. That consensus holds that Brazilian race relations are not much different in practice than in the United States and South Africa, even during formal segregation or apartheid. Based on the limited available evidence, I find this hard to believe. My interest in this book is thus to describe race relations at various levels by making systematic international comparisons, particularly on those dimensions that are measurable and address key sociological issues regarding the importance of race and the salience of racial boundaries. Although the terms "miscegenation" and "exclusion" may be well understood as common sense in the Brazilian context, they are often vague notions that are therefore of limited analytical value. On the other hand, they capture the central tensions in Brazilian race thinking that I seek to confront in this book.

Analytically, I find that the concept of exclusion is inadequate because it expresses a dichotomy in which persons or categories of people are either entirely in or out. Such a perspective would seem to preclude the possibility of inclusion coexisting with any exclusion. I do not believe race relations are necessarily unidimensional in this sense. Also, the reference for the term "exclusion" is unclear: included or excluded from what? Similar terms such as "marginalization" or "informalization" are problematic for similar reasons. Although they have the advantage of linking poverty and inequality to the social processes of development, I prefer the more neutral concept of "vertical relations" to capture the dimension of economic exclusion. Miscegenation suggests little or no social distance among persons of different color, although it connotes a different understanding outside of the Latin American context. Similarly, segregation is used analytically in U.S. sociology to refer to great social distance, but for Latin Americans it also connotes an abhorrent and explicit system of racial division and separation. Therefore, I use the more neutral concept of "horizontal race relations" to refer to miscegenation, or more precisely, levels of sociability, which can then be used to analyze cross-national differences.

Vertical race relations are often viewed as cause or consequence of the nature of horizontal relationships. Many U.S.-based sociological theories assume that as long as social distance remains high, particularly in intermarriage and residential segregation, prejudice and discrimination will

persist.⁸ However, the extent and nature of discrimination at each of these levels, while not fully independent of the other indicators, may have separate logics. One cannot, for example, assume that discrimination at one level implies equal discrimination at all levels. Even if this is the case for black-white relations in the United States, it is not necessarily the case for other instances of race relations, in the United States or elsewhere. While racial injustices of any kind on any dimension are morally wrong, it is insufficient to say that Brazilian society is racist; that kind of thinking might make for good activism at some level, but it makes for poor sociology at any level. The intensity and manifestations of racism and the interrelationships between different dimensions need to be understood in order to accurately understand Brazilian reality.

I believe we can better understand the Brazilian system by separating out horizontal and vertical dimensions of race relations. This strategy permits locating and distinguishing those points in which Brazilian race relations may be more or less exclusive than previously believed or in comparison to the United States. This distinction allows us a reexamination of hypotheses about horizontal relations by the early generation of research with current data and more sophisticated methodologies. We can also use more current empirical study and theory to inform our analysis of vertical relations. To present a fair and accurate depiction of race relations requires strong, empirically based indicators that can address race relations on both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. The intensity of racism at both these levels can be further understood when we compare Brazil's indicators on both dimensions to those of a society that stands out for its troubled race relations and for being the dominant model for the study of race.

COMPARISONS TO THE UNITED STATES

In addition to trying to make sense of the internal logic of the Brazilian race system, another main reason for writing this book is to compare Brazil with the United States (and, to a lesser extent, South Africa). As the articles by Gans (1999) and Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) reveal, systematic comparisons of race in Brazil and the United States are seriously in need. In these countries, race has been important throughout the past five centuries or more, from the time Europeans first set foot on American (or African) soil. At the very least, the important case of Brazil needs to be understood to develop a global theory of race relations. Brazil and the United States are the two largest countries in the Western Hemisphere, both in terms of total population and African-origin population. Brazilians claiming to be black or mixed race number about 80

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million, constituting nearly half of Brazil's 173 million people. A large percentage of whites in Brazil also have African ancestors, raising the number of African-origin persons to perhaps over 100 million. This compares to about 30 million blacks in the United States, or about 12 percent of a total population of approximately 270 million.⁹

Comparisons to the United States have often served as a backdrop for understanding Brazilian race relations, as the work of many North Americans and Brazilians alike reveals. Historians of slavery have long sought to explain differences between the United States and Brazil since Freyre (1933) and Tannenbaum (1947). Explicit and implicit comparisons to the United States are prevalent throughout the literature on Brazilian race relations, probably due to the former's economic, political, and cultural hegemony. Also, many analysts of Brazilian race relations have been North Americans (e.g., Donald Pierson, Charles Wagley, Marvin Harris, Carl Degler, George Reid Andrews, and Michael Hanchard) or Brazilians that studied in the United States (e.g., Gilberto Freyre, Nelson do Valle Silva, and Antonio Sergio Guimarães).¹⁰

The Brazil-U.S. comparison in this book relies mostly on quantitative indicators, which have been used in abundance to understand U.S. race relations. Despite strong ethnographic and historical evidence, comparisons of Brazil and the United States using quantitative indicators are rare. Also, the substantive reach of both qualitative and quantitative research has been confined to mere parts of the entire racial system. Anecdotal evidence has often been used to fill in gaps where strong evidence is lacking, leading to many misconceptions and myths in the comparisons. Carl Degler's *Neither Black Nor White* is a good example. Although it may provide the best comparative account even thirty years after its publication, it was unfortunately sustained on weak and often anecdotal data, not to mention that it is now greatly outdated, as race relations have changed markedly in both countries.¹¹

I believe statistical indicators can be used for the study of race in any society, provided data are available and interpreted in the context of the particular case. They convey condensed information on various dimensions of race relations and, in this case, permit U.S. and Brazil comparisons with a greater degree of confidence than was previously possible. I expect that these indicators will help to either validate or invalidate previously held assumptions. While many of the findings based on such indicators may seem obvious, others may challenge strongly held truths or bring light to our sociological uncertainties.

On the subject of comparative indicators, a careful consideration of the issue of racial classification is fundamental. The ambiguity of Brazilian race data has led to some questioning of its reliability for capturing

"real" racial differences. However, previous research that relies on large data sets has used them uncritically. In contrast, I question the reliability of race data in a context where race is thought to be ambiguous and subject to social factors. Where reliability is most questionable and where data permit, I examine race relations outcomes using two recent data sets that classify race according to both interviewer- and self-classification. Although inequality between whites and nonwhites may be so great that ambiguity is unlikely to account for the racial gap, brown-black differences may be less so and thus require more careful examination. Because racial classification cannot be taken for granted in Brazil, I dedicate an entire chapter to this issue and emphasize matters of classification where appropriate in subsequent chapters.

Ultimately, I seek to reexamine the adequacy of race-relations theories. To what extent can sociological theories account for race relations in Brazil? How can an understanding of the Brazilian case help to build better race-relations theories? What does the U.S.-Brazil comparison say about the construction, maintenance, and manifestations of racial boundaries in contemporary society? To what extent, where, and why do societies as different as Brazil and the United States set racial boundaries?

As the focus of this book is clearly the Brazilian case, my comparisons to the United States are not systematic, but instead are brought in at key moments to highlight contrasts between the two countries. Due to the fact that the U.S. literature on race is large, often hotly contested, and enters into many debates, I decided to limit the interpretation of that case to dimensions where fairly objective indicators can be found and to those areas in which there is considerable consensus. I hope that the comparisons in this study using basic sociological indicators for both the United States and Brazil will overcome misinformation and stereotypes of race relations in the United States for Brazilian readers, just as I hope it will overcome the same assumptions about Brazil for North American readers.

The dynamics of race relations in the United States are far from universal and, in many ways, they may be an exception to the more common cases of racism without racist laws. Rarely have states enforced segregation laws as strict as those in the United States (and South Africa), although many more societies—including about twenty Latin American countries, including Brazil—have had little or no formal segregation, while racializing large segments of their populations. On the other hand, for readers whose principal interest is in the U.S. case, Brazil may provide some valuable lessons about the newest phase of U.S. race relations, which has been referred to as *laissez-faire racism*, *postracism*, or *discrimination with a smile* for its absence of legal racism and general acceptance of antiracism.

BRAZIL'S NEW ERA OF RACIAL POLICY

A final reason for reexamining Brazilian race relations is to discuss them in the context of the sudden and dramatic changes in Brazilian race thinking. This new phase is reflected mostly in the new acknowledgment of racism and government attempts to redress it. The issue of race in Brazil has moved to the center of the social-policy agenda. As a result, public interest in race has skyrocketed. For the first time in Brazilian history, social policies have begun to explicitly promote social integration of blacks and mulattos. Such policies do not merely seek to eliminate or alleviate material poverty but also strive to eliminate or reduce class, racial, gender, and other discriminations that bar citizens from access to social justice. This includes both universal policies that encompass the entire population or the poor population, as well as particularistic policies that combat discrimination and promote categories of people that have been excluded on the basis of particular characteristics, including race. The designs of these policies vary widely, but together they seek to address a broad range of social exclusions that are manifested economically, psychologically, politically, and culturally. This change is a milestone in Brazilian racial thought, much like Brazil's earlier ideological transition from white supremacy to racial democracy.

✓ Indeed, the idea of affirmative action or policies specifically designed for blacks and mulattos sounds quite odd and out of place in the Brazilian context. In fact, the whole idea sounded preposterous and highly unlikely just a few years ago. Brazil had been one of the first multiracial states to go beyond race, but it had become apparent that its racial democracy continued to privilege whites at the expense of nonwhites, just as it did during most of its history of white supremacy. Now that these policies are actually being implemented, Brazilian policymakers are accused of imposing U.S. policies. Why would Brazil want such policies? Opponents claim that the Brazilian context is different from the United States and such policies would be of limited effectiveness. But does Brazil have an alternative to U.S.-style race-conscious policies? As the Brazilian state begins to use race explicitly to promote blacks for the first time in its history, what consequences can be expected?

These recent changes have engendered a backlash of scholarly thinking on race in Brazil. Although largely schematic and anecdotal, it has had much influence on the policy debate, mostly because it has been advocated by several well-known senior Brazilian scholars. They argue that rather than dismiss racial democracy as mere myth, it should be used to fight against racism. Myths are not mere falsities to be discovered and discarded but rather represent a popular way of thinking, which makes

Brazil unique or at least different from the United States. Prompted by the federal government's plans to implement affirmative action, they believe that the belief in racial democracy provides an ideal of racial egalitarianism, which will help Brazilians to overcome racism. Furthermore, they argue that U.S.-style affirmative action will produce negative consequences for Brazilian society, making its race relations more like those of the United States.

Finally, although recent decisions to implement affirmative action may represent the most explicit intervention ever by the Brazilian state on issues of race, I also seek to show how the Brazilian state has been very actively involved in shaping race relations throughout its history. This has included the explicit importation of European immigrants to whiten its population as well as the promotion of racial democracy through a series of actions by elites, including representatives of the Brazilian government.

ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS

In my quest to present an integrated and comparative analysis of Brazil as well as to provide a historical context and an analysis of policy, I organize the book into ten chapters. Chapters 2 and 3 provide a history of politics and ideology, which serves as background for understanding race in Brazil, followed by five chapters on contemporary race relations. Chapter 4 examines the complex system of Brazilian racial classification. Then I explore vertical relations, specifically, racial inequality in chapter 5 and discrimination in chapter 6. These chapters are followed by analyses of horizontal race relations of intermarriage in chapter 7 and residential segregation, a less intimate indicator of interracial sociability, in chapter 8. I then summarize the main points of the previous chapters and draw out the theoretical implications in chapter 9. Finally, I examine the implications of the Brazilian system for designing social policy in chapter 10.

DATA

The Brazilian censuses, annual national household surveys, and two attitudinal surveys provide a treasure trove of data on race, enabling me to map out the form and nature of race relations across large sectors of the population. These largely unexplored data are based on random sampling techniques, so that all sectors of Brazilian society are represented in their rightful proportions. The importance of such data cannot be underestimated. Unlike the majority of Latin American countries, Brazil has

Key Points & Findings:
Social Mobility
captures the extent to which national populations...

collected race data in a majority of its censuses and has been able to document racial inequalities. Most Latin American countries do not collect population information about race. As a result, they can more easily deny racial inequality, given the inability to prove its existence. Brazil sought to do the same in the 1970s, when it did not collect data on race. However, the proof of racial injustice in Brazil since then has come largely through such government data.

Data for chapters 4 through 8 rely mostly on the analysis of survey and census data, primarily supplied by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). These include the 1960, 1980, and 1991 censuses, as well as the national household surveys, Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), from 1976, 1981, 1986, 1996, and 1999. Particular chapters rely more on one or another data set, depending on the substantive appropriateness and availability of the data. All of these sources inform the time-series charts in chapter 5, which span the period of 1960–1999. Where possible, I use either the 1991 census or the 1996 or 1999 PNAD to represent a fairly current depiction of the situation. I use the 1991 census when I need a large number of cases for analysis. Unfortunately, microlevel data for the 2000 census were not yet available at the time of this writing.

Moreover, I examine residential segregation, intermarriage, and the cross-sectional effects of industrialization on inequality, using a special 1980 data set of urban areas, that was specially created by the IBGE. In the case of residential segregation, the IBGE does not make their census data available by census tracts, but they graciously agreed to calculate these indexes for the forty largest urban areas in 1980. At a later point, they calculated intermarriage, inequality, and other indexes for the seventy-three largest urban areas. I worked closely with the IBGE in producing these summary indicators, including examining computer programs to ensure that formulas for computing indicators were correctly applied. District-level maps of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro were created using the 1991 census and the 1990 PNAD, respectively. Finally, I use two independently developed surveys, including a 1995 national survey and a 2000 survey for the state of Rio de Janeiro, in the chapters on racial classification and for occasional references to racial attitudes.

Chapters 3 and 10 focus on the new era of race consciousness and policies designed to revert racism and racial inequalities. They draw largely on information I gathered as the program officer in human rights for the Ford Foundation's Brazil office. There, I was fortunate to witness closely the dramatic changes occurring in Brazilian society, with ready access to influential academics, policy makers, and leaders of the black movement. My perspective of the sudden changes in Brazilian politics of race during the past decade and the black movement is thus largely an insider's view,


which would be difficult to access from traditional sources such as meeting records, official documents, and interviews. The largely demographic analysis of the other chapters has important implications for the ways in which I understand the structural sources and the implications of those changes.

A NOTE ON REGION

Regional differences are fundamental to understanding Brazilian society. In a country with a landmass larger than the continental United States and levels of development that vary from the highly industrialized São Paulo to the very poor Northeast, regional differences need to be considered before generalizing local findings to describe "race relations in Brazil." My own experience of having resided in Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, as well as frequently visiting my wife's family in Rio Grande do Sul on many occasions, is that racial classification is distinct and race relations have a different feel in these different contexts. For one thing, the white proportion of the population in each of those places is roughly 20, 55, 75, and 85 percent, respectively. While the South and Southeast have been described as class societies marked by massive European immigration, industrialization, and early urbanization, the Northeast and North have been characterized by their especially great status differences and a castelike system, inherited from slavery but not transformed by industrialization or immigration. Throughout this book, I either directly examine regional differences or indirectly through its correlates of racial composition or industrialization. For theoretical reasons that I explain later, I tend to examine horizontal relations as they relate to racial composition (e.g., percent white), and for hierarchical relations, their correlation with industrialization.

Economist Edmar Bacha once described Brazil as "Belindia," comprising a small Belgium, reflecting a high level of development, and a large but poor India.¹² Although he meant merely to describe regional differences in development, Bacha's statement could be interpreted as having racial implications as well. This is apparent in map 1.1, which shows the twenty-six Brazilian states coded by percentage of the population that is white and divided by levels of social development. Increasingly lighter shades on the map indicate states with higher proportions of whites. White majorities are found in the seven southernmost states while whites are a numerical minority in the other nineteen states. The bold line separating the large northern part of the country from the smaller southern half represents levels of social development, according to the human development index, as measured by the United Nations. The human

Key Points & Findings:
Social Mobility
... captures the extent to which national populations or nations...



MAP 1.1 Brazil showing human development and percent white by state, 2000

development index measures health and educational development, encompassing levels of literacy, life expectancy and infant mortality. Social development coincides with racial composition in Brazil. All nineteen states north of the bold line have an index of human development that is less than or equal to 0.8, while the seven states below it are relatively highly developed. With the exception of Minas Gerais—in which whites are a bare majority (51.4 percent)—and Espírito Santo—in which whites are a bare minority (47.9 percent)—all majority white states are highly developed, while the majority nonwhite states rank low on human development. Thus, whites are privileged by their location in the South and Southeast, while blacks and browns tend to reside in the less developed regions of Brazil.

The differences between the first and second generations of research were also regional. The classic studies of Brazilian race relations focused almost entirely on the northern half of Brazil, which were too often gen-

eralized to all of Brazil and may have partly accounted for differing conclusions about race in Brazil. For example, the importance given to miscegenation seems to be differentiated by region in the academic interpretation of race in Brazil. In the 1930s, Freyre (1937, 1986) reduced Brazilian society to the patriarchal family of the rural Northeast which he describes as the cradle of Brazilian civilization where miscegenation found its greatest expression. In the 1950s and 1960s, North American researchers of race in Brazil also focused on the northern regions and, like Freyre, noted high rates of racial fluidity there, especially when compared to their native United States. By contrast, their Brazilian contemporaries, such as Florestan Fernandes, focused on the white southern regions and emphasized racial discrimination and inequality, generally neglecting the issue of miscegenation.

A NOTE ON THE CONCEPT OF RACE AND THE USE OF RACIAL TERMS

Because race is a controversial and sensitive topic, I prefer to define the concept early on. As is the consensus in sociology, race is a social construct, with very little or no biological basis. Race exists only because of racist ideologies. In the West, which includes Brazil, nineteenth-century scientific theories established that humans could be divided into distinguishable racial types, which were hierarchically ordered according to an ideology establishing that such characteristics are correlated with a person's intellectual and behavioral traits. Even though such theories are currently discredited by the vast majority of the scientific community, beliefs in the existence of races are embedded in social practices, giving the concept a great influence on social organization. By race relations, I believe that Robert Park's (2000) definition, which he wrote in the 1930s, of "relations that exist between individuals conscious of racial differences" continues to be applicable, even though he denied that race was important in Brazil and would sometimes invoke essentialistic or biological distinctions. This definition avoids the idea of race as based on a group identity that is common in the United States but is often inappropriate for Brazil.

Race is important because people continue to classify and treat others according to societally accepted ideas. The idea of race has had enormous influence in the evolution of modern societies, including Brazil's, and it has had negative consequences for its victims. I can empathize with a concern that the use of the term "race" reifies social distinctions that have no biological value, but race continues to be immensely important in sociological interaction, and therefore sociological analysis must take

learning
Key Points & Findings:
Social Mobility
... captures the extent to which national populations or national...

it into account. As sociologists have long discovered, ideas or beliefs, like those about race, can have powerful real-world consequences. W. I. Thomas's (1922) classic sociological formulation succinctly stated "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

Concepts like race vary in their connotations in different languages, as they evolved out of distinct cultural contexts. For example, color is more commonly used in Brazil, while race is more common in the United States. Choosing race instead of color is understandable in English but clumsy in Portuguese and Spanish. Nevertheless, I find race and color in Brazil to be analytically similar and derived from similar racial ideologies. I thus decide to use the term race, which underlies both concepts. I further describe my thinking on this at the beginning of chapter 4.

The choice of English translations of racial categories is more problematic. The Brazilian system uses multiple and overlapping terms, which cannot be precisely translated into English. Since I rely greatly on data that uses the census categories white, brown, and black (*branco*, *pardo*, and *preto*), I will usually employ these terms in this book. Unfortunately, the common terms *moreno* and *negro* also translate as brown and black, respectively, so when I refer to these terms, I often leave them in Portuguese to avoid confusion. Because much of the literature uses the term "mulatto" to refer to mixed-race persons of black and white descent, I occasionally use it as well. Certainly, the choice of one or another term may annoy some readers but almost all the terms (except perhaps white) are problematic. However, such choices are inevitable.

A special problem is choosing a term that aggregates browns and blacks. Although it is important to sometimes make the distinction between browns and blacks as this book will show, the white-nonwhite distinction is generally the most important racial cleavage between Brazil's haves and have-nots. Although the black-movement classification system recommends that the term *negro* include blacks and browns, I prefer to use "nonwhite" to avoid the conceptual confusion between that use of *negro* and its more restricted popular use. Occasionally, I use the Portuguese *negro* as analogous to nonwhite, especially when I refer to government, black-movement, and journalistic uses of the term, which is the term they prefer. However, it is not always clear if *negro* is being used to refer to only those at the dark end of the color continuum (blacks) or if it includes intermediate color categories. Examples are the *movimento negro* (the black movement), social policies for negros or popular attitudes about negros. This ambiguity is discussed further in chapter 4.

In seeking to respect the black movement's attempt and right to self-identify, I could also have used the term "Afro-Brazilian" or "Afro-descendant," translations of *Afro-Brasileiro(a)* and *afrodescendente*. Although these are not commonly used in the discourse of ordinary Brazil-

ians, they are increasingly used by college-educated persons and activists in the black movement. According to some black-movement leaders, *afrodescendente* has gained currency because their Spanish-speaking allies can easily use it, whereas *negro* is extremely demeaning in some Latin American countries. Also, black-movement leaders prefer *afrodescendente* because it clearly identifies the descendants of enslaved Africans, which is critical in the current reparations (for slavery) movement.¹³

Admittedly, the term "nonwhite" should include the small and regionally concentrated Asian and indigenous population, the other two race categories in the census, but I exclude them in my analysis. This study examines the white-to-black color continuum, which encompasses the vast majority of all Brazilians. The experiences of the small and regionally concentrated Asian and Indian populations are distinct from the regionally diverse and larger white, black, and brown populations. Other ethnic groups, including Jews and Arabs, who are largely assimilated and considered white Brazilians in the Brazilian census, as well as those of Japanese and indigenous origin, are the subjects of separate scholarly treatments, to which I defer.¹⁴

leading to continued
Key Points & Findings:
Social Mobility
... captures the extent to which national populations or national subgroups

Chapter Two

FROM WHITE SUPREMACY TO RACIAL DEMOCRACY

We are a mestizo country . . . if not in the blood then in the soul.
—Silvio Romero 1888¹

TO INTERPRET Brazil's current system of race relations, we need to understand the social, cultural, and intellectual context within which Brazilian ideas of race emerged and evolved. In this chapter, I show how distinct ideologies in Brazil were formed around elite concerns about Brazil's apparently high rates of miscegenation. I begin with the belief in miscegenation as degenerate and leading to Brazil's backwardness (most of the nineteenth century), proceeding to whitening through miscegenation and as a genetic solution to its backwardness (late nineteenth and early twentieth century), and then to miscegenation as a positive value and proof of Brazil's "racial democracy" (1930s to 1980s). I pay particular attention to scholarly thinking and to the related state actions around issues of race, whether they were explicit or implicit, discriminatory or anti-racist. Finally, I examine Brazil's changing racial composition from its first census in 1872 to its most recent in 2000.

THE ORIGINS: PORTUGUESE COLONIZATION AND SLAVERY

The Portuguese first landed on Brazilian shores in 1500, and soon after they began to enslave the native population for its growing sugar economy. With the decimation of the indigenous population through wars and disease brought by the Europeans, the Portuguese colonizers looked to Africa for an alternative labor supply. Beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, Africans began to be brought to Brazil as slave laborers for the expanding sugar economy. Roughly three hundred years later, when the slave trade ended in 1850, 3.6 million Africans had been brought to Brazil as slaves, mostly to labor in the production of raw materials for export to the North Atlantic. At first, Brazil produced mostly sugar, then the economy shifted to mining and cattle raising in the eighteenth century

and finally to coffee growing in the nineteenth century.² In 1888, Brazil became the last country in the Western Hemisphere to abolish slavery, although a series of government reforms gradually emancipated slaves before then. Just as independence in 1822 had been a smooth transition from colony to state, the transition from slavery also did not involve war or rupture in local values or the social structure, as it did in the United States. According to Carvalho (2004), the colonial aristocratic system remained fairly intact and a Brazilian national identity was thus slow to develop. Elite doubts about its large nonwhite population further impeded the formation of a positive national self-image.

As early as 1755, the king of Portugal had encouraged his subjects in Brazil to "populate themselves" and "join with the natives through marriage."³ In the same year, the Marquis of Pombal rose to power in Portugal as the war minister, eventually becoming prime minister, and during his twenty-two-year reign went to great lengths to encourage such intermarriages.⁴ However, the Portuguese crown did not encourage intermarriages of the white colonists with blacks and mulattos, and the Catholic Church condemned miscegenation in general, but that meant that interracial marriages were simply not recognized by the church. Such prohibitions against race mixture were easily ignored, especially given such a highly uneven sex ratio among the colonizers.⁵ The Portuguese colonizers in the early historical period were mostly males in search of wealth rather than settlement (as in the U.S. case) and Portuguese women were often forbidden to migrate, creating a very high gender imbalance among the white colonial population. This led Portuguese colonizers to seek out Indian and African mates, and the number of progeny of these mixed unions grew throughout most of the colonial period.

However, given the racial hierarchy imposed by the slave-based economy, relationships between the white colonizers and nonwhite Brazilian women were highly unequal. White men frequently raped and abused African, indigenous, and mixed-race women. Indeed, mixed-race Brazilians were largely spawned through sexual violence throughout the period of slavery, although cohabitation and marriage between whites and nonwhites was not uncommon.⁶ Thus, a tradition of race mixture was established in Brazilian society through both violent sexual relations as well as informal and formal unions. Although the relative frequency of the different forms of miscegenation is not clear from the historical record, by the 1872 census—when the male-female balance had been largely restored but before slavery was completely abolished—5.1 percent of marriages in the federal district of Rio de Janeiro were between whites and mulattos, and another 0.8 percent involved whites and blacks.⁷

Black
based models to show
leading to continued disparity in
Key Points & Findings:
Social Mobility
captures the extent to which national populations or national subgroups differ

WHITE SUPREMACIST VIEWS OF MISCEGENATION

As slavery was being abolished throughout the Americas in the nineteenth century, science would validate racial domination by claiming that Caucasians were inherently superior to nonwhite people.⁸ Prior to that, when race mostly described one's descent rather than a hierarchy of biological types, the subjugation of Indians and Africans proceeded on the basis of moral and religious reasoning rather than on scientific argument. Scientific interest in the issue of race in Brazil began in the late nineteenth century, and concern grew over how race would affect Brazil's future development. This was especially true in the emerging science of eugenics, which set out to discover "the social uses to which knowledge of heredity could be put in order to achieve the goal of better breeding."⁹ Eugenics, at that time, viewed blacks as inferior and mulattos as degenerate. Furthermore, eugenicists believed that tropical climates like Brazil's weakened human biological and mental integrity, and therefore the Brazilian population exemplified biological degeneracy.

A notable example of this thinking was by Count Arthur de Gobineau, who published *L'Essai sur l'Inégalité des Races Humaines* in 1856, and from 1869 to 1870, he was appointed to serve as the Representative of France in Brazil.¹⁰ He would come to deplore Brazil, commenting that its miscegenation had affected all Brazilians (except the emperor whom he befriended) across all classes and even "in the best families," making them ugly, lazy, and infertile.¹¹ His obsession would lead him to openly identify ministers and other members of the Royal Court as mulattos. For him and other Europeans, as well as for North Americans of the time, Brazil typified the perils of miscegenation by producing a degenerate people that would doom the new country to perpetual underdevelopment. Such a view of the Brazilian population by highly respected Europeans would leave its mark for many years to come.

In the 1880s, Raimundo Nina Rodrigues, a professor at the prestigious medical school in Bahia was perhaps the first Brazilian scientist to examine the subject of race. As a follower of European eugenics and particularly Italian criminologist Cesare Lombroso, famous for measuring cranial capacity to determine intelligence, Rodrigues similarly feared that miscegenation would lead to degeneracy. He predicted that Brazil's future, especially in the north, would become ethnically black or mestizo.¹² In his well-known ethnographic study of the African-origin population in Brazil, Rodrigues declared unequivocally that Africans were inferior. Rodrigues died at a young age in 1906, when he was in the midst of developing his ideas. He had advocated for separate criminal laws by race, which was about as close as any influential Brazilian had ever come to proposing

legal racial segregation.¹³ Whereas a principle of *livre arbitrium* was part of the Imperial Penal Codes, Rodrigues proposed to eliminate the principle for blacks because he believed that they were not free to choose crime because of their diminished capacities.¹⁴ However, reflecting his uncertainty about mulattos, he encountered difficulty in placing them into his conceptual scheme. He decided to divide the mulatto population into superior, ordinary, and degenerate or socially unstable types.

Rodrigues's uncertain classification of the mulatto may have reflected his own mixed-race identity,¹⁵ as well as the general sentiments of the Brazilian elite, since many of them could be classified as mulatto. Miscegenation had presented a dilemma, and consequently Brazilian eugenicists and other intellectuals had begun to waver in their conclusions about mulattos. Mulattos were clearly perceived as distinct from pure-blood blacks and Indians, and there was often an optimistic sense that they were more like whites. Rodrigues's ambivalence about the status of the mulatto and the need to distinguish them from whites may have kept him and other members of the elite from taking the extreme segregationist route chosen by the United States and South Africa in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Moreover, it would have been difficult to determine who was white in Brazil, so the imposition of segregation was impractical, as it would have potentially excluded many influential members of the Brazilian elite, as Gobineau had disparagingly described them. Although most members of the Brazilian elite are likely to have been classified as white in their own country, their status as whites in the eyes of Europeans and North Americans was not so certain. This fact is likely to have influenced their own visions of race mixture and their development of a national project.

In addition, persons that were classified as mulattos in nineteenth-century Brazil had also occupied important positions in the Council of the State, the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, or stood out in letters and arts. Some of the more prominent figures were José de Patrocinio, Luiz Gama, Afonso H. de Lima Barreto, André Rebouças and Tobias Barreto. Even Brazil's greatest writer, Machado de Assis, was a mulatto. Certainly these mulatto members of the elite had very privileged lives at the time and were often treated as whites were, but their racial origins were not completely forgotten. Although the flexibility of the Brazilian system had allowed them to sometimes escape the stigma of race, they sometimes suffered for having African origins. For example, the personal histories of André and Antonio Rebouças reveal that, while they were members of the upper echelons of Brazilian society, their African origins would be used to discredit them in debates about the emancipation of slavery.¹⁶ In addition, Aluisio Azevedo's (1973) classic *O Mulatto*, although fictional, relates the experiences of a mulatto doctor in the late nineteenth century.

He is apparently able to socialize freely in elite society, generally being treated as and perceiving himself as white, until he encounters the racially sensitive domain of marriage.¹⁷

Literary critic Silvio Romero, an important Brazilian intellectual of the time, equivocated in his response to the determinist dilemma posed by Gobineau and other Europeans, and to a large extent by Rodrigues. Although Romero agreed that blacks and especially Indians were inferior to the Portuguese, who themselves were inferior to the "Germano-Saxons," he also considered the possibility that miscegenation produced vigorous growth, and thus that Brazilians might be racially benefited in their future development. Romero's uncertainty about the consequences of Brazil's miscegenation would certainly add to the Brazilian elite's climate of racial insecurity, although by 1888 he began to be more confident in his optimism about miscegenation and Brazil's future.¹⁸

WHITENING AS THE SOLUTION

Eugenics promoted social policies which would apply the new scientific understandings of heredity to improve the human population. Brazilians developed their own brand of eugenics and subsequently influenced ideology and social policy.¹⁹ North American, British, and German eugenicists closely followed Mendelian eugenics, which strictly adhered to genetic inheritance and its racial implications. However, most Brazilian and other Latin American eugenicists followed the neo-Lamarckian strand, which was the dominant view among the French, with whom they maintained strong intellectual ties. Neo-Lamarckianism argued that genetic deficiencies could be overcome in a single generation. Although neo-Lamarckianism would be short-lived, its predominance among Brazilian eugenicists at the turn of the century had enormous implications for Brazilian interpretations of race in the ensuing decades.

These scholars accepted the racist predictions of black and mulatto inferiority but thought this inferiority could be overcome by miscegenation.²⁰ Based on their interpretation of eugenics, and their own sensitivities to theories about racial and tropical degeneracy, Brazilian scholars used a theory of constructive miscegenation and proposed a solution of "whitening" through the mixing of whites and nonwhites.²¹ Based on the higher white fertility rates and their belief that white genes were dominant, these eugenicists concluded that race mixture would eliminate the black population, eventually resulting in a white or mostly white Brazilian population. Brazilian eugenicists also successfully countered scientific claims that tropical climates were unhealthy for whites, which originally had limited their ability to import European laborers.

Whitening, as prescribed by the eugenicists, became the major basis of Brazil's immigration policy. To accelerate the whitening goal, Brazilian elites and policy makers looked for workers in Europe, where a demographic transition was producing surplus labor. In Brazil, as in other Latin American countries, the elites sought out and subsidized European immigrants to "improve the quality" of its work force and replace the former slaves.²² In particular, the state of São Paulo, in collusion with coffee planters, encouraged, recruited, and subsidized European immigration, while the federal government restricted available Asian immigration until 1910. This new supply of labor supplanted the former African slave population in places like São Paulo and at the same time acted as a "civilizing agent" by whitening the Brazilian gene pool. These white settlers were expected to mix eventually with the native population, thereby diluting Brazil's large black population.²³

POPULATION HISTORY OF 1872-1940:

WHITENING THE BLACK OUT OF BRAZIL'S POPULATION

The large number of Europeans immigrating to Brazil, coupled with ongoing miscegenation, made several Brazilian eugenicists confident that their country was successfully whitening. For example, in 1912, João Batista Lacerda believed that miscegenation would eventually produce whites and predicted that by 2012, the Brazilian population would be 80 percent white, 3 percent mixed (*mestiço*), 17 percent Indian, and there would be no more blacks.²⁴ The extent to which the whitening process actually occurred can be gauged through a review of Brazil's racial composition across its censuses.

Figure 2.1 shows Brazil's changing racial composition from its first census in 1872 until its most recent in 2000. In 1872, the only year that a national census was taken during the period of slavery, Brazil's population consisted of roughly 10 million persons. The census enumerated 37 percent of the population as white, 44 percent as brown, and 19 percent as black. The brown category in 1872 consisted of *pardos* (42 percent) and *caboclos* (1.8 percent), the latter referring to persons of predominantly Indian origin.²⁵ Since the slave trade ended in 1850 (and few blacks have migrated to Brazil since then), the percentage of the black population diminished in subsequent censuses. By 1890, in Brazil's first census after abolition, data began to capture the influence of massive European immigration. The white population increased as a share of the total Brazilian population from 37 to 44 percent between 1872 and 1890. The brown population decreased from 44 percent to 41 percent, and the black population fell from 19 to 15 percent.²⁶




FIGURE 2.1 Racial composition: Brazil, 1872–2000. (1872, 1890, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1980, 1991, and 2000 censuses of Brazil. Based on estimates (est.) for remaining years.)

Figure 2.2, based on immigrant entry data, shows that European immigration began to increase significantly in the 1880s, reaching its peak in the 1890s. In the 1890s, more than 1.2 million European immigrants were added to a population of about 5 million whites. In the following three decades, more than 2 million more immigrants had come mostly from Europe. In the 1930s, as the Brazilian economy reeled as a result of faltering coffee prices and a world economic crisis, and clearly by the 1940s, with the war raging in Europe, mass immigration came to an end. Immigration recovered somewhat in the 1950s; but the relative impact of immigration on national racial composition greatly declined by then since the native population had already grown tremendously.

Figure 2.2 shows the trends in total immigration and immigration from the four largest sending countries from 1872 to 1969. In 1880, persons from Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Germany represented nearly all immigrants to Brazil, but by 1930, they constituted only half of all immigrants. Lesser (1999) notes that Brazil's eugenics-influenced immigration policy favored the entry of immigrants from these countries as agricultural laborers, but a fear of nonassimilation and social and labor activism among those groups led policy makers eventually to seek immigrants of other nationalities. The newer immigrant groups came largely




FIGURE 2.2 Immigrants into Brazil by decade and national origin: 1872–1969. (Merrick and Graham 1979.)

from eastern Europe, including many Jews, and from the Middle East. Immigrants from these other countries often negotiated to be in the “desirable” white category, leading to a significant shift in notions of Brazilianness and whiteness between 1850 and 1950. While Brazil's immigration policy had previously barred Asians from coming to Brazil, immigration from Japan began in 1910, and by the 1930–39 period, constituted 30 percent of all immigration to Brazil.²⁷

Although Brazilian eugenicists expected that whitening would occur through both “natural selection” and European immigration, the actual extent to which the Brazilian population whitened could not be assessed after 1890 until 50 years later in 1940. There were no censuses in the intervening years with data on race, and no censuses were taken in 1910 and 1930. The question about color was omitted in the 1900 and 1920 censuses, although a 1920 census publication includes an article by Oliveira Vianna (1922) announcing the rapid reduction of the “inferior blood coefficient” in the Brazilian gene pool. The omission of race in those years was probably due to the elite's intent to downplay Brazil's racial composition, as well as the overall low level of resources given to census taking in the period.

leading to continued debate

Key Points & Findings:

Social Mobility

- captures the extent to which national populations or national subgroups differ

SHIFTING VIEWS OF RACE: 1910s TO 1920s

With the ending of European immigration in the 1920s, concerns about miscegenation and Brazil's racial future resurfaced. By then, neo-Lamarckianism had become increasingly discredited in the eugenics community. A new generation of Brazilian eugenicists, often trained in the now more scientifically credible Mendelian line of genetics, had challenged the view of the neo-Lamarckians. However, unlike many of their foreign counterparts, most of Brazil's eugenics community after World War I had become critical of the simplicities of Mendelian implications on race and came to discredit the concept of race altogether.

However, faced with the proposal to restrict Japanese immigration and the planned immigration of Afro-North Americans to Brazil, the so-called eugenic problem of immigration would find its way back into policy and scientific discussions at the First Brazilian Eugenics Conference in 1929. There, a heated debate ensued about whether mixture with blacks would lead to degeneracy, in response to the restrictionist presentation of Congressman A. J. Azevedo Amaral at the scientific conference. The president of the conference, Edgar Roquette-Pinto, who was influenced by and had previously discussed his own ideas with Franz Boas, convincingly argued that miscegenation was normal and healthy rather than degenerative, and that race had nothing to do with eugenics. For him, Brazil's problem was "mostly that it lacked a realistic sense of self-confidence" as it seemed to fear treading out on an uncharted course, radically different from the growing racist state policies being implemented in the United States and Germany. Another eugenicist at the conference, Fernando Magalhães, reminded the attendees that "we are all mestizos and would therefore exclude ourselves," just as Silvio Romero had expressed forty years before. The turn to certain racist solutions found in the United States and Germany received little support in Brazil. According to Stepan (1991),

The variant of eugenics identified with public hygiene and compatible with racial mixing and the myth of racial democracy gained support; extreme reproductive eugenics, or Nazi-style race hygiene, did not.

Influenced by increasingly aggressive eugenics-based policies in Germany,²⁸ Renato Kehl (1933) advocated for the sterilization of degenerates and criminals, compulsory prenuptial exams, and legal birth control. He had moved far away from the idea of constructive miscegenation. However, by then, Kehl had become fairly isolated as most of his colleagues had reached quite distinct conclusions. Much of the Brazilian elite and many eugenicists had for some time begun to extol the virtues of

Brazilian miscegenation, including the possibilities of racial harmony and unity.²⁹ In that same year, a highly influential book by Gilberto Freyre would close the door on Kehl's type of thinking.

GILBERTO FREYRE AND RACIAL DEMOCRACY:
1930s TO 1980s

Race mixture became a central feature of Brazilian national identity largely due to a single publication. Selected by leading academics as the most influential nonfiction book of twentieth-century Brazil,³⁰ Gilberto Freyre's *Casa Grande e Senzala* transformed the concept of miscegenation from its former pejorative connotation into a positive national characteristic and the most important symbol of Brazilian culture. Under the influence of his mentor, anti-racist anthropologist Franz Boas—who proposed that racial differences were fundamentally cultural and social rather than biological—Freyre effectively proposed a new national ideology.

Although he did not coin the term and elements of the concept were promoted well before him, Freyre fully developed, expressed, and popularized the idea of racial democracy, to where it dominated Brazilian race thinking from the 1930s to the early 1990s.³¹ Freyre argued that Brazil was unique among western societies for its smooth blending of European, Indian, and African peoples and cultures. As a result, he claimed that Brazilian society was free of the racism that affected the rest of the world. Although the notion that Brazil had a more benign system of slavery and race relations than the United States was longstanding,³² Freyre turned this contrast into a central aspect of Brazil's emerging national identity, granting it scientific, literary, and cultural status that would prevail at least until well into the 1980s.

Freyre characterized the extended patriarchic family of the large rural slave plantations (*latifundios*) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a cauldron for interracial mixing that harmonized differences and diluted conflicts, thus enabling extraordinary assimilation, creating a new "Brazilian people." In later publications, he would extend this argument into the modern period.³³ Although he had been obsessed with the idea that miscegenation had become Brazil's Achilles' heel,³⁴ Freyre came to believe that race mixture produced "a unity of opposites" among racial stocks, including white masters and black slaves. In the 1940s, he referred to Brazil as an "ethnic democracy," where he may have used the term "ethnic" to replace the scientifically false notion of race. By "democracy," he was referring to the Spanish connotation of the term, which referred to brotherhood or fluid social relations rather than to a type of political institution.³⁵

According to Freyre, miscegenation was possible early on because of gender imbalance among the Portuguese colonizers and also because of a Portuguese predisposition to cultural and biological mixing. Freyre believed that the Portuguese possessed a high degree of plasticity that enabled them to conform to and blend with other societies and cultures, especially in comparison with the cultural rigidity, seclusion, and self-reliance found among other Europeans. Ruled by the Moors for more than five hundred years, the Portuguese had developed a culture that was accustomed to and welcomed darker-skinned peoples, Freyre alleged. Indeed, miscegenation with the Moors had long been practiced in Portugal. Like his Portuguese contemporaries, Freyre considered Portugal itself to be non-European and a bridge between Christian Europe and Islamic North Africa. Freyre's doctrine of "Lusotropicalism" justified Portuguese colonialization, arguing that they were the only European colonizers to create a new civilization in the tropics, an accomplishment attributable above all to their racial tolerance.³⁶

Ironically, Freyre's antiracist vision of miscegenation was contingent on the process of whitening, as developed by the earlier generation. Freyre acknowledged that miscegenation could only occur in modern times because of the population's belief in the white supremacist ideology of whitening. According to this popular notion, ordinary black Brazilians believed their greatest chance for escaping poverty was to marry whites and light mulattos.³⁷ His whitening bias is revealed in his phrase "Negroes are rapidly disappearing in Brazil, merging into the white stock." However, Freyre would generally downplay whitening and rather focus on miscegenation's effects on diffusing racial differences and the contribution of African cultural influences on the white elite. This association of miscegenation and racial democracy with whitening would later lead black activist Abdias do Nascimento (1978) to accuse Freyre's ideas of promoting a campaign of genocide against Brazil's black population, through which the Brazilian elite sought to eliminate black people and black culture.

Freyre's optimistic analysis of Brazilian race relations was largely based on the contrast he repeatedly made with the racial situation in the United States. Freyre had grown up as the scion of a *latifundio* family in Brazil's Northeast and was educated in local North American missionary schools. He then became an undergraduate at Baylor University in segregated Waco, Texas, from 1917 to 1920, and attended graduate school at Columbia University. He later became a visiting professor at both Indiana and Stanford Universities and traveled extensively throughout the racially segregated South. Thus, it is not difficult to imagine how the contrast between the two systems of race relations in Brazil and the United States at that time may have led Freyre to conclude that there was little or no racism in Brazil.

The extraordinary influence of Freyre's work was due to many factors, including his use of anthropological logic and evidence and explicit treatment of sexuality, which were innovations in Brazil. Most importantly, his literary elegance, essayistic style, and vivid portrayal of Northeast tradition and life would capture the imaginations of readers for generations, although at the expense of scientific precision and the systematic use of evidence.³⁸ Moreover, Freyre's work had served to promote national unity in a country that was becoming increasingly divided between the traditional rural oligarchy and the new industrial elites exemplified by the expanding urban economies, particularly in São Paulo. According to Bastos (2001), Freyre had elegantly recovered, invented, and elevated Northeast regional traditions and values as truly Brazilian traditions in a society that had mostly copied and valued European and North American culture. Freyre's radical new ideas of racial and cultural fusion were consistent with a growing modernist movement in the Southeast region, which would greatly transform Brazilian culture and further promote national unity and "Brazilianness."³⁹

ACADEMIC AND LITERARY SUPPORT FOR RACIAL DEMOCRACY

Freyre's theories received great attention and academic support in the 1940s. In 1942, sociologist Donald Pierson reported that race did not seem to affect social relations, based on his study of Salvador, Bahia. Like Freyre, Pierson believed that "bonds of sentiment" arose from a tradition of miscegenation, which attenuated racial prejudices and put mixed-blood offspring in a socially advantageous position through intermarriage. He concluded that racial groups did not exist and thus reasoned that racism could not either, and that it was class, not race, that created social barriers between whites and nonwhites.⁴⁰ For Pierson, existing color hierarchies simply reflected an incompleteness of the assimilation process—which had only begun with abolition a half century before—and the persistence of surviving African cultural practices among the darkest segment of the population.

Pierson's conclusions about Brazil stood in sharp contrast to the findings about U.S. cities by the early Chicago school, where Pierson had been a student of Robert Park. Through his study of Bahia, Pierson has sought to demonstrate that there was nothing natural about North American racism. He concluded that Brazil was a "multiracial class society," which was in the process of breaking down racial differences and assimilating the descendants of African slaves, and therefore was much more advanced than the United States. Sociology and anthropology were underdeveloped in Brazil at the time, and foreign scholars such as Pierson

Key Points & Findings:
Social Mobility
... captures the extent to which national populations or national subgroups differentially

would become important in the development of those fields. His work would therefore have a great impact in the Brazilian academy, as well as in U.S. social science.

Freyre would also have a major influence in the development of the field of comparative slavery, which began with Tannebaum's *Slave and Citizen* in 1946. Building on Freyre's treatise, Tannebaum argued that the Catholic Church was able to influence Latin American slavery by extending greater humanity and legal citizenship to slaves in Latin America than they received in the United States, where slaveowners had greater autonomy over their slaves. He used Freyre's evidence of extensive manumission in Brazil to support a theory of a greater benevolence of slavery in Latin America. However, subsequent literature would point to counterevidence such as the greater mortality of slaves in Latin America, revealing a greater physical harshness and cruelty in colonial Brazil, where slaveowners could more easily purchase slaves, therefore diminishing their concerns about overworking them to death.⁴¹ Later studies would also show that manumission sometimes made little difference for freed blacks and mulattos, who lived side-by-side and worked with slaves in similar and sometimes inferior socioeconomic conditions.⁴²

In literature, perhaps no other writer projected Freyre's image of Brazil in popular culture as widely as Jorge Amado, whose novels have been translated into at least a dozen languages. His portrayal of Brazilianness exalted race mixture, racial harmony, and cultural syncretism. In Freyrean style, Amado encouraged miscegenation, believing that racial problems could only be solved by "the mixture of blood." But unlike Freyre, who spoke on behalf of the landed elite and its capacity for ensuring harmonious race relations, Amado wrote about the street-level experiences of his mostly mulatto characters. One of Amado's books, *Tenda dos Milagres* (Tent of Miracles), was made into one of Brazil's most popular films in 1977, further disseminating the idea of Brazil's miscegenation and racial democracy.⁴³

RACIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE SERVICE OF THE NATION

As Brazil sought to recover from the world financial crisis, Getulio Vargas became president in 1930. Vargas received support from Brazilians of all colors as he sought to modernize the predominately agrarian Brazilian society. In 1937, he announced a new constitution that effectively gave him full dictatorial powers. During his tenure, Vargas instituted a series of modernizing reforms that led to greater centralization of the Brazilian government, regional integration, industrial growth, and improvement of the rights and conditions of many urban workers. Vargas remained in

power until he resigned in 1945, when democracy returned to Brazil. Vargas was later elected again as president and took office in 1951, where he remained until his suicide in 1954. Vargas was followed by a series of democratically elected presidents until the military coup of 1964.

The Frente Negra Brasileira (FNB) was the most important black organization in the first half of the twentieth century. With its nationalistic and anti-immigrant tendencies, the FNB became a political party in 1930 and sought the integration of blacks into Brazilian society through social mobility. FNB members had supported Vargas's rise to power as they believed that he had destroyed the party of the rural oligarchy, which they regarded as the "bulwark of the aristocratic class of former slaveholders."⁴⁴ Although Vargas shut down the FNB in 1937, as he did with all political parties, he had acknowledged their support as he immediately began a series of reforms to protect native workers from immigrant competition, ensuring that large numbers of blacks and mulattos would enter its growing industrial labor force for the first time and be preferred for government employment.⁴⁵

Since Vargas, Brazilians have become proud of their *Carnaval* and *futebol*, not only because of their high quality, but also because they represent Brazil's self-image of multiracial harmony and festiveness to the rest of the world. Members of Brazilian soccer teams often represent the entire color spectrum, as do *Carnaval* dancers, and racial differences seem to be irrelevant in both cases. Vargas appropriated this symbolism, thus integrating blacks and mulattos into Brazilian national culture, helping to diffuse black protest. By actively promoting national chauvinism among Brazilians of all classes and making *Carnaval* and soccer prominent symbols of national identity, Vargas enhanced his own prestige. Moreover, Gilberto Freyre's popular *Casa Grande e Senzala* was an added benefit, providing Vargas with a narrative of race and nation that was inclusive of the Brazilian masses and could substitute for the white-supremacist ideology of whitening.⁴⁶ Thus, Vargas would effectively add the consolidation of the racial-democracy ideology to his list of national unification and modernizing feats.

A notable exception to Brazil's growing self-promotion of its racial unity during that period was the passage of the Afonso Arinos law of 1951, which made racism illegal and punishable. However, the exception in this case clearly confirmed the rule as the Afonso Arinos law was drafted presumably in response to foreign influences that had triggered two discriminatory incidents. One involved a widely publicized complaint by Afro-North American dancer Katherine Dunham, who was not allowed to check into a prestigious São Paulo hotel. Gilberto Freyre, then a senator, attributed the Dunham case to the fact that it happened in São

based models to the leading to continued disparity in areas like

Key Points & Findings:
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Paulo, where U.S. industrialism and commercialism had taken over "with a vengeance."⁴⁷ The sponsor of the bill, Afonso Arinos added his own complaint of discrimination suffered by his black chauffeur at the hands of Spanish immigrants, "ignorant of our traditions and insensitive to our old customs of racial fraternity."⁴⁸

Through its constitution and by signing international laws, the Brazilian state endorsed other antiracist laws, but these were mostly thought of as unnecessary and pro forma responses to international conventions and expectations. The Brazilian Constitutions of 1934 and 1946 had stressed equality before the law regardless of race, although the 1934 document also restricted the immigration of persons of African descent.⁴⁹ In 1965, Brazil ratified the International Labor Organization's Discrimination Convention of 1958 (Convention 111), which interestingly required the promotion of victims of racial discrimination in the labor market. In 1968, it signed the UN's International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), which prohibited all forms of racial discrimination and required the submission of biannual reports to the elected eighteen-member Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which monitors whether individual states are complying with the convention.⁵⁰ By accepting these conventions, such laws would be incorporated into domestic law. However, Brazil's racial democracy ideology had become so well accepted that the Brazilian government had generally convinced itself, its population, and the international community that its people were antiracist by culture and therefore did not need such laws.

THE 1940 CENSUS: RESUMPTION OF RACE COUNTING

As a part of Vargas's modernization efforts, Brazil established its first modern census in 1940. After an absence of fifty years, race was reintroduced in that census at the very same time that the racial-democracy ideal began to take hold. The new official belief that race was not problematic is demonstrated in the following quote from a Brazilian government publication in 1950:

The preparation of the 1940 Census developed in a period in which racist aberrations appeared on the way to global predominance. Nevertheless, the national Census Commission not only wanted to remain faithful to the most honorable tradition of modern Brazilian civilization, the equality of the races, but it also sought to eliminate any suspicion that the question on color, introduced in the census purely with scientific objectives, was to serve as a preparatory instrument for social discrimination."⁵¹

If racial distinctions were no longer believed to be important, then why ask the race question? Despite the emerging belief in racial democracy, belief in whitening also persisted among some sectors of the Brazilian elite. Concerns about Brazil's racial composition surely remained and the 1940 census would be an opportunity to measure the effects of massive European immigration during the previous six decades. A government document published in 1961 claimed that as a result of the 1940 census

Many educated Brazilians . . . were anxious to see the exact percentage of the progressive predominance of the white group in the national population, which, with triplicate impropriety, was customarily called aryanization, and according to the then widely diffuse ideas, seemed supremely desirable.⁵²

The nomination of Giorgio Mortara as the director of Brazil's first modern census in 1940 was also important in making it a key analytic variable for differentiating the Brazilian population in the published 1940 and 1950 censuses. Mortara had been a prominent statistician and demographer in his native Italy, but as a Jew, the Fascist regime forced him to renounce his prominent academic posts and he seized the offer to become director of the Brazilian census. Keenly aware of the implications of race thinking in fascist Europe, and despite the official line of the Brazilian government, Mortara would make race an important variable in the analysis of the new Brazilian census.

The results of the 1940 census revealed that mass European immigration had brought Brazil closer to its whitening goal. As figure 2.1 shows, 64 percent of Brazilians were white in 1940, a 20-percentage-point increase from 1890.⁵³ During the same period, the relative size of the black population hardly changed, while the proportion of the mixed-race population declined by more than half from 41 percent to 20 percent. In absolute terms, the Brazilian population more than quadrupled in size from 10 million in 1872 to 41 million in 1940. The white population grew by more than six times, the black population quadrupled, and the mixed-race population merely doubled. The decline in the percentage of the mulatto population was likely the result of little intermarriage because of the especially great marginalization of blacks and browns in this period (Andrews 1992) and relatively high levels of endogamy among the immigrant ethnics, whose social interactions must have been limited by their language, customs, and cultural institutions. Also, the changing categories for the mixed-race population from *mestiço* and *caboclo* to *pardos* may have led to the underestimation of the change in the brown and overestimation of the black population. A shift from ancestry to appearance may have also led persons who would have been classified as *mestiços* but were dark in appearance to be reclassified as black in the 1940 census. Although the growth of the white population and the

decrease in the proportion of the brown population would have led to some optimism for whitening supporters like Lacerda and Roquette-Pinto, the fact that the proportion of the black population did not change during this period would have surely discouraged them.

THE MILITARY AND RACIAL DEMOCRACY

By 1962, Gilberto Freyre had become a self-proclaimed defender of Brazilian patriotism and the growing military presence in the Brazilian government. In that year, Freyre first used the term "racial democracy," which he would ardently defend.⁵⁴ The concept of racial democracy reached its peak as a dogma under the military governments from 1964 to 1985, which also encompassed the period of Brazil's greatest economic growth. The military governments turned Freyre's doctrine into an obsession and an uncontested principle of the Brazilian nation. In a 1977 speech to the National Congress, the year in which President Ernesto Geisel shut down that institution, its president proclaimed:

We have all inherited common attributes and what we are building—socially, economically and culturally—proves the correctness of our rejection of the myths of racial superiority.⁵⁵

The idea of racial democracy became incorporated into the emerging Brazilian religion of *umbanda*, with its African roots. Umbanda gained legitimacy during this period as white middle-class persons, including military officers, became leaders in *umbanda* federations.⁵⁶ Motivated mostly by economic causes, the Brazilian government also expanded its relations with Africa and established centers in Rio de Janeiro and Bahia to study Africa and its relations with Brazil.⁵⁷ Finally, Brazil's so-called economic miracle from 1968 to 1974 also helped diffuse resistance of any kind to the military. With the government's active intervention in the Brazilian economy, economic growth averaged 11 percent per annum. All social classes benefited from that growth, although income inequality grew as the middle class made the greatest gains.

At the height of military repression, the Brazilian national soccer team won the 1970 World Cup, dominating all of its opponents. Led by Pelé, a black player, who would be elevated by sports fans to godlike status, Brazil's team became known as the greatest team of all times. Under the command of General Medici, the Brazilian government showcased its heroes, thereby reforming its international image and sparking a new wave of nationalism. At the same time, the United States was ending a decade marked by civil-rights protests, the assassination of major antiracist leaders, and urban rioting. Local and international observers could not

help but notice the contrast with Brazil and its nationally celebrated and multiracial soccer heroes. All the while, though, hundreds of political protestors were being tortured and assassinated in Brazil, away from public view.⁵⁸

Ignoring Brazilian realities, the military government confidently proclaimed that racial discrimination did not exist in Brazil in its 1970 report to the CERD. Brazil's foreign minister declared:

I have the honor to inform you that since racial discrimination does not exist in Brazil, there is no need to take sporadic measures of a legislative, judicial or administrative nature to assure the equality of races in Brazil.

In the following six pages of the report, the minister of justice and the interior confirmed the foreign minister's proclamation by citing the extensive Brazilian legislation guaranteeing equality. In the first three paragraphs of the 1972 addendum to the report, the Brazilian government reported:

1. The climate of peaceful and friendly interrelations that is one of the outstanding features of Brazilian culture has not only been manifested but has been improved.
2. It is impossible to provide statistical data since the last [1970] census did not ask for indications of race.
3. It should be mentioned that miscegenation is rapidly increasing.

Even in the dark days of authoritarian rule from 1967 to 1974, the ideology of racial democracy was well entrenched and widely understood. The mere mention of race or racism was met with social sanctions, which would often result in one being labeled a racist for bringing up the issue. If such sanctions were not enough, any protest like those occurring in the United States at the time would surely have been met by the repressive power of the military government and the willingness to use it. I have been told by a reliable but confidential source, that Brazil's military government perceived black protest as a major threat to national security.

However, the mounting academic evidence of racism by leading Brazilian academics had not escaped the attention of the military governments, even at the height of repression. Brazil's authoritarian rulers were quite aware of racism and racial inequality in Brazil but were troubled by the prospect of racial conflict similar to that occurring in the United States. For at least the more astute military leadership, their actions in support of racial democracy were probably not cynical so much as a rather well-engineered strategy for staving off racial polarization. This was made clear in a book published by the Brazilian army in 1969 called *Brazil 2000: A Future without Fantasy*. In the second paragraph of the introduction, it states:

No, we have not become violent racial segregationists, but we cannot consciously pride ourselves on our "racial democracy." How will we react when blacks overcome social and economic disadvantages that segregate them, and the university educated among them are no longer only 448 out of 5,600,000 individuals? Today, blacks do not cause trouble, but what will happen when they have enough economic power to buy titles to private clubs or into the more expensive private schools or force their admission into important offices or positions, or live in first-class neighborhoods? Will we be mature enough to accept them as brothers in everything or are we headed for racial conflict?

Interestingly, the book widely cites the findings of the very scholars that the military would later exile. Skidmore (1985) believes that the forced exile of Abdias do Nascimento, Florestan Fernandes, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Octavio Ianni was largely due to their questioning of the nationalist consensus on race. The military had made research on race perilous to the personal safety of these scholars.

ACADEMIC CHALLENGES TO RACIAL DEMOCRACY

By the 1950s, Brazil had gained an international reputation for its racial democracy. As a result, UNESCO commissioned a series of studies to understand the secret of Brazil's racial harmony in a world marked by the horrors of racism and genocide. Florestan Fernandes of the University of São Paulo was commissioned as the primary Brazilian investigator in the UNESCO project. However, his conclusions stunned his sponsors by mounting the first major assault on the racial-democracy image of Brazil, leading to the first clear break with Freyre and to Fernandes's vehemently disagreeing with the findings of his Freyre-inspired North American counterparts on the UNESCO project, most notably Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris. Instead, Fernandes concluded that racism was widespread in Brazilian society. Fernandes directly attacked racial democracy, calling it a myth, and concluded that Brazilian whites were hostile to and prejudiced against blacks. Whites continued to benefit from the racial domination of blacks, long after the end of slavery. However, he also blamed slavery and its social and psychological effects on blacks themselves for their inability to compete with whites in the newly industrializing labor market. Moreover, he believed that although racial prejudice and discrimination were functional to a slave society, they were incompatible with the competitive order established by a capitalist class society. For Fernandes, racism would therefore disappear with capitalist development, although whites would seek to maintain their privileged positions for as long as possible.

Much of the disagreement between Freyre and his predominately North American supporters, and Fernandes and the mostly Brazilian UNESCO scholars, about the extent of racism in Brazil may be attributed to differing emphases. The Freyreans tended to follow Gilberto Freyre's emphasis on sociability or horizontal relations rather than economic or vertical relations, presumably because they believed that indicators of the integration of minority groups in society like miscegenation and intermarriage best represented current and future race relations. In their optimistic interpretation that Brazil's racial system was more benign than that of the United States, they dismissed racial inequality as merely the result of the recent abolition of blacks from slavery rather than from current racial discrimination.

Guimarães (1999) argues that the research agendas of Pierson, Wagley, and Harris were shaped by the comparative concerns of assimilation and integration. In the spirit of Chicago School theory, they assumed that the distinct racial groups would eventually assimilate and structural differences would disappear, as dominant and previously subordinate groups would become similar. Researchers of this school found social relations among the races to be harmonious and integrative compared to the United States, thus predicting an optimistic future for the descendants of Brazilian slaves. The conflict and exploitation found in the labor market and in the naturalized racial hierarchy in which blacks were subordinate, on the other hand, were either unproblematic or transitory for them.

By contrast, Fernandes and his Brazilian UNESCO colleagues focused mostly on the vertical relations of racial inequality and the racial discrimination that produced it. Guimarães claims that, like other *Paulistas* (residents of São Paulo state), Fernandes generally ignored race mixture, which was valued in the more traditional Northeast. Rather, southerners like Fernandes held the notion that true Brazilians were mostly white and valued being part of a European rather than a mestizo nation. As the primary destination of mass European immigration, São Paulo had become an ethnic mosaic, and blacks were only one of several minorities, although they were the most stigmatized. Moreover, a disdain for race mixture may have come from Fernandes's close association with Abdias do Nascimento, who associated the elite's support for miscegenation with a whitening campaign to eliminate blacks from the Brazilian population. Instead, social equality and development concerns motivated Fernandes and his followers to investigate race relations.

Although Fernandes had become a central figure in the Brazilian social sciences, he eventually abandoned research on race upon his return from exile, as did his student, Fernando Henrique Cardoso. Fernandes and Cardoso returned from exile and wrote about other sociological issues, including dependency theory, and both became politicians in the 1980s. Cardoso eventually became president of Brazil. Otavio Ianni, unlike his

mentor Fernandes and his earlier co-author Cardoso, continued to write about racism, among other subjects. Despite such academic challenges beginning in the 1950s and modern black protest beginning in the mid-1970s, most sectors of Brazilian society would continue to believe in racial democracy throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s.

THE BROWNING OF THE BRAZILIAN POPULATION: 1940-1991

From 1940 to 1991, census findings began to show that miscegenation became the primary force driving changes in Brazil's racial composition. The whitening goal was greatly advanced from 1940 to 1991, in the sense that the black population fell from 15 to 5 percent. However, the white population also continued to decline from its recorded peak of 64 percent in 1940 to 52 percent by 1991, with an increase to 54 percent in 2000. The brown population was the only population to grow, more than doubling its proportion from 21 to 43 percent during the same period. Thus, the second half of the twentieth century was characterized by browning, rather than whitening, *strictu sensu*.

As a result of rapidly declining mortality levels in the early part of the period without correspondingly sharp declines in fertility until the latter part of this period, Brazil's total population nearly quadrupled from 41 million in 1940 to about 153 million in 1991. Whereas previous population growth was mostly through immigration, these decades witnessed unprecedented natural growth, encompassing the "Brazilian demographic transition." From 1940 to 1960, women had, on average, more than 6 children each, and life expectancy increased from 44 to 59 years.⁵⁹ Fertility declines began to occur sharply in the 1960s for white women, well before similar declines for browns and blacks.⁶⁰ Although racial differences in fertility decline were partly offset by earlier mortality declines among whites as well, the differences could account for greater natural growth among the nonwhite population since about 1960.

Changing racial classification rather than actual race mixture may also account for the growth of the brown population. Miscegenation affects racial composition from one generation to the next, while racial classification may change for individuals over the course of their lives. Demographer Charles Wood (1991) finds that 38 percent of 10- to 19-year-olds classified as black in the 1950 census, reclassified as brown in the 1980 census, when they became 40 to 49 years of age. Thus, at least part of the reduction in the size of the black population in the second half of the twentieth century is probably due to a growing tendency of blacks to reclassify as brown. If we assume that these estimates are roughly similar for all age groups, then such reclassification would account for most

of the decline in the black population and about one-third of the growth in the brown population from 1950 to 1980.⁶¹ In any case, the period from 1940 to 1991 has been marked by the growth of the brown population, which can primarily be attributed to miscegenation.

Results from the 2000 census reveal a reversal from the previous five censuses. Proportionally, the brown population began to decrease, while the white and black populations increased. Specifically, the black population increased from 5.0 percent in 1991 to 6.1 percent in 2000, and the white population went from 52.1 percent in 1991 to 53.4 percent in 2000. By contrast, the brown population decreased from 42.1 to 38.9 percent. Asians and Indians combined went from 0.7 to 0.8 percent. These changes could reflect the changing quality of data collection or demographic factors such as a greater decline in mortality within urban areas, where whites and blacks are more likely than browns to reside, but it more likely suggests changing racial classification with growing preferences for the polar categories of black and white, as I will suggest in chapter 4.

CONCLUSION

Whitening and racial democracy, the twin pillars of Brazil's racial ideology, have been rooted in a profound belief that miscegenation is a historical fact that makes Brazil unique. Whitening took a negative view of Brazil's miscegenation, and racial democracy promoted miscegenation as Brazil's solution to racism. Brazil's ideology of whitening sought to rectify scientifically based fears of the nineteenth century that its extensive miscegenation would doom Brazil to perpetual underdevelopment. However, Brazilian elites, backed by a small scientific community, decided they could eliminate the large black population through a process of whitening through miscegenation, accompanied by massive immigration. Whitening became accepted as popular ideology, which ranked individual worth or quality on the basis of race, and the Brazilian state directed immigration policies to admit only Europeans.

As scientific racism waned and biological concerns about racial determinism ended, the Brazilian elite chose to promote the idea of racial democracy. Racial democracy denied that there was any racism in Brazil. Once again, miscegenation became a central feature of this ideology and served as a global counterpoint to the horrors of race-based genocide and segregation. Although troublesome for elites at one time, miscegenation in Brazil became a source of national pride as the fiction of racial superiority began to be uncovered. While whitening was a development strategy of the Brazilian state in the context of scientific racism, racial democracy would become a centerpiece of a consolidating national identity. In

particular, Brazilians especially gained a sense of moral superiority over its powerful but unabashedly racist neighbor to the north, where miscegenation was associated with degeneracy, mongrelization, and sexual terror and prohibited for three centuries.

To use David Goldberg's (2002) phrase, the Brazilian state "fashioned the terms of racial expression . . . as well as racist exclusions and subjugation." At first, it created racial conditions and representations through slavery and whitening but then denied them through racial democracy. Unlike the United States and South Africa, which sought the clear separation of whites from nonwhites, Brazil began to develop a soft racial state in the 1930s, which celebrated biological and cultural hybridization. Like these other societies, the Brazilian state used race to promote its particular form of nationalism, but rather than create exclusionary policies, it would take a very different route. The Brazilian state instead denied racism and diffused racial divisions while ignoring the racial hierarchy, thus constructing a multiracial nationalist image to serve its modernizing project.

In addition, Brazilian and mostly North American academics came to support some form of a racial-democracy argument from 1933 or earlier to the late 1950s, and North American academics endorsed it until into the early 1970s. Racial democracy was analytically supported on evidence concluding that race was of little relevance to sociability or horizontal human relations in Brazil, making them far superior to those of the United States. However, racial democracy would begin to face challenges by Brazilian sociologists, largely on evidence that vertical race relations in Brazil were deplorable by their near total exclusion of blacks. The disagreements between the two generations of scholars thus largely hinged on their respective emphases on horizontal or vertical race relations. In studying one or the other dimension, they were somehow able to ignore or explain away the other.

Despite the challenges by Brazil's leading academics to racial democracy, it survived as the dominant ideology for roughly another thirty years, as a military government was able to suppress ideologically and forcibly counterhegemonic thinking and activism. Although democratization and antiracist movements had begun a decade before, racial democracy had become well entrenched in the Brazilian mind and continued serving the maintenance of Brazil's civil and economic order. It was only in the mid-1990s, that the Brazilian state began to recognize racism and implement racial reforms. Despite the end of racial democracy, its legacy nevertheless continued to shape social relations in the following years.

Chapter Three

FROM RACIAL DEMOCRACY TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

It is not enough to end slavery. It is necessary to destroy the
work of slavery.

—Abolitionist Joaquim Nabuco (circa 1890), and cited by
Marco Maciel, vice president of Brazil (1996)

THE SHIFT from racial democracy to affirmative action represents a dramatic moment in Brazilian history. Occurring mostly in the 1990s, this transition consisted of an acknowledgement of racism by the Brazilian government and society generally, the consolidation of black-movement organizations, their limited incorporation into the democratic process, and finally, the implementation of race-based affirmative action in many Brazilian institutions. These changes occurred in the context of Brazilian democratization in general, which was characterized by the retreat of the military, a strong rejection of their rule by Brazilian society, the rapid expansion of civil-society organizations, decentralization involving civil-society participation at the local level, and the strengthening of democratic political institutions. As a validation of the vigor of Brazilian democratization, 95 million Brazilians freely and orderly elected a socialist candidate as president in 2002. In this chapter, I examine this momentous shift in Brazil's racial politics from about the beginnings of that country's democratization to the initiation of large-scale affirmative action in the early 2000s. I thus focus on the changing black movement and their growing access to spaces inside the Brazilian state.

BEGINNINGS OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Brazil returned to democratic rule in 1985, although the resumption of some constitutional guarantees had been reestablished as early as 1978. Although it occurred slowly and unevenly, democratization would begin to yield political space to social-movement activists representing a variety

of concerns and ideologies. The demands of some social movements received higher priority than others. Especially intense resistance to black-movement demands persisted, because their cause seemed to threaten central tenets of Brazilian nationalism. The racial-democracy ideology, in particular, limited the black movement's ability to resonate with the Brazilian elite, especially during the 1980s when it continued to be advocated. At the same time, Brazil had grown enormously and consistently in the previous five decades, but the 1980s saw economic decline. This would limit social-movement gains as the government focused on the economy and on granting basic political and civil rights.

Before the late 1970s, black associations in Brazil tended to have culturalist and assimilationist goals and were engaged in the politics of patron-client relations and corporatism. However, with the beginnings of redemocratization, such goals and the political methods used to pursue them were becoming discredited by a new generation of black activists. The mostly young and often college-educated black leaders of the 1970s and 1980s pursued a confluence of race and class politics, emphasizing black identity and relentlessly denouncing racial democracy as a myth. In 1974, blacks in Salvador, Bahia, founded Ilê Aiyê, an exclusively black (preto) Carnival school, in response to their racial exclusion in previous Carnivals.¹ Ilê Aiyê's actions in favor of negritude signaled a bridge from the cultural mobilizations of the past to the beginning of modern black protest. Although not explicitly political, the Black Soul movement similarly marked the beginnings of change in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in the same year. Black Soul was characterized by ostentatious expressions of black identity in fashion, music, and dance, which Gilberto Freyre himself came to denounce as un-Brazilian and a product of U.S. imperialism.² The transition to modern black politics was completed in 1978 with the formation of the Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU). In July of that year, about 2000 blacks rallied together in front of the Teatro Municipal in São Paulo to demonstrate against the existence of widespread racial discrimination in Brazil.³ By the mid-1980s, the small but growing black movement began to exert a limited influence on the federal and a number of local governments.

EARLY PUBLIC-POLICY ATTEMPTS

In response to growing black-movement demands, some states established special councils or *conselhos* on the status of blacks in the 1980s. Created in 1984, the first of these was the Council for the Participation and Development of the Black Community in the state of São Paulo. Its purpose was to monitor legislation that defended the interests of the

black population, suggest projects on their behalf to the state legislature and executive branches, and investigate complaints of racial discrimination and police violence. With the beginnings of democratization, the council's government and civil-society members were optimistic that the historical moment would provide an opportunity to reunite currently divided black leaders to work together to create "real emancipation" for blacks. By 1988, the council's civil-society members were selected to represent a diversity of political parties, particularly from the Left, reflecting the need to create a united front among the divided and ideologically diverse black organizations. In the end, it encountered many political and operational problems, but the former president of that council, Helio Santos, credits it with improving the image of black Brazilians through its effects on the educational system and in advertising, and activist Sueli Carneiro believes that the experiences of black activists in the São Paulo conselho awakened them to possibility of democratic participation. The São Paulo experience provided a model for similar councils in several other Brazilian states, including Bahia (1987), Rio Grande do Sul (1988), and Rio de Janeiro (1991), and in many smaller municipalities, although they often tended to focus on cultural issues.⁴

In 1985, despite his wavering support for racial democracy, President José Sarney proposed, but never implemented, a Black Council for Compensatory Action (Conselho Negro de Ação Compensatória) at the federal level, following a meeting with Afro-Brazilian leaders. However, on May 13, 1988, the centennial of abolition, President Sarney announced the creation of the Palmares Cultural Foundation (Instituto Fundação Cultural Palmares). In his radio address on that day, Sarney vacillated between the official interpretation of Brazilian abolition as peaceful and consensual and a perspective critical of racial democracy. Aiming to get the support of the black population, Sarney expressed that the foundation would "make possible a black presence in all the sectors of leadership in this country."⁵

According to its home page, the Palmares Cultural Foundation seeks to "promote and preserve cultural, social and economic values that come from black influences in the formation of Brazilian society," as guaranteed in the Brazilian Constitution (article 215 of the 1988 Constitution). Moreover, it seeks to "create and implement public policies that may create the possibilities for participation by the black population in development, arising from its history and culture."⁶ While the foundation has served as an important intermediary between the black movement and the Brazilian government, its emphasis on culture and cultural rights and its location under the Ministry of Culture reflects the government's traditional concern with Afro-Brazilian culture and history. For some analysts, the emphasis of the foundation, as well as by several other

black-movement activities of the time, on culture distracted it from addressing the more important socioeconomic needs of black people in work, education, and health.⁷

On another front, Brazilian rights advocates began making significant progress in securing legislative and constitutional reforms to expand the democratic rights of all citizens and create new rights for historically disadvantaged groups. Black and feminist groups in particular were successful at including important antiracist and antisexist laws in the 1988 Constitution. The 1988 Brazilian Constitution revolutionized the legal basis of the defense of human rights. The Constitution also recognized principles of tolerance, multiculturalism, and individual dignity, rights and identities, and became the basis of hundreds of antiracist laws at various jurisdictional levels.⁹ Specifically, Article 5 (paragraph 42) made the practice of racism an unbailable crime, subject to imprisonment.¹⁰ The Constitution also mandated some important structural changes in the judiciary in the direction of expanding individual and collective rights. These included the strengthening of the constitutional role of the Federal Supreme Court and major reforms in the functions of the Public Prosecution (Ministério Público). By increasing the number of institutions that could petition for unconstitutionality and creating new social and economic rights, the Public Ministry also became the state's adjudicator for members of society that had little or no political power.¹¹ Since then, the 1989 *Caó* law defined practices of racism, and similar laws have also been implemented at the state and municipal levels.

On the street, the voices of the black movement were becoming increasingly heard as they used the occasion of the centennial of abolition in 1988 to mobilize Brazilians in defense of racial justice. On May 11, Brazilian army units in Rio de Janeiro blocked a march that condemned abolition as a farce and arrested several of its participants. The Army spokesman alleged that the marchers sought to degrade the image of a famous Brazilian military figure by marching past it, although the organizers had agreed to march far from it. For the black movement, that demonstration would become a historical benchmark for the future of black consciousness and organization in Brazil.⁸ Although the Brazilian state considered issues involving race to be extremely marginal to its social priorities at the time, activities such as these were helping the black movement begin to capture public attention.

The elections of increasing numbers of blacks to prominent posts began to challenge their perceived status in public minds and raise the hopes of much of the black population. Unlike the past, black elected officials now often recognized their blackness and made race an important issue, as noted by Johnson (1995). In the 1980s, Abdias do Nasci-

mento, a backup (*suplente*) senator and a longtime black activist from Rio de Janeiro, became the first black legislator to defend explicitly the Afro-Brazilian population in Congress. Since about 1991, with the 49th legislature and the election of Benedita da Silva, a poor black woman who raised racial issues in her grassroots campaign as early as 1989, blacks in Congress began to speak out openly and regularly on behalf of race issues. Since then, black deputies such as Paulo Paim of Rio Grande do Sul, Ben-Hur Ferreira of Mato Grosso do Sul, and Luiz Alberto of Bahia—all members of the Worker's Party—have taken firm stands on behalf of black rights. Although vastly underrepresented, there had been black deputies and senators in the past, such as Nelson Carneiro, who served in the Senate for nearly thirty years but never defended the black population.¹² In the early 1990s, Albuino Azevedo, Alceu Collares, and João Alves were elected as state governors for Espírito Santo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Sergipe, respectively. Elected to one of Brazil's most powerful civil-society positions in 1994, Vicente Paulo da Silva (Vicentinho) became president of the Central Unica de Trabalhadores (CUT), Brazil's largest labor union. Benedita da Silva later became vice-governor and then governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro.

Democratization offered the hope of including previously excluded groups, especially to the extent that they were able to organize themselves. During this period, the black movement was also involved in extensive grassroots campaigns to organize on the basis of race. Despite cultural focus of many black-movement organizations in the past, increasing numbers of activists began to focus on racism and racial inequality. Black-movement leaders were beginning to gain national and international attention through campaigns highlighting that blacks were the primary victims of Brazil's poverty and human-rights abuses, which included street children, trafficking in women, and the violence from the growing drug trade.¹³

Like other social movements and with the support of international foundations, particularly the Ford Foundation, several black leaders formed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that employed highly trained professionals and support staff.¹⁴ For example, Geledés—The Institute for Black Brazilian Women was created in São Paulo in 1990, and CEERT (Center for the Study of Racial Inequality in the Workplace) in São Paulo was later formed and began to sensitize Brazil's trade unions to issues of race. CEAP (Center for Marginalized Populations) was formed under that name in 1989 in Rio de Janeiro and evolved into a primarily black-movement organization by 1994. With European funding, it actually began to organize in 1979 as the Association of Ex-Students of FUNABEM around street children issues, focusing largely on the fact

that street children were predominately black. By the end of the 1990s, black-movement NGOs of varying sizes, resources, and professional capacity had been created in many Brazilian states. The NGOization of the black movement mirrored changing Brazilian social movements generally, in which these organizations increasingly became their institutional representatives.

Civil-society organizations were beginning to recognize that, at least in theory, injustices in a democratic state should be resolved through legal mechanisms and institutions. Black-movement organizations thus set up legal branches to seek redress for victims using the new antiracist clauses of the 1988 Constitution. In particular, some black-movement NGOs hired attorneys, drawn mostly from the small number of black law-school graduates, to meet the growing demands of constituents that had become increasingly conscious of racism and wanted to file their grievances. At first, these organizations established SOS Racisms to defend victims of racial discrimination, mostly through cases in which plaintiffs suffered from racial insults. The first SOS Racism was begun at the Research Institute of Black Cultures (IPCN) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 as a newspaper, modeled after the French newspaper of the same name and funded by the French. In 1993, Geledés established the first SOS Racism with legal assistance, and by 1997, SOS Racisms existed in NGOs in several Brazilian states including Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Santa Catarina, Sergipe, and Pernambuco. While some of these cases proved to be important for highlighting the sometimes explicit and long-denied nature of racism in Brazilian society, cases that decided in favor of plaintiffs were rare and had little effect on redressing Brazil's racism. Researchers from the *Folha de São Paulo* could identify only three convictions handed down from 1988 to 1998.¹⁵

An important exception was the victory in 1992 at the Supreme Labor Court (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho) of Vicente Paulo Espirito Santo, a worker for the Santa Catarina Electrical Company, who was fired because of his supervisor's desire to whiten the department. This was the first case of racism ever to reach a high court in Brazil. According to Nilo Kaway, the attorney representing Espirito Santo, the plaintiff was ultimately victorious, despite setbacks in the first hearing and in an appeal, due to a combination of strategic planning, dedication to the case, and luck. In addition to vigilant and competent legal representation, Kaway cites the importance of political pressure from the local black-movement NGO, which was able to gain the attention of the leading national news program. He also notes the persistent attention and emotional support given by that NGO and local labor unions so that the plaintiff would not back down, despite offers of monetary compensation from the company,

and, serendipitously, the momentary media attention given to racial issues because of the 1992 Los Angeles riots.

With the organizational and professional support needed, black-movement leaders were able to carry out and sustain their antiracist strategies, including the launching of public education campaigns and the use of media to expose the prevalence and perniciousness of racism in Brazil. Black-movement organizations were able to get national television and print-media coverage of events such as the case of Espirito Santo in 1992 and the March of Zumbi in 1995. Additionally, black-movement organizations used the national media to accuse high-profile institutions and personalities of racism, such as Brazil's media giant, TV Globo, about an episode of a popular soap opera ("Dono do Mundo") in which the protagonist shouts racial epithets at his gardener. In addition, these organizations denounced Sony Music and Tírica of recording a racist children's song (1996) and the federal transportation minister for declaring that Pelé and asphalt were Brazil's most admired blacks (1997). These actions often prompted offers from the perpetrators to compensate for their aggressions, when they were recognized. For example, TV Globo ran a television series about a middle-class black family soon after, and the minister met with black-movement leaders, vowing to hire more blacks in the Transportation Ministry. More recently, black-movement NGOs secured national media coverage of their Campaign against Racism in the Bahian Carnival (2000), accusing Samba schools of preventing blacks from participating, and of a boycott of a middle-class shopping center in Rio de Janeiro (2001), accusing storeowners of failing to hire black employees.

Such activity seemed to be affecting public opinion. The term "racial democracy" was beginning to fall out of favor in the popular Brazilian lexicon. By 1995, a national survey by Brazil's major newspaper revealed that the vast majority of Brazilians believed that Brazilian whites held racial prejudices, as shown in table 3.1. The black movement made racial democracy a hopelessly inappropriate concept. Despite challenges from the most important academics in Brazil throughout the period, Freyre's way of thinking had taken the day for more than fifty years, but a new way of thinking finally took its place in the 1990s.¹⁶ This new period was marked by the recognition of racism by various sectors of Brazilian society and emerging pressures on the state to extend real democratic citizenship and human rights to its black population. To speak of Brazilian race relations would now require major attention to the issue of affirmative action, reflecting the government's recognition of racism in Brazil and the end of racial democracy. However, as table 3.1 further demonstrates, roughly 90 percent of Brazilians of all colors and in all regions in

TABLE 3.1
Percent supporting race mixture and recognizing racial prejudice
by color and region: Brazil, 1995

Percent agreeing that "whites hold prejudices against negros"					
	Brazil	Northeast	Southeast	South	North/Central West
White	89	83	91	90	87
Brown	88	85	91	87	89
Black	91	89	94	82	93
Percent agreeing that "race mixture is a good thing"					
White	88	76	88	85	90
Brown	87	87	87	89	91
Black	89	90	90	88	88

Source: Data Folha Survey, 1995.

1995 agreed with the statement "race mixture is a good thing."¹⁷ Thus, thinking about race shifted from denying racism to recognizing it, but at the same time, it would sustain the racial-democracy value of race mixture.

THE NEW SCHOLARSHIP ON RACE

As the military governments began to relieve their repression of academics, scholarship on race resurfaced. With the completion of his Ph.D. dissertation from UC-Berkeley in 1978, Carlos Hasenbalg returned to Brazil and initiated a new phase of race research in the Brazilian academy. Hasenbalg's work, like that of Florestan Fernandes before him, focused on the effect of capitalist development and industrialization on racial inequality. Like Fernandes, Hasenbalg found widespread racial discrimination and inequality, and believed that whites benefitted mostly by disqualifying nonwhites as competitors and restraining the aspirations of nonwhites. However unlike Fernandes, he concluded that racism was compatible with the development of Brazilian capitalism, arguing instead that racial inequality would thrive rather than disappear with capitalist development. Hasenbalg's treatise mirrored larger debates in the U.S. academy concerned with race, class, and capitalist development.

The work of Hasenbalg and his University of Michigan-trained colleague, Nelson do Valle Silva, was critical to debunking the belief in

racial democracy, mostly because it convinced Brazilians of vast racial inequality and discrimination in their country. Their work relied largely on newly available racial statistics¹⁸ and Silva's empirical bent and sophisticated statistical skills, which he brought to the study of race and class in Brazil. Another important contribution to changing Brazilian ideas about race was a book on racial inequality in the labor force, *O Lugar do Negro na Força de Trabalho*, published in 1983 by the IBGE, the Brazilian equivalent of the Census Bureau and the Department of Labor Statistics put together. The importance of this work was enhanced because it was produced by the governmental statistical agency.¹⁹

In the 1990s, race would begin to be accepted as a legitimate field of study in the Brazilian social sciences, reflecting the new consensus that race and racism were important. Scholarship on race proliferated in a wide variety of disciplines and made much broader research inquiries than it had in previous decades. This change signaled an important transformation in Brazilian academia, where research on race went from being considered a marginal area of research from the 1960s until the mid-1990s to becoming one of its fastest-growing topics of scholarly interest. This was revealed quite clearly in the number of panels on race at Brazilian scholarly meetings, particularly ANPOCS [Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Sociais (National Association of Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences)]. Most notably, leading economists, political scientists, and policy analysts became interested in the topic for the first time, and a growing number of young Brazilian social scientists developed their research agendas around race.

Quantitative studies of Brazil's racial inequalities continue to be produced as a constant reminder of Brazil's racial injustices, providing important fodder for black-movement demands. Indeed, the Brazilian government's Research Institute for Applied Economics (IPEA) was commissioned in 2001 with conducting studies on racial inequality. However, statistical research on racial inequality seems to have lost its academic prominence because of its inability to produce innovative findings, although it continues to make news headlines and sustain social-movement claims about the need to redress the inequalities this research continues to uncover. On the other hand, a growing number of ethnographic, historical, and other methods have been used to provide important new findings about Brazilian racism. Most notably, two scholars, Antonio Sergio Guimarães and Livio Sansone, have produced research on a broad range of topics for the past decade and have occupied important institutional positions, which have allowed them to influence greatly the debate on race in Brazil and train many young scholars, including a number of Afro-Brazilians.

THE EMERGENCE OF BLACK-MOVEMENT DIALOGUE WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Political elites began to respond to the claims of the black social movement only to the extent that activists could make their presence known. On November 20, 1995, thousands of marchers commemorated three hundred years since the death of Zumbi dos Palmares, the legendary leader of the marooned slave community (*quilombo*) that resisted the Portuguese for nearly one hundred years. The march in Brasília culminated with black-movement activists, along with labor leaders, voicing their claims to the National Congress and meeting with President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to demand concrete measures to combat racial discrimination. On the same day, the president announced the creation of the Interministerial Working Group (Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial or GTI) for the Development of Public Policies to Valorize the Black Population. Notably, a head of the Brazilian government had recognized racism for the first time and announced the possibility of measures to promote racial justice, breaking with decades of official denial of racism. The GTI was charged with creating ideas for how to include blacks in Brazilian society, which it published in a 72-page document.²⁰ Unfortunately, the government did not create a similar group or mechanism for operationalizing these ideas, and government ministries sought to boycott implementation of the GTI's recommendations.

The possibility of affirmative action-like policies was debated at the Multiculturalism and Racism conference sponsored by the Ministry of Justice and sanctioned by President Cardoso in 1996. In that seminar, he declared that "[racial discrimination and prejudice] must be unmasked and counter-attacked, not only verbally, but also via mechanisms and processes that can bring about a transformation of a more democratic relation among races, social groups and classes."²¹ Later that year, President Cardoso created the National Program for Human Rights (Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos), which prescribed short-, medium- and long-range goals for women, disabled persons, and indigenous and black persons. For the short term, the program mandated the study of public policies that "valorize negros." For the medium term, it sought to "develop affirmative action policies that give negros access to professional training, to universities and to high technology areas." For the longer term, its goals were to repeal all discriminatory laws, improve policies and regulations that seek to combat racial discrimination, and create "compensatory policies that socially and economically promote the negro population." The federal government thus endorsed the idea of explicit race-based public policies in support of nonwhites.

According to Helio Santos, the director of the GTI, the black movement held high hopes for change in the government's historical attitude about race because of the president's own academic history.²² Early in his career, as a student of Florestan Fernandes, Cardoso conducted research on race relations in Brazil's South region, from which he wrote two books.²³ This would explain much of his own commitment to race issues. However, the president's early commitment to the black movement seemed to fizzle out during the five years after the program's unveiling, although it reignited with the World Conference on Racism in 2001. At that time, less than two years before the end of Cardoso's second consecutive four-year term, many of the goals of the National Program for Human Rights concerning blacks had yet to be implemented. The government's dialogue, according to Hedio Silva, had turned into a monologue in which the black movement persistently made its claims, while the government listened but no longer responded.²⁴ The beginnings of the first Cardoso administration was a movement of guarded optimism for some black-movement activists, and their reservations turned out to have merit. The Brazilian elite, as many expected, continued to resist any real attempt to incorporate blacks and mulattos in their country's development schemes.

Although Cardoso himself may have wanted to implement affirmative-action policies, he needed his peers to design and support them. Cardoso often relied on the opinions of a small community of senior social scientists and economists, some of whom served as his ministers. At the 1996 conference, he called in a handful of prominent Brazilian academics and international race scholars to weigh in with their opinions about the possibility of social policies for promoting the black population. The invited Brazilian scholars were stars in their fields but had mostly ignored race throughout their careers prior to the presidential summons. Rather, their analyses often reflected their knowledge of popular notions of race and their penchant for class-based analysis. The international scholars, by contrast, were mostly experts on racial issues, but their analyses seemed to resonate less in the policy-making community, perhaps because they were less attuned to Brazilian politics at the time, and they were not involved in subsequent discussions. Incidentally, black-movement leaders were also invited to the conference but were mostly relegated to the audience.

While recognizing racism in Brazilian society, the senior Brazilian scholars, whose opinions mattered most for Cardoso and his administration, reinforced the belief that racial democracy's values are deeply cherished in Brazil, thereby placing Brazilian society in an advantageous position for improving its prospects for abolishing or attenuating racism, especially when compared to countries like the United States. Although

they recognized that racial democracy is not a descriptor of Brazilian society, they believed it should be viewed as a national project or goal to promote racial justice. They also expressed the ideas that race-targeted policies would solidify racial boundaries and perpetuate the idea of race itself. For them, Brazilian popular culture celebrates ambiguity and miscegenation rather than the conceptual separateness of groups, as required to identify beneficiaries of affirmative action. Rather than providing light about how to design policies to include nonwhites, these scholars voiced oblique opposition to affirmative-action policy, denouncing it as an inappropriate replication of U.S. policy.²⁵ At the same time, President Cardoso, credited for controlling Brazil's hyperinflation, was riding a long wave of popularity that would last from 1995 until December 1998, when the national currency was devalued.²⁶ For nearly four years, then, his administration must have surmised that the implementation of a controversial program like affirmative action would have been politically risky. As a result, the Cardoso government hesitated to pursue actively the goals it had earlier set out. However, the president's earlier proclamations seemed to have accelerated a rhythm of antiracist activities, including experiments in affirmative action.

BEGINNINGS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Despite the resistance by the federal government to implementing large-scale policies to combat racial inequality and discrimination, various sectors of Brazilian society began to develop a limited set of affirmative-action policies, including initiatives established by progressive local governments and demonstration projects of various sorts by the government and private sector. In her study of ten large metropolitan areas between 1995 and 1999, Heringer (2000) identified 124 programs intended to combat racial discrimination. Forty were specifically for negroes, while seventy others sought to combat racial discrimination generally, valorize black culture and history, or promote members of disadvantaged groups including negroes, and still another fourteen sought to combat racial discrimination without mentioning race. Twenty-nine of these programs were sponsored by the federal, state, or municipal governments, forty-two by NGOs, another seventeen by government-NGO partnerships, and the rest by universities, churches, political parties, and businesses. The federal programs included professional, administrative, and computer training and education about the government procurement system for negro small businesses in an effort to increase their efficiency at securing public contracts.

Initiatives to promote and support nonwhites in the university were particularly noteworthy. Among the nongovernmental initiatives were courses in several Brazilian cities to help blacks (sometimes "the disadvantaged and blacks") pass the college entrance exams, which alone determine acceptance into particular universities and fields of study. These were begun in Rio de Janeiro in 1994 by a Catholic priest with support from the Church, local neighborhood organizations, and the contributions of participants, and continues to serve as a model. The Rio course is directed to "negros and the disadvantaged [*carentes*]," which reflects a compromise in a debate about whether it should be for the poor in general or blacks in particular.²⁷ Most of these initiatives were private, although the city of Belo Horizonte created a similar course in 1999, and public universities began to sponsor such courses. Additionally, Geledés, a black women's NGO in São Paulo, with financial backing from Bank Boston, chose several promising black adolescents from poor families to support financially and academically over several years until they are able to finish college and enter the labor force. This project, known as "Generation XXI," is meant to be a model to demonstrate how poor black youth can succeed with the proper support.²⁸

Two local governments, led by leftist parties, implemented policies to combat racism. For the first time in any large city, Belo Horizonte, Brazil's third-largest city, established the Municipal Department for Black Community Affairs (SMACOM) in 1998, but it became caught in a political crossfire and was dismantled in 2000, as described by Diva Moreira (2002), the former SMACOM director. As mandated by executive law in that municipality, the secretariat sought to develop social policies in poor areas, especially in housing and professional training. Participation in its programs was not limited to negroes, although SMACOM included programs to combat racial discrimination and valorize black culture and people, particularly women.²⁹ In 1999, Brazil's sixth-largest city, Porto Alegre, responded to accusations of racism by establishing that 5 percent of the work force of all contractees with the city be negro.

A São Paulo-based black-movement NGO, the Center for Research on Race Relations in the Workplace (CEERT), has sponsored several seminars to examine diversity in the private-labor market. These began in 1995 when several black-movement leaders alerted the Ministry of Labor that U.S. multinationals that had racial and gender diversity policies in the United States discriminated against women and especially negroes in their Brazilian affiliates. This led the ministry, in association with the secretary of human rights under the Ministry of Justice, and the International Labor organization, to organize several meetings among the North American company's representatives, labor unions, and black and women's

social-movement organizations. Subsequently, CEERT has sponsored meetings with the human-resource administrators of these and Brazilian companies to share experiences and discuss programs that promote race and gender equality and diversity. They found that the few companies that had diversity programs involved women and the physically disabled but never negro workers. As a result of CEERT's efforts, panels on racial diversity were held at the meetings of the Brazilian Association of Human Resources and the Instituto Ethos's Conference on Business Social Responsibility in the Americas, both of which brought together hundreds of business leaders.³⁰ An Instituto Ethos publication (2000) asserted that diversity may improve productivity and corporate image, enhance worker satisfaction, reconcile the firm to client profiles, lower turnover, and decrease legal vulnerability.³¹

In the area of media, well-known actress Zeze Motta created the Brazilian Center for Information and Documentation of the Black Artist (CIDAN) in 1984 to promote negro actors and other artists. Responding to media, film, and theater executives claiming that there are few black artists available, CIDAN created a Web site in 1999 with the photographs and vitas of more than 1,000 black artists, which major media and advertising companies subsequently consulted and used to hire black artists, including those in major television productions.³² Legislatively, a state law in Bahia, where nonwhites constitute about 75 percent of the population, requires that in state publicity at least one-third of all models or actors in advertising be negro.³³ Attempts at similar legislation at the federal level have met with little success. The Statute of Racial Equality, as proposed by Deputy Paim, is more stringent than the Bahian law, requiring that television stations air only programs and films in which at least 25 percent of actors are negro, and that producers of films and advertising hire negros for at least 40 percent of their artists and models.

The one area in which the federal government was active in explicit support of the negro community during the 1990s was in allowing the recognition of historically black rural communities or *quilombos*. Recognition of quilombo lands followed the precedent set in recognizing indigenous lands. Since runaway slaves organized to resist slavery on many of these lands, the descendants of these slaves today represent historical and symbolic continuity from the time of resistance to slavery, making them central to black-movement struggles throughout Brazil. Many of these communities have been isolated for decades or even centuries and thus conserve elements of African religious, linguistic, and other cultural traditions. More practically, quilombo lands often permit the economic survival of their residents in an environmentally sustainable manner, contrasting sharply with the widespread deforestation by encroaching private enterprises of nearby lands.³⁴

Despite widespread support of quotas for nonwhites in work and in college entrance, federal affirmative-action laws continue to be delayed in Congress. On social issues, not to mention racial issues, Congress is especially sluggish in passing legislation. As of March 2002, up to 130 bills that deal with racial issues are pending in the National Congress. The two most notable bills were introduced in Congress by Senator (and former president) José Sarney and by Federal Deputy Paulo Paim. Sarney's bill proposes that 20 percent of admissions to all Brazilian universities and employment positions in public service go to blacks and browns. Paim's bill, the Statute for Racial Equality, also introduced in 2000, is much more ambitious: it establishes 20-percent quotas for negros in public universities, medium and large firms, and municipal, state, and local governments. It also requires similar quotas of at least 30 percent for party candidates, 25 percent for television and film actors, and 40 percent for publicity campaigns, as well as the payment of 102,000 reis as reparation to all African descendants in Brazil, the teaching of African history in all schools, an ombudsman for racial equality in Congress, and a guarantee of legal ownership for residents of quilombos. In 1999, a Senate bill by Antero Paes de Barros required that at least 50 percent of all admissions to federal universities go to public-school graduates. The idea of quotas or targets for the poor rather than for negros seemed to stand a greater chance of approval by the federal legislature, given the historic opposition of the Brazilian elite to race-specific actions. So far, the National Congress has balked at passing race-specific affirmative-action legislation. Brazil's executive branch, on the other hand, is much more agile and responsive to social-movement pressure, although executive policy actions are often less stable than the laws that Congress passes.

THE BLACK MOVEMENT GOES GLOBAL

Brazil's black movement gained greater influence on the Brazilian government by reaching beyond national borders. Although globalization presented new problems, such as the spread of racism on the Internet and a greater vulnerability of poor populations to the decisions of international capital, the transnationalization of human rights provided new opportunities for social movements generally. Informally, through the Internet, e-mail, and expanding international media, the work and visibility of international human-rights networks expanded greatly. The black movement, often in cooperation with other human-rights organizations, seized on these new opportunities and established ties with black-movement organizations throughout Latin America, the United States, and South Africa. In particular, globalization has helped in the consolidation of a

United Nations Human Rights System including the San Salvador Protocol and the Interamerican System. This includes international courts that try human-rights cases that previously exhausted judicial processes in member countries and allegedly received unjust outcomes. More generally, the globalization of human rights has enhanced the idea of universal human rights and the need to protect disadvantaged members of society, such as nonwhites in Brazil.

The black movement's growing attention to the UN System includes the monitoring of Brazilian government reports to the international conventions on racism, such as the Committee for the Elimination of Racism (CERD). The Brazilian government's 1996 CERD report declared, "the Federal Government, as determined by President Cardoso, has acted with absolute transparency in this area" (7).³⁵ While earlier reports promoted Brazil's racial-democracy ideology, that report began to report on Brazilian racism and racial inequality. Prepared in consultation with the Center for the Study of Violence at the University of São Paulo, the report pointed to national legislation and administrative measures that prohibit racism and racial discrimination. Although it attributed racial inequalities to historical racism and the concentration of nonwhites in poor and rural regions, it stopped short of blaming contemporary discrimination. This was consistent with the declarations of Rubens Ricupero (1993), the Brazilian ambassador to the United States, who claimed "this undeniable inequality is the product not of racism but of distinct historical causes." However, in the 2001 report, released just prior to the UN World Conference against Racism, the Brazilian government admitted to contemporary racism, disclosing its many dimensions, and demonstrated how the Brazilian judiciary responded.

Concerned that black communities in Latin America had not gotten their fair share of development funds, black-movement leaders also began to participate in meetings with such hallmarks of global capitalism as the World Bank and the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB).³⁶ Perhaps as a result of a growing black-movement presence, these institutions have become increasingly concerned about social issues in their work in Latin America and have listed aid to the victims of racism among their priorities since the late 1990s. The first time that a Brazilian black-movement leader participated in one of these meetings was in New York in January 1998, when an IDB representative from Brazil considered Ivanir dos Santos's proposal to invest in Afro-Brazilians as preposterous, boldly expressing, "I don't think you should bring up that issue. That's a problem of the United States, which doesn't exist in Brazil."³⁷ However, the Uruguayan president of the IDB was sensitive to the issue of racism, therefore overriding the protest of his Brazilian representative, and the IDB's dialogue with Brazil's black movement began. These meetings represented a pow-

erful challenge to Brazil's racial-democracy ideology because the decisions of these institutions would condition much-needed foreign aid for Brazil's social development on race-conscious considerations.³⁸

Domestically, Brazil's black movement has also become part of a wider and growing human-rights movement within Brazil that now recognizes that blacks and mulattos are the major victims of most human-rights violations because of persistent discrimination and their subsequent position in the economic and social structure. The general Brazilian human-rights movement has also increased its ties to the international human-rights community itself in a way that parallels and sometimes works together with the black movement. Although Brazil's modern human-rights movement began mostly with middle-class opposition to the military government and its denial of political and civil rights, the human-rights movement of recent years has brought these same activists together with grassroots activists that fight social injustice on economic, social, and cultural grounds. The black movement has finally been able to put race issues on the national human-rights agenda for both the government and civil society in general. The National Movement for Human Rights (MNDH), which grew out of the struggle for political and civil rights during the military dictatorship, reflects this. Although it began in the 1970s in opposition to the political and civil-rights abuses of authoritarian rule, it now brings together more than six hundred mostly grassroots NGOs, including black-movement organizations from throughout Brazil, with a growing concern for economic, social, and cultural rights. Their publications regularly note that negros are disproportionately victims of nearly every type of human-rights abuse in Brazil.

THE ROAD TO DURBAN

One of the most apparent consequences of social-movement transnationalization has been the growth and consolidation of an international human-rights system, consisting of international conferences and legal conventions. International conferences, beginning with Rio de Janeiro's Conference on the Environment in 1992, served as strong examples to Brazilians about the power of a global civil-society involvement regarding social justice and human-rights issues. Through the presence of social-movement NGOs and countries with progressive human rights, these international conferences and their conventions serve to pressure countries to position themselves with respect to human rights in the eyes of the international community, declare their support (or not) by becoming signatories, and thus commit to international human rights laws. While core countries, particularly the United States, often disregard these treaties, arguing that their rule of law and democratization are well established in their own

countries, peripheral countries are concerned that their position regarding these treaties affects their international reputations, especially regarding their level of democratization. The UN Race Conference in 2001 and the activities leading up to it are typical and coincided with changing activities inside of Brazil's organized black movement.

The year 1997 marked a new stage in black-movement activities as the black movement began to step up its efforts to use the institutional mechanisms of law and social policy. Recognizing an increasingly democratic context in which it perceived that laws might be used for social change and that government would seek civil-society proposals to help design social policy, the black movement shifted from simply denouncing racial injustice to becoming increasingly solutions oriented. Its new focus was initially demonstrated by its organizing of legal professionals in that year. In a meeting in Aracajú, black-movement organizations, attorneys, and leaders interested in antidiscriminatory law formed a national multiracial network comprising attorneys, prosecutors, and judges. They subsequently held other meetings across Brazil, with as many as one hundred participants, featuring national and international legal scholars and jurists as well as the national secretary of human rights. Of particular note, Nelson Jobim, a former minister of justice who is now on the Brazilian Supreme Court, met several times with this association and became an important interlocutor with the government. Aside from the technical discussion of strategies to improve antiracist law, find better ways to implement it, and extend its benefits, the network sought to begin an active debate about how best to promote the status and the economic, social, and cultural rights of the black population. Not satisfied with the efficacy of the law in reverting Brazil's racial status quo, black-movement attorneys and other leaders increasingly strategized on how to make their work more efficient.

In the same year, the UN General Assembly decided to convene the Third World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Forms of Intolerance as international concern grew about increasing incidents of racism, and as the UN recognized the challenges and opportunities for combating these phenomena in an increasingly globalized world. The national network of antiracist attorneys now resolved to prepare its participation at that conference. Specifically, they enlisted the assistance of the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG), which had taken the lead in organizing the World Conference for the United Nations. The IHRLG would meet with black activists and relevant policy makers and lead several training sessions for participation in the World Conference.³⁹

Prior to the international conferences, black-movement dialogue with the government had nearly always been channeled through the Palmares

Cultural Foundation (PCF), since its founding in 1988. Several black-movement leaders attended the first preparatory conference to the World Conference against Racism in Geneva on May 1–5, 2000. There the PCF monopoly as the representative of the Brazilian government to the black movement was broken, and higher-level sectors of the Brazilian government soon showed signs of wanting serious dialogue with the black movement. Although the Brazilian government committed itself to hosting the regional meeting of the Americas in preparation for the World Conference, the representative of the PCF announced that Brazil would no longer be the host, claiming that black leaders did not want the conference in Brazil. This was an insincere statement considering the efforts of black-movement leaders to inform their constituents about the conference. It was especially startling given the presence of black-movement leaders. Although the head of the Brazilian mission in Geneva later cited cost factors as the reason for not hosting the regional meeting, this was an equally unconvincing claim considering that these conferences were mostly subsidized, and that the poorer countries of Senegal and Iraq were to host the African and Asian conferences.

The real reason lay in the government's concern over their rapidly crumbling international image of racial tolerance and their belief that such a conference would bring undue attention to Brazilian racism. Just ten days earlier on April 22, Brazil had celebrated five hundred years since Portuguese navigators first landed on its shores, with a ceremony by leading dignitaries, including President Cardoso, on the beach where the historic event occurred. Peacefully protesting this celebration of five hundred years of European exploitation, landless workers, blacks, and indigenous protesters were held back from the celebration site near Porto Seguro in Bahia for several days. Despite permission granted by a judicial decision, when they sought to parade onto the site on the day of the celebration, they were detained, and several were beaten by the police, an event widely aired in the international media.

With Brazil steadfastly maintaining its decision not to hold the regional conference—despite pressure from Mary Robinson, the UN's high commissioner for human rights—Chile was finally chosen as the new site. At least two important meetings involving Brazil's black movement were held prior to that conference. The first was a national meeting by the national Coordination of Black Entities (CONEN), which set goals for the black movement's participation in Chile. At the same time, Gay McDougall, executive director of the International Human Rights Law Group—the organization largely responsible for assembling the Third World Conference—and Ariel Dulitzky, the Law Group's attorney for Latin American affairs, made several visits to Brazil and trained black-movement

organizations in several cities of Brazil, as well as participating in the CONEN conference. In its visit to Brazil, as well as two prior trips by Dulitzky, the Law Group trained attorneys and activists on technical, substantive, and political issues that would be discussed at the World Conference and at its preparatory conferences.

Mostly preceding the official preparations for the World Conference, the Southern Education Foundation held a series of four international meetings to discuss "human relations" in Brazil, South Africa, and the United States between 1997 and 2000, and propose actions to overcome the consequences of racism. The conference organizers produced a series of publications, many with Portuguese translation, and brought together black-movement leaders and government officials of the three countries to discuss common issues and possible solutions. It was noteworthy because it brought together important black leaders from the three countries with government officials and academics. The Brazilian delegation felt marginalized in the first three conferences, partly for linguistic reasons but also because they felt that the organizers and delegations from the United States and South Africa perceived Brazil to be unimportant and Brazilian racism to be less serious than in their countries.⁴⁰ All of these conferences were important for Brazilians in that they established close ties between government officials and the black movement, but the Brazilians also perceived that their race problem was of little international interest. However, by the fourth conference, which occurred soon after the Geneva Preparatory Conference in Capetown in May 2000, the Brazilian delegation sparked the interest of the South Africans and North Americans. Indeed, Brazil became central to the proceedings, further propelling the influence of Brazil's black activists.

Provoked by the absence of a Brazilian on a panel considering solutions to racism, eighty-five-year-old Abdias do Nascimento shouted from the audience, questioning the conference organizers' integrity in seriously including Brazil.⁴¹ Other Brazilian activists joined in, also questioning the historical absence of blacks among Brazilian government representatives. A young diplomat from the Brazilian embassy, sent specifically from Pretoria to monitor the proceedings, repeatedly proclaimed that the Brazilian Foreign Service and the Brazilian government did not discriminate. As expected, Brazilian black activists reacted, and a lively exchange took place, provoking the attention of the North Americans and South Africans to the Brazilian case. They finally realized that their countries, freed of legal segregation and apartheid, and beginning to face the color-blind defense, had much to learn from Brazil. The Brazilian diplomat's denial of racism resonated with the South Africans and North Americans, who suddenly realized that their relatively brief experience with postformal racism had long characterized Brazil. Wade Hen-

derson, executive director of the Leadership Conference for Civil Rights of the United States, remarked to Rio's vice governor, Benedita da Silva, Brazil's highest-ranking black official, that "we [North] Americans and many South Africans finally were able to recognize that Brazil was not that racial ideal that we had." As a result, international alliances were strengthened, and the Brazilian government was increasingly concerned.

The dialogue established at the preparatory meetings for the World Conference and at the Southern Educational Foundation between black-movement leaders and members of the Ministry of Foreign Relations was unprecedented. Also known as Itamaraty, the name of its historic building in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's Foreign Service is often considered to be especially elitist and particularly closed to civil society. Among its foreign colleagues, Itamaraty continued to proclaim the idea of Brazil as especially tolerant well into the late 1990s, after the idea of racial democracy no longer had popular support in Brazil. The Foreign Ministry was perhaps the last branch of government that continued to proclaim openly Brazil's racial tolerance and even racial democracy, comfortable in its belief that such claims would continue to resonate among some foreigners, and that it was immune from black-movement and civil-society vigilance. At the same time, it had almost no nonwhites among its more than 1,000 diplomatic professionals.

Itamaraty officials continued to spout Brazil's moral superiority on race to foreign governments without challenge. In what may have been the last gasp of racial democracy among Brazil's Foreign Ministry, a high-level Brazilian ambassador announced his country's offer to host the regional UN World Conference against Racism in March 2000. He stated, "I need not insist on the significance of this event for Brazil, whose very essence as a nation is expressed through the affirmation of multiethnicity and tolerance."⁴² While his peers commonly hailed Brazil's racial democracy, in this case the Brazilian diplomat did not mention racial democracy, although he seemed to be aware that the image of Brazil he projected would continue to be accepted in the international community.

Preparations for these international conferences provided a catalyst for Brazil's black movement, unlike any other in recent years. Most importantly, these meetings allowed them to discuss directly issues of racism with the undivided attention of high-level Brazilian government officials, an event that would rarely, if ever, occur in Brazil. This dialogue was further ensured by the presence of international peers, particularly diplomats, and NGO leaders committed to human rights. Also important, these conferences rallied together black activists from throughout the country with a renewed optimism about the possibility of black progress, especially in light of an unprecedented—although suspicious for many—dialogue with the federal government.

Brazil's black movement played a central role in forming La Alianza Estratégica de Afro-Latinoamericanos (La Alianza), an organization based in Montevideo, which has brought together Afro-Latin Americans and Afro-Caribbeans since 1998 through leadership training, the exchange of information, the discussion of common problems, and the development of regional strategies. Brazilian black-movement organizations worked closely with La Alianza in preparation for the Third World Conference on Racism. With black-movement representatives from at least ten other countries from the region, La Alianza met in San Jose, Costa Rica, on October 2000 and signed a document to be presented to the Latin American governments in Chile.⁴³ The document known as "El Documento de Santiago" provided a diagnosis of historical and current discrimination in the region and recommendations for overcoming its consequences. It also affirmed that denying the existence of discrimination and racism at the level of the state as well as society contributes directly to the practices of racism, discrimination, xenophobia, and related forms of intolerance. Finally, the document demanded the designation of effective antiracist policies that "can include" affirmative action. In that same month, twenty-six black women's organizations from Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Uruguay met to discuss strategies to further influence the World Conference.

The Latin American regional meeting was held in Santiago, Chile, in December 2000. That meeting was a turning point for the black movement in that the Brazilian government for the first time showed a resolve to do something about the issues the activists raised. Much to the surprise of Alianza members, the Latin American governments decided to accept "El Documento Santiago" in its entirety and make it part of their official platforms. Romero Rodriguez, a black-movement leader from Mundo Afro in Uruguay, proudly proclaimed that the "Documento de Santiago" had become the most important document for Latin American blacks since Abolition.

In June and July, a series of preparatory meetings were held in almost all of the twenty-six Brazilian states. The Brazilian government funded at least eighteen conferences for regions and states, including special topics such as one on the Afro-indigenous population. Additionally, fifteen states funded their own preparatory conferences.⁴⁴ Most of the funding for these conferences was by the Brazilian government, which signaled a strong commitment to the UN Race Conference. Government attention to the black movement was reaffirmed and consolidated at the National Preparatory Conference in July 2001 in Rio de Janeiro, which was attended by approximately 2,000 black-movement supporters from throughout Brazil. Government officials could not help but notice that the black movement was no longer based on a small cadre of activists but rather had developed widespread support. Moreover, they were confronted with many testimonials about race-based injustices and suffering person-

ally endured by those present. Government officials, for the first time, had opened themselves up, in a public forum, to accusations that they had long ignored the deeply harmful racial discrimination of Brazilian society, and that it was high time for them to seek the proper correctives.⁴⁵

Also prompted by the Brazilian government's sluggishness in addressing black-movement demands, black parliamentarians met in Salvador in July 2001 for the first time ever to form a black congressional caucus. Despite representing a diversity of parties and ideologies, they recognized the black movement's claim of persistent racial discrimination and inequality and the need to develop policies to promote equality. Among their priorities, they vowed to coordinate their efforts to promote a "National Reparations Fund to support public policies with lawfully determined funding"—that is, "a percentage of federal, state and local budgets for ten years"—and policies for "the well-being of the black population" and to "preserve the self-esteem of the black population."⁴⁶ Such a caucusing of black elected officials would have been unthinkable only a few years earlier.

THE WORLD CONFERENCE

The much-awaited World Conference finally occurred in late August 2001. The black movement was able to send between 150 and 200 activists to Durban as part of an NGO delegation, with the financial support of various private foundations and local governments as well as some self-financing, which involved great personal sacrifice. It also counted on representatives from other human-rights NGOs, including those representing indigenous peoples, women's rights, and economic, social, and cultural rights. The importance of the Brazilian delegation was heightened as a Brazilian black-movement activist and director of a São Paulo NGO, Edna Roland, became the general rapporteur for the official World Conference. The Brazilian government delegation consisted of about fifty representatives, which included the minister of justice, the secretary of human rights, several congressional delegates, local officials, and the national committee on race and racial discrimination with both its government and civil-society delegates.

According to Guacira Cesar, a feminist active at Durban and at the previous UN conferences on women and human rights, the Brazilian government had never invested this level of support to address any social-movement demands.⁴⁷ The Brazilian government had sent its secretary of human rights along with several ambassadors to the Chile conference. Along with the minister of justice and the secretary of human rights, it sent five diplomats to the Durban conference, which was more than it had sent to any other UN conference, including those in Vienna

(Human Rights, 1993), Cairo (Population and Development, 1995), Beijing (Women and Development, 1995), Copenhagen (Social Summit, 1995), and Beijing Plus 5 (Women and Development, 2000). The federal government's participation demonstrated an unprecedented seriousness about racial issues that continued to amaze even some of the most skeptical black-movement leaders. Itamaraty would no longer ignore or deny racial issues as it had in the past but rather it would commit major efforts and resources to Durban.

One event in particular was indicative of the growing cooperation between the government and the social activists. On the day before the beginning of the official conference, the minister of justice invited the civil-society activists to a meeting at his hotel so that they could share their concerns about the conference and he could brief them about the government's strategy. What followed was an interesting mix of nationalism and racial grievance making. After the brandishing of a Brazilian flag and a rousing bout of the Brazilian national anthem, in which everyone that I could see jubilantly participated, each of the attendees introduced themselves. Even though the activists had shown themselves to be patriots and nationalists, their often lengthy introductions also revealed high levels of black consciousness and their grievances and lamentations about the government's failure to act on their behalf. A few days later, the same black-movement activists and their international and domestic allies held a demonstration for the international press in front of the UN meeting hall in Durban, denouncing Brazil's failure to implement antiracist policies.

During the conference, the Brazilian government and Latin American governments turned out to be progressive on race issues, especially when compared to the government delegations from other world regions. By contrast, the United States and Israel eventually withdrew from the conference, leaving thousands of U.S. NGO activists disappointed and demoralized. The conference was politicized by two issues, both of which caused the United States to exit: the demand for reparations for centuries of slavery (and colonization), and the proposed sanctioning of Israel for its treatment of the Palestinians. The all-powerful Bush administration thus saw the conference as contrary to its interests. To stay and face the prospect of having its domestic race issues raised for discussion in a world forum, or to have their closest ally chastised and sanctioned would not be tolerated by an increasingly isolated and arrogant United States. Additionally, the nations of the European community, acting in unison, failed to support reparations for colonialism and slavery, and India denied that the caste system was racist.

Perhaps the greatest sign of change was what happened in Brazil itself rather than at the conference. While scores of black-movement activists attended the NGO conference in Durban in the days preceding the

official UN conference, their friends at home witnessed a transformation in the Brazilian media's historical neglect of race. To literally translate a phrase used by black activists at the time, "the race question was catching fire." In the week preceding and during the first week of the conference, the major newspapers in Brazil ran stories on race, racism, and the World Conference daily. The five major newspapers in Brazil ran 170 news articles, editorials, letters, and opinion pieces during the week of August 25–31, an unprecedented event in Brazilian journalistic history, where the subject of race was thought to be of little public interest, and articles ran only occasionally.⁴⁸ Part of the reason for the media's interest may have involved its exploitation of a rift in the government between the president's support for racial quotas and the minister of education's opposition, which was occurring in the wake of the forthcoming elections, in which the minister was expected to be a leading candidate. However, it undoubtedly also reflected a growing interest in the race issue by the Brazilian public.

The World Conference in Durban raised much optimism among black-movement leaders. Itamaraty appeared to have reversed its position, to now support the black movement. The government's promises, which included the implementation of affirmative action, were unprecedented and represented a new discourse that flew in the face of opposition from both the Left and the Right. But were these merely words? Despite the belief by many that policy was about to be revolutionized, many skeptics remained. Joaquim Barbosa, quoted in several newspapers, represented this view well, noting

I don't see any political or institutional conditions. This is a government at the end of its term with difficulties of getting approval for even items that form part of its political agenda. How are they going to pass affirmative action? The government is going to play to the public, saying it's going to happen, knowing well that it doesn't have the slightest chance of doing anything.⁴⁹

He also noted that the legal-philosophical principle of affirmative action is the search for the effective implementation of the principle of equality. Affirmative action implies setting aside formal equality and seeking real and material equality. It means breaking the logic by which we are all equal, when in fact, we are not. Such doubt seemed to be widespread. Although Brazil began experimenting with small-scale forms of affirmative action, both in the public and private spheres, large-scale government affirmative-action programs were, prior to the Durban conference, merely plans.

THE POST-DURBAN TRANSFORMATION

The Durban conference ended on September 8, 2001, with continuing debate and interest on racial issues in the Brazilian media. Regardless of the failure of Durban for the United States, the results were unequivocally positive for the black movement in Brazil. On September 5, the Brazilian government seemed to be well on its way to initiating race-specific affirmative action on a large scale. In response to the demands of the World Conference, the minister of agrarian development, Raul Jungmann, announced a "Program of Affirmative Action for Black Men and Women."⁵⁰ The program would strive to reduce the inequalities of opportunity among civil servants (*servidores*) and beneficiaries of agrarian reform and family agriculture by mandating race-based quotas for the participation of black men and women in administrative positions and positions in public exams (*concursos públicos*); guaranteeing black communities access to rural financing; and promoting seminars, research, and programs that focus on gender, race, and ethnicity. Specifically, 20 percent of all administrative positions in the ministry was to be reserved for negros, with this number increasing to 30 percent by 2003; and 30 percent of the ministry's budget allotted to predominately black rural communities. The program also mandated that all quilombo lands on federal and state lands should be recognized and titled.

However, the events of September 11, 2001, in the United States suddenly sidelined Brazilian media attention and public discussion of race in Brazil for at least one month, slowing the momentum and political payoff of Durban. Then on October 9, the State Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro announced that 40 percent of admission slots in state universities would be reserved for blacks and browns.⁵¹ Unlike the federal actions, the Rio action was legislative and therefore not subject to administrative modification or the likelihood of change or repeal with a new administration. Earlier that year, the same Rio de Janeiro state government body had reserved 50 percent of its university slots for public-school graduates. Also, at about the same time, a judge ruled in favor of a case brought forth by the Public Ministry, stipulating that public universities in the state of Minas Gerais should constitutionally be required to reserve 50 percent of its slots for students from public schools.

In December, the Ministry of Justice and the Federal Supreme Court followed suit, the former mandating that at least 20 percent of its high-level staff and consultants, as well as the staff of subcontractors, be black, and the latter that 20 percent of the employees of subcontracting firms be negro.⁵² The president also announced a program of affirmative action in the virtually all-white Foreign Diplomacy School (Instituto Rio Branco),

providing twenty scholarships annually for black students.⁵³ As Benedita da Silva had announced in Durban on March 24, 2002, the minister of labor directed that 20 percent of the budget of the Worker Assistance Financing (FAT) be directed to professional training for negro workers, particularly black women. The federal actions spawned a series of related actions in early 2002 by local governments, including the states of Mato Grosso do Sul and Santa Catarina, the municipalities of Jundiaí and Uberlândia, and universities in several Brazilian states.⁵⁴ Other localities instituted actions specifically for indigenous peoples. Most notably, the Federal Senate approved a bill by Senator Sebastião Rocha that supplanted the Sarney bill and would mandate a 20-percent quota for all public employment, all public and private universities, and federal subcontractors, for a period of fifty years.⁵⁵

In May 2002, President Cardoso signed the National Program for Affirmative Action, which was presented to him by seven of his twenty-one Ministers. It proposed federal administrative mechanisms to promote disadvantaged populations but did not set any quotas or goals. The administration's candidate for president, Health Minister José Serra, did not sign the plan, but promised to "create mechanisms that increase the participation of *negros* in businesses that transact with the federal government," without mentioning quotas or anything similar.⁵⁶ However, Serra eventually lost in the general elections in November to Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva of the Worker's Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores or PT). Near the end of Cardoso's term, his administration initiated the Diversity in the University program with the assistance of the InterAmerican Development Bank. That program seeks to create educational materials on diversity for secondary schools, establish a clearinghouse for sharing experiences and providing information on building college student diversity, and fund college-prep courses for mostly nonwhite students.

LULA'S FIRST YEAR

Lula began his presidency in January 2003. Lula's election signalled further progress in increasing black representation. Soon after his election, he chose three blacks or mixed-race persons to head ministries, an unprecedented act in Brazilian history. These included Gilberto Gil, a prominent singer and composer of Brazilian popular music, to head the Ministry of Culture; Benedita da Silva, a former senator and governor from Rio de Janeiro, to be the minister for social assistance and promotion; and Marina Silva, a mixed-race environmentalist and former senator from the Amazon region, to be the minister of the environment. He later created a secretariat for Promoting Policies of Racial Inclusion

(SEPPIR) and installed a black woman, Matilde Ribeiro, in that position. The Senate elected Paulo Paim as their first vice president shortly after Lula's inauguration. Most importantly, President Lula nominated forty-eight-year-old Joaquim Benedito Barbosa Gomes to the Brazilian Supreme Court, thus becoming the first black person in that position in the 174 years of that court. While the ministerial positions are temporary positions at the disposition of the president himself, the position of Supreme Court minister is particularly important because of its influence, and the term of office is guaranteed until the holder is seventy years old.

Since Lula's election, affirmative action seems to be gaining a hold in Brazilian policy circles. Affirmative action continued to be extended to other local governments and universities, including the National University of Brasília. Through SEPPIR the current administration has laid out extensive plans for "promoting racial equality." It supports racial quotas and other forms of affirmative action, including the continuation of the Itamaraty fellowships and the diversity in the university program, and Lula signed into law a plan that introduces African culture and history into the curriculum for elementary and secondary schools. Most importantly, he made the "overcoming of racial inequalities" a priority in his multiyear government plan. The black movement-federal government dialogue is at unprecedented levels. The future of real government action in combating racism will surely depend on the political will of the new PT administration and the black movement's ability to negotiate and influence the new government. Most of Brazil's black-movement leadership seems to be from the Worker's Party, as is the leadership of most social-movement organizations, and Lula apparently recognizes this.

By 2003, affirmative action began to suffer a backlash. In particular, the Federation of Private Schools has brought legal action challenging the constitutionality of Rio de Janeiro state laws that mandate quotas requiring 40 percent of admits to state universities be reserved for blacks or browns and 45 percent for public secondary-school graduates.⁵⁷ There have also been more than 100 writs seeking injunctive relief (*mandatos de segurança*) by white students demanding admission because of discrimination and displacement by the quotas. The Brazilian media—which had earlier supported the new racial quotas—and much of the white middle class now seem solidly positioned against the quotas. Meanwhile, the Rio de Janeiro state's public prosecution and black-movement attorneys have begun to prepare defenses of the state laws. This case is expected to reach the Brazilian Supreme Court in the coming months. However, in 2003 the Rio state legislature considerably reduced the number of admission slots reserved for quota students. The new quotas became 20 percent for public school students, 5 percent for the physically dis-

abled, and the racial quota became 20 percent for blacks (negros) as opposed to the previous 40 percent for blacks and browns (negros and pardos).

CONCLUSIONS

Brazilians' belief in racial democracy has become a thing of the past. Through its perseverance over the last twenty years during a period of democratization, the black movement had already turned public opinion around in Brazil. There is now widespread recognition of racism by Brazilian society, and the Brazilian government has begun to search for ways to deal with racism. After several fits and starts, Brazil surprisingly ushered in an era of affirmative action. Aside from the real change in the position of blacks that it is likely to create, Brazil's affirmative action has forced the issue of race on the national social agenda. Whether or not they agree with the racial quota systems that have been adopted so far, Brazilian policy makers and public opinion no longer ignore Brazil's racial hierarchy.

The end of the widespread belief in racial democracy was not revolutionary in the same sense as the end of legal segregation in the United States or apartheid in South Africa. After all, racial democracy was an ideology of nonracism and thus, for many, essentially antiracist. As sociologist Howard Winant (2001) claims, Brazil had anticipated by several decades the transition to nonracism that the United States and South Africa followed. However, the Brazilian elite under racial democracy had been silent or ambivalent when it came to issues of race, considering it a nonissue and discussion of it as un-Brazilian and racist. The end of racial democracy unveiled a facade that had long blinded Brazilians to deep-seated racism in their society. It also meant a coming to terms with racial exclusion as a central feature of Brazil's notorious social inequality. For the first time, Brazilian elites, academics, media, and policy makers began openly discussing racism and racial inequality. In comparative perspective, while some in the United States and South Africa came to believe that they had recently transcended race and racism through their new experiences of color-blind societies, the irony was that Brazil had done the same decades ago but without the racial reforms instituted by those two countries.

Unlike in the United States and South Africa, Brazil's black-movement victories were not dependent on mass social movements. Attempts at mass movements in Brazil have generally been failures. Rather, the black movement has used international forums and a receptive international

human-rights regime to denounce the Brazilian government for its record on racial justice despite an international reputation as a racial democracy. Black-movement NGO leaders went around their own elected representatives and sought the assistance of multilateral development institutions and international human-rights organizations. Additionally, they benefited from a common identity with black-rights leaders and organizations in the United States, with whom they shared valuable political and legal strategies. By acquiring the attention and commitment of these relatively powerful organizations the Brazilian black movement was able to secure its own place on the Brazilian government's agenda and pressure it for reform. At the same time, the Brazilian government had sought to improve its own standing in the international community and so needed to protect its reputation of being especially tolerant. Rather than risk being a new pariah of race relations, the international interests of the Brazilian government prompted steps toward real reforms at home.⁵⁸

The international human-rights community was particularly receptive to issues of race as preparations were being made for the UN Conference in Durban. The Third World Conference on Racism in Durban in 2001 granted legitimacy to the struggles against racism "and related forms of intolerance" in Brazil, throughout Latin America and other regions of the world, where such had long been denied. While North Americans may rightfully believe that the Third World Conference was doomed by the actions of the United States, important gains were made in not-so-powerful countries like Brazil that faced international and domestic protest over racist policies and their failures to combat racial intolerance. Media attention to the issue of race during the days of the conference was unprecedented in Brazil, as were government actions soon after. The idea of developing social policy to redress racism and racial inequality seems to have become well entrenched in Brazil's political life. Thus far, the Brazilian government seems to take issues of race seriously, although the extent to which it will seek to practice appeasement rather than pursue real reform remains to be seen.

At best, racial democracy continues to be a dream for Brazil's future. Many Brazilians seem to still believe that elements of racial democracy are at the core of Brazilian values. There also seems to remain an underlying sense that human relations in Brazil, at some level, are superior to those of segregated countries, particularly Brazil's perennial referent, the United States. Notably, the longstanding value given to race mixture, which sustained ideas of racial democracy, continues to be valued by Brazilians. Unfortunately, an ideology of whitening, which derives from a yet earlier stage in which miscegenation was considered degenerate, also continues to guide popular beliefs about the worth of others. Ironically, miscegenation has also come to frame opposition to affirmative

action. Like racial democracy had been in previous decades, a belief in the positive value of miscegenation remains relatively uncontested, a sort of commonsense truth that continues to represent beliefs about Brazilian race relations. Ideas about racial hybridity and syncretism continue to predominate in popular culture. The exact form that racial thinking will take in this postracial-democracy period is not yet clear.

This chapter focused mostly on political and ideological change, both essential for understanding the changing context of race in Brazil. The ultimate goal of these changes, however, should be real social change. Social exclusion, including discrimination, poverty, and violence, continue to be persistent problems in Brazilian society, disproportionately affecting blacks and mulattos. Whether or not Brazilian democratization and changing racial politics change that state of affairs remains to be seen. However, Brazil's new recognition of racism and increasingly proactive stance in combating it requires us to at least understand its nature. Much of the remainder of this book will seek to do just that, beginning with the important issue of how Brazilians classify by race.

Despite the closer ties to African culture found in Brazil as compared to the United States, there is a greater sense of a separate racial identity from whites for black North Americans than for Afro-Brazilians. Religion is an indicator of this. While religion in Brazil can be more directly linked to Africa, religious practice is largely separate by race in the United States, unlike in Brazil. In the United States, unlike in Brazil, black identity and black-white boundaries are based largely on cultural distinctives, such as language and segregated Christian churches. This suggests that the Brazilian nation was especially successful at imposing cultural uniformity across racial categories. However, little cultural separation, weaker racial consciousness, or ambiguous racial identities do not mean that racial boundaries are unimportant. Frederick Barth and his followers have argued that it is the social construction of boundaries that is more important than any cultural content that may define them. This chapter has shown that Brazilians clearly make racial or color distinctions that are not necessarily delimited by the cultural characteristics of those in particular racial categories. The following chapters will show that these racial distinctions are used to create social hierarchies, further strengthening the racial boundaries.

Chapter Five

RACIAL INEQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT

SCHOLARS have clearly established the existence of racial inequality in Brazil, but systematic and comparative evidence is scattered. In this chapter, I compare Brazil's racial inequality to that in the United States and South Africa, focusing on their income structures and the distribution of whites and nonwhites by income. I then establish a base line of reliable indicators of racial inequality along several socioeconomic-status variables. Inasmuch as I can, I also explore racial inequalities between browns and blacks, as well as by gender. Finally, I examine the relation of Brazil's racial inequalities to its recent development using two strategies. First, I investigate changing levels of racial inequality from 1960 to 1999; and then, I examine the relation between occupational inequality and industrialization across the seventy-three largest urban areas in Brazil.

INCOME INEQUALITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Brazil is renowned for being the world champion in overall income inequality. The World Bank's 2000 report shows Brazil as having the third-highest Gini index of income inequality among 150 countries, preceded only by the small countries of Swaziland and Sierra Leone. South Africa is also near the top, in fourth place. In Brazil, the average income of the highest-earning 10 percent is twenty-eight times the average income of the bottom 40 percent.¹ For many analysts and for its elite, Brazil's severe inequalities are at the root of nearly all of Brazil's major social problems, including its poverty, poor health and education systems, high rates of crime, and the lack of social and political integration of the majority of the population.²

As long as whites, browns, and blacks are unevenly distributed along the income structure, racial inequality exists. However, both the shape of that structure and the relative position of the population by race along it determine overall levels of racial inequality. In other words, the fact that black and brown men earn 40 to 50 percent of white men in Brazil, while black men earn 75 percent of white men in the United States, could




FIGURE 5.1 Percent distribution of the population by monthly income (in U.S. dollars) and race for Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. (Brazil, 1996 figure: 1996 Brazilian National Household Survey [PNAD]; South Africa, 1998 figure: 1998 Survey of Socioeconomic Opportunity and Achievement; United States, 1996 figure: 1996 Current Population Survey.)

simply reflect Brazil's far greater income inequality. In comparative terms, the top 10 percent of Brazilians earn incomes worth 52 percent of the total income of all Brazilians, while South Africa has the second most unequal structure among large countries, in which the top 10 percent of South African earners control 47 percent of the country's total income. The country with the greatest inequality among the so-called industrialized nations is the United States, with a comparable figure of 25 percent of total income for the top 10 percent of earners.

Figure 5.1 portrays the dual effect of income structure and the distribution of whites and nonwhites along that structure for Brazil, South Africa, and the United States. It portrays the shape of these three nations' income pyramids, using data from recent censuses or surveys for all persons with income.³ For Brazil and South Africa, the steps on the pyramids are calculated in categories of approximately \$50 (U.S.) each, and for the United States, in increments of roughly \$100, due to the greater incomes generally found in that country. As a rough guide, the income or socio-economic shape of a society with a large middle class should be larger in the middle rungs, while a society with large income inequalities or a large proportion of poor people tend to look like a wide-based pyramid. The wide base of the income structures of Brazil and South Africa illustrate the existence of many poor persons. This high rate of poverty, coupled with a sizable number of persons in the top rung, reflects their status as the two most unequal large countries in the world. A more rectangular shape for the United States shows that income is more evenly distributed there than in Brazil and South Africa.

The right half of the pyramids, with darker bars, represents the distribution of nonwhites in the three countries while the left side represents the income distribution for whites. The pyramids are not symmetrical because whites and nonwhites are not evenly distributed by income. Thus, the extent of the asymmetry reveals the extent to which there is racial inequality. In all three countries, whites tend to be concentrated near the top and blacks near the bottom, although the differences in racial distribution along the pyramids vary. The figure reveals that South Africa is clearly the most racially unequal of the three societies. Blacks and coloreds are concentrated in the bottom income rungs, where there are few whites. For example, about 27 percent of nonwhite South Africans are in the lowest income bracket compared to only 4 percent of their white compatriots. Seventy-six percent of black and colored South Africans earn under \$300 per month, roughly the poverty rate, compared to 15 percent of white South Africans. This is not surprising given that country's recent emergence from apartheid, which legally mandated a racial hierarchy.

According to figure 5.1, Brazil's racial inequality appears to be intermediate to the United States and South Africa. Browns and blacks are

concentrated in the lowest rungs, as they are in South Africa, but many more whites are also at the lowest income levels in Brazil. Persons earning less than \$200 (those in the bottom four rungs) represent the lowest-earning 40 percent of Brazilians with at least some income. This group includes 52 percent of nonwhites but only 29 percent of whites. Unlike South Africa, where the poor are almost exclusively nonwhite, a significant proportion of the Brazilian poor is white, as it is among the North American poor.

The difference between Brazil and the United States tends to be at the top end. Racial inequality in Brazil derives mostly from the near absence of nonwhites in the middle class and above, rather than from the absence of whites among the poor. For example, the highest income bracket shown for Brazil (\$2,000 or more) consists of 7.5 percent of the national white population but only 1.5 percent of nonwhites. Thus, whites are about five times as likely as nonwhites to be in the top income bracket in Brazil. By comparison, whites in the United States are only twice as likely as blacks to be in the top end of the income structure. On the other hand, white South Africans are about ten times as likely as blacks and coloreds to be in the highest income bracket.

The highest income bracket in figure 5.1 also includes persons making much more than \$2,000. The numbers of income categories could have been extended higher, but I closed this interval because the numbers in each bracket would become nearly imperceptible in the figure, especially for nonwhites. The very top of the income distribution—which includes Brazil's business and media executives, judges, doctors, and other high-level professionals—is almost all white. For example, according to the 1996 PNAD, whites outnumbered nonwhites as judges by more than ten to one. Johnson (1996) estimated that 29 "black" representatives served in the federal Congress between 1988 and 1995, out of a total of more than 2,000 representatives. Johnson probably included those that were very obviously mulatto or black or that had declared themselves as such. Currently, at an even more prestigious level, approximately 2 of roughly 1,060 diplomats,⁴ 1 of over 100 generals,⁵ and 8 of 600 members of the Federal Public Prosecution⁶ are black or brown. Until Lula became president on January 1, 2003, all of Brazil's presidents and ministers in recent memory, except Pelé, were white. A 2003 survey of the 500 largest businesses in Brazil found that only 1.8 percent of managers are negro.⁷ Although the nature of Brazilian classification makes it impossible to get uncontested precision about the number of nonwhites in such elite positions, there is no doubt that the proportions are very small.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

In recent years, analysts have placed increasing emphasis on social conditions as an indicator of development as opposed to the traditional reliance on a country's productivity, as the gross domestic product (GDP) measures. To this end, the United Nations and multinational banks have created the index of human development, which measures average national achievements on three basic dimensions: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. The specific data inputs include life expectancy, infant mortality, adult literacy, and school enrollment, which are then differentially weighted for calculating an index for all countries. In 1999, Brazil ranked 69th out of 174 countries in human development, which put it between Saudi Arabia and the Philippines.⁸ The most developed countries using that index are Norway, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Belgium, and the United States.

The index of human development can also be calculated for subsectors of national populations provided the data are available. For example, I mapped Brazilian states indicating level of human development in chapter 1. I showed that regional differences in racial composition correlated with human development. More directly, Santa Anna and Paixão (1997) calculated the human development index for whites and nonwhites separately at the national level. Their results, presented in table 5.1, revealed that the black and brown Brazilian population by itself would score 0.663, placing it between Guatemala and Honduras at 108th on the world scale. The white population, if it constituted a separate country, would score 0.784 and rank 43rd, alongside Costa Rica, the Bahamas, and Kuwait. The components used to compute the human development index are also shown in table 5.1 for all of Brazil and for whites and

TABLE 5.1
Index of human development (IHD) and select components by race:
Brazil, 1996/1997

	Human development index	Life expectancy at birth (1997)	Infant mortality/ 1000 (1996)	Adult literacy rate (1997)	School enrollment ratio (1997)
Brazil	0.773	67	48	85	78
Whites	0.784	70	37	92	82
Nonwhite	0.663	64	62	72	73

Source: Santa Anna 2001.

nonwhites separately. Life expectancy for whites is six years greater than for nonwhites, and infant mortality is 40 percent less. Adult literacy for whites is 28 percent greater than nonwhites, and the school enrollment ratio is about 12 percent greater.

POVERTY

While inequality refers to the overall distribution of incomes, poverty refers to the bottom of the income structure—specifically, the point under which basic human needs cannot be satisfactorily met. By drawing a line at some reasonable point along the income hierarchy, one can roughly figure the number of blacks, whites, or browns living in poverty or belonging to the middle class. However, this method is only approximate and skeptical readers might claim that this overestimates the actual amount of racial inequality, since nonwhites are especially likely to live in places where the cost of living is lower. This is an especially important issue in a country as large and regionally diverse as Brazil, where costs of living vary widely depending on supply and demand, consumption habits, levels of development, size of urban areas, and other factors.⁹ These adjustments not only affect calculations of the poverty rate but have implications for the measurement of racial inequality.

By considering local costs of living and consumption habits of the poor, as well as household size and income, Lopes (1989) calculated the number of urban Brazilians that were living in poverty or indigent in 1989. He defined the poverty line as the minimum income needed to satisfy all of the basic needs of an individual, including food, access to schools, health services, water, and sanitation, and the indigency line as the minimum amount needed to satisfy only basic individual dietary needs. Lopes found that 18 percent of households with black or brown heads were indigent compared to only 6 percent of white households. Another 32 percent of black or brown households—compared to 16 percent of white households—were poor but not indigent. Based on this careful analysis, we can conclude that 50 percent of black and brown households in Brazil were poor in 1989 compared to only 22 percent of white households. Thus, urban browns and blacks were just as likely to be poor as to not be poor (50:50) in 1989. White chances were 78:22 or about three-and-a-half times as likely to be nonpoor than poor. In sum, according to the standard for calculating relative odds, that makes nonwhites three-and-a-half times as likely as whites to be poor.

UNEMPLOYMENT

Differences in unemployment are a leading indicator of racial inequality in the United States and are often considered a particularly good indicator of discrimination. Like unemployment figures for the United States, the official IBGE statistics capture only open unemployment, which refers to those people that were not employed at all in the previous week and were seeking work in the past thirty days. However, this method greatly underestimates the degree to which persons remain unproductive. Alternative unemployment figures are produced by the Brazilian Labor Unions' Department for Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies (DIESSE), based on their monthly surveys of six large metropolitan areas. These figures tend to be higher than those of the IBGE because, in addition to open unemployment, they also count hidden unemployment due to unstable work or discouragement from the job search.¹⁰ The DIESSE statistics for unemployment and weeks unemployed are presented by INSPIR (Instituto Sindical Interamericano pela Igualdade Racial) (1999), which publishes them for negros (browns and blacks) and non-negros (whites and Asians). Thus, the negro category is the same as our nonwhite category, and the non-negro category is, for all intents and purposes, the same as white in all six metropolitan areas. In São Paulo, the Asian population is particularly large, compared to other urban areas, but the white population is roughly twenty times larger.

Table 5.2 shows that the black and brown population in all six metropolitan areas had higher levels of unemployment than whites. For example, in the São Paulo metropolitan area, 16 percent of the combined

TABLE 5.2
Race differences in unemployment for six metropolitan areas, 1998

Metropolitan area	Unemployment rate	
	Negro	Non-Negro
São Paulo	22.7	16.1
Salvador	25.7	17.7
Recife	23.0	19.1
Brasília	20.5	17.5
Belo Horizonte	17.8	13.8
Porto Alegre	20.6	15.2

Source: Instituto Sindical Interamericano pela Igualdade Racial, 1999.

white and Asian population was unemployed compared to 23 percent of the nonwhite population. Comparable figures include 18 percent for whites and 26 percent for nonwhites in Salvador and 14 and 18 percent for Belo Horizonte. Based on DIESSE's publication, these differences held up even when gender, age, family position, and educational level were kept constant. The published data was available only for negros and thus it did not allow an analysis of brown-black distinctions, although the authors of the study told me that browns were generally intermediate to whites and blacks on unemployment and average levels of income. White-nonwhite differences in unemployment, which the INSPIR data effectively capture, are always smaller than the 2:1 ratio that has historically characterized black-white unemployment in the United States. However, it may be that the white-black (preto) distinctions in Brazil may be more similar to those for the United States.

BLACK-BROWN DIFFERENCES

Thus far we have considered racial inequality between whites and nonwhites, the latter encompassing blacks and browns or mulattos. Carl Degler's *Neither Black Nor White* claims that the main difference between Brazil and the United States is that mulattos have a privileged status in Brazil, unlike light-skinned U.S. blacks. Degler seems to assume that because mulattos in the United States are categorized as black, they are treated like blacks. He contrasts this to Brazil where the status of the mulatto reflects a national belief in whitening, where whiteness is desirable and blackness is stigmatized and to be escaped from. Degler's theory has been challenged by Nelson do Valle Silva (1978; 1985), who uses econometric models to conclude that blacks and browns in Brazil experience similar levels of racial discrimination. In addition, lighter skin tone is also correlated with greater opportunity in the United States. Although white/black distinctiveness in the United States is based on rules about ancestry, in which anyone with "a drop of black blood" is defined as black, light-skinned "blacks" in the United States generally do better than their dark-skinned counterparts, and on a standard of physical beauty, are seen as more attractive.¹¹ Indeed, Skidmore (1993, 380) notes that Degler seems to overlook the contradiction in his claims that "mulattos have been forced back into the nonwhite category and so feel keenly their deprivation because they are better educated and more socially mobile." Skidmore then asks "but why were they better educated and more socially mobile?"

Figure 5.2 shows the overall income status of Brazilians according to the three color categories used in the census. The figure reveals that the




FIGURE 5.2 Mean annual family income in Brazil and the U.S. for whites and by skin color among African-origin population: 1980. (Data for Brazil are from 25-percent microdata sample of the 1980 Brazilian census; data for the U.S. are from the 1979-1980 National Survey of Black Americans as reported by Keith and Herring 1991.)

average incomes of black and brown families is about 40 and 44 percent, respectively, of those of white families. Black and brown Brazilians have much lower incomes than whites, but black family income is close to (90 percent of) brown family income. Thus, there is a huge white-nonwhite gap and a relatively small gap between blacks and browns. In terms of actual income, then, the primary racial boundary in Brazil is clearly between whites and nonwhites.¹²

Similar findings might be expected in the United States. Light-skinned African Americans might earn more than darker-skinned African Americans, but according to Degler's claim, the differences are slight when compared to the much higher earnings of whites. However, data from the National Survey of Black Americans, which is also presented in figure 5.2, demonstrate that family incomes of African Americans range from 53 percent of mean white incomes for the darkest subgroup to 80 percent of white income for the lightest. These results demonstrate greater differences between dark- and light-skinned Africans in the United States than in Brazil,¹³ and the gap between white and brown is much greater in

*large conclusion
showing how big a gap*

Brazil than in the United States. Ironically, a color continuum thus better characterizes racial income differences in the United States than in Brazil, although subjective notions of race are based on a dichotomy in the United States, but on a continuum in Brazil.

WEALTH

Recently, researchers in the United States have begun to focus on wealth because of the growing availability of data and a stubbornly large wealth gap between blacks and whites. Wealth is what people own and can be drawn on beyond income sources to give their bearers or their children access to expensive items like housing and children's private schooling. Wealth is especially important for racial inequality because it is often transmitted intergenerationally and posthumously, thus reproducing historical inequalities. For the United States, Oliver and Shapiro (1995) find large differences in wealth between whites and blacks of the same occupation or income group. For example, whereas black professional incomes are 75 percent of those of their white counterparts, their net worth is only 18 percent of that of whites.¹⁴ Thus, racial inequalities in private wealth in the United States reveal large inequalities that are not apparent by looking at income, education, or occupation.

✓ Oliver and Shapiro attribute the large racial difference in assets in the United States to institutional and policy discrimination, particularly housing discrimination. For most North Americans, home ownership is their only major financial asset, which they call the sine qua non of the American Dream. However, the chances of owning a home are lower for blacks because they were barred from access to the housing and mortgage markets that continue to give whites vast privileges in securing housing. When blacks own homes, their market values do not increase at a similar rate as the homes of whites, because they are almost invariably located in segregated neighborhoods, where home values remain low. Furthermore, the historical and current restriction of blacks to ghettos and isolated communities, deny African Americans access to jobs and high-quality schools, which itself contributes to income attainment and wealth accumulation.

In Brazil, wealth assets also permit an improved quality of life, over what income by itself allows. For the Brazilian middle class, wealth may allow one to afford private school for kids and provide a cushion against occasional economic downturns. Discrimination against blacks at an earlier time, when racism may have been more severe, may create racial differences in wealth accumulation currently.

Unfortunately, full wealth data for Brazil is unavailable. The only wealth indicator I was able to find was from the PPV (Pesquisa Sobre Padrões de Vida [Survey of Life Patterns]), which provides information on the value of the home that respondents own and reside in. The survey also asked if respondents had bought an automobile, land, telephone, boat, etc. in the past year, but only collected the value of those items that were recently purchased. The value of the home in which one resides is likely to be the greatest financial asset for most Brazilians, but for the elite, it may represent only a minor portion of all financial assets.

I compare home-ownership values among whites, browns, and blacks across the same occupational groups in table 5.3. Specifically, column 4 shows the mean monthly market value of homes for the six occupational groups by color¹⁵ with data from the PPV, which was collected in 1996 and 1997 for the Northeast and Southeast regions of Brazil, which represent most of the Brazilian population. The results demonstrate that racial differences in wealth are greater than those for income, which are shown in columns 2 and 3. For example, among the lowest status category, the value of one's home for whites (83) is more than twice as great as for browns (41) and three times as great as for blacks (27). By comparison, white incomes at that level are less than twice as high as those for browns or blacks. This order of difference is generally repeated at all six occupational levels. If all other assets could be added, racial inequality in wealth would most likely be higher still, especially for the highest occupational bracket. Such large racial differences reveal the added disadvantages beyond income of being brown, and especially black, in Brazil.

DEVELOPMENT AND RACIAL INEQUALITY

The following two sections examine changing income and educational racial inequality in Brazil since 1960. These trends reveal stability or change in racial inequality in the past four decades and thus provide a historical context for understanding current levels and prospects for the future. In exploring these trends, I am particularly interested in the relation between development and racial inequality, a relation that has commanded the attention of sociologists for decades. Development itself has arguably been the most important area of research in Brazilian sociology. The effect of development on racial inequality was a central focus of research on race in Brazil and the United States from the 1950s to the 1980s. Prior to the analysis, I first examine two competing sociological theories that conceptualize how development may affect racial inequality.

TABLE 5.3

Occupational distribution, income and home-ownership value for whites, browns, and blacks: southeast and northeast regions of Brazil, 1996-1997

<i>Occupation^a</i>	<i>Percent in each occupational category by color (PPV)</i> (1)	<i>Monthly income from primary jobs</i> (2)	<i>Total monthly income^c</i> (3)	<i>Market value of owned homes per month</i> (4)
White				
High-level professional	4.5	2870	3434	743
Mid-level professional	9.5	1914	2170	569
Low-level professional	16.4	888	1108	358
Semi-/skilled urban manual	16.7	587	687	223
Unskilled urban manual	38.3	386	435	232
Unskilled rural manual	14.7	120	165	83
Brown				
High-level professional	1.5	2142	3179	441
Mid-level professional	3.3	1288	2034	269
Low-level professional	10.7	490	579	184
Semi-/skilled urban manual	15.5	444	541	140
Black				
Unskilled urban manual	38.8	245	281	131
Unskilled rural manual	30.2	70	102	41
High-level professional^d				
Mid-level professional	0.3	—	—	—
Low-level professional	2.2	1196	1312	283
Semi-/skilled urban manual	8.9	534	634	153
Unskilled urban manual	20.5	510	566	129
Unskilled rural manual	41.3	291	313	127
Unskilled rural manual	26.8	63	85	27

Source: Pesquisa Sobre Padrões de Vida (PPV) 1996-1997

N = 3,785

^aHigh-level professional includes university-educated professionals and large-property owners; mid-level professional includes mid-level professionals and midsize property owners; low-level professional includes nonmanual laborers, low-level professionals, and small-property owners; and semi-/skilled refers to skilled and semiskilled urban workers.

^bIncludes gross monthly salary of primary job (first job or business income) and the value of benefits received in the last 30 days from bonuses or vacation, transportation, food, housing supplements, and any other job-related benefits.

^cIncludes gross monthly salary of primary job (first job or business income), secondary job (benefits included), additional jobs and the value of benefits received in the last 30 days from bonuses or vacation, transportation, food, housing supplements, any other job-related benefits, retirement, social security, permanence, life insurance, alimony, dividends, workers' compensation, lottery or inheritance, money from sale of items, unemployment, value of gifts, and all other sources of income.

^dN = 3

✓ *The traditional liberal theory.* This perspective argues that industrial development reduces or eliminates racial inequality. Industrialization can be expected to undermine traditional social orders in preindustrial societies, where, after slavery, patriarchal social systems continued to keep blacks and mulattos in low-level, racially defined positions. Theoretically, the new industrialized economic system dislodges persons from their old social positions, which forces new relationships between persons of different races as active competition replaces the structured domination of the old paternalistic system. Job opportunities expand for all, and heightened competitiveness requires industrial employers to evaluate workers on the basis of productivity rather than ascription. Moreover, sentimentality is replaced by rationality and status, and contractual and impersonal relations replace personal ones. This perspective draws largely from Durkheim's belief that modern societies rationally allocate labor on the basis of workers' achieved rather than ascribed characteristics. According to this conventional view, greater universalism also means lower racial inequality in education.

In addition to transforming social relationships and values, industrialization brings about specific organizational changes that support this conventional view. Industrialization tends to concentrate workers in factories so that hiring, firing, and promotion are more impersonal and often decided by several supervisors. Absentee company owners interested in maximum returns on their capital may be solely concerned with productivity and thus focus only on the human capital that workers bring to their jobs. ✓ In an increasingly competitive environment, even the most racist owners are forced to hire the most productive workers available. A high level of capital investment puts similar pressure on owners. Greater industrial specialization and complexity also ensures greater mobility of workers, thus leading to greater opportunity for underrepresented groups. The same phenomenon may be obtained in modernized service sectors, which also become increasingly competitive and often ancillary to manufacturing.

Industrialization has been central to academic research on race relations in Brazil, especially during the 1960s when such work focused on the integration of blacks into the newly industrializing Brazilian economy. Although not a traditional liberal thinker but rather a Marxist, Florestan Fernandes agreed that development and particularly the rise of capitalism would erode racial antipathies. Fernandes (1965) claimed that racism was a legacy of slavery, but that capitalism and industrial development would transform Brazil into a modern society based on class identification, which would eventually displace racial ascription. He argued that white hostility and the "social deficiencies," inherited from the dehumanizing system of slavery, had kept Afro-Brazilians from competing with whites; but such effects, he maintained, were beginning to disappear.

✓ *The persistence of race theory.* The liberal view was first challenged by Blumer (1965) and later by Hasenbalg (1979) with regard to industrialization in Brazil. Blumer, while recognizing the great transformative influence of industrialization, proposed that it might actually reinforce the traditional racial order. Where subordinate groups are highly differentiated and marginalized, industrial organizations may find material advantages in maintaining the racial order, such as avoiding labor conflicts where dominant group workers benefit from the elimination of subordinate group members as potential competitors for jobs. Thus, industrialization would reinforce the prevailing racial ideology, ensuring the continuation of racial inequality. Industrialization's effect would be neutral, although the meaning and function of race may have changed. For the Brazilian case, the denial of racism may have reinforced the perception that there was no problem to fix, entrenching the old racial order.

Wilson (1978) claimed that racial norms from preindustrial times had generally maintained preindustrial inequalities after industrialization, and the continuation of such inequalities in turn reinforced the norms. He noted that in the United States it was only the state, acting in response to political pressures, that had been powerful enough to change racial norms, and thus racial inequality. Most notably, the United States instituted Jim Crow legislation, and more recently, affirmative-action policies. Likewise, in countries like the United States and Brazil, the state implements most educational reform, often independently of industrialization. Redistributive investments in education can compensate disadvantaged populations.

Brazilian development. Brazil experienced tremendous industrialization from the 1930s—especially after World War II—until about 1980. Growth during the period was mostly modeled on an import-substitution plan. Its objective was to modernize the economy and increase economic growth by diminishing dependence on foreign-manufactured goods. While it had relied on the exportation of a few agricultural products throughout most of its history, by the 1950s, industrialization had become the engine and hope of Brazil's drive to modernization and development. Industrial growth was high throughout most of the postwar period, and by the early 1970s, the value of manufactured goods surpassed coffee among Brazil's exports. Economic growth was particularly intense during the "Brazilian economic miracle" between 1968 and 1974, when it averaged 11.3 percent per year. By 1980, Brazil had become the seventh-largest ✓ economy in the capitalist world.

However, this growth disproportionately benefited the middle class. Between 1960 and 1970, the share of the national income for the lowest 40 percent of earners had declined from 11.2 percent to 9.0 percent,

while the top 5 percent increased their share from 27.4 to 36.3 percent. Industrialization was concentrated in São Paulo and to a lesser extent in other states of the Southeast and South, while the North and Northeast benefited little from industrialization. In 1981, Brazil experienced its first year of negative growth in decades, which brought with it high unemployment rates, a decline in real wages, shrinkage of the government sector, and the growth of informal and service-sector jobs. Economic growth resumed in 1983, sputtered again from 1987 to 1992, and then resumed again, albeit at a slower pace. By the mid-1990s, it became clear that import substitution had run its course, and Brazil embraced neoliberal economic policies, based on relatively open markets and global trade.¹⁶

In my investigation of historical trends in patterns of income and educational inequality, I use seven time points from 1960 to 1999. Because of data restrictions, the longitudinal analysis can only begin in 1960, well after industrialization had begun. The time points are 1960, 1976, 1982, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 1999. Unfortunately, national-level data on race are not available for the sixteen years between 1960 and 1976, but subsequently, the data points are about five years apart. As a rough guide, 1960 to 1976 saw tremendous growth; growth continued from 1976 to 1982, although not as fast; and declined in 1981 and 1982. Growth reemerged from 1982 to 1986, but 1986 to 1991 was mostly a period of decline. The two periods since then have experienced slow but continuous growth.

INCOME

A common way to figure out whether nonwhites are narrowing the gap that separates them from whites is to ask if the income of the typical non-white is becoming more like that of the typical white. Thus, in figure 5.3, I report trends from 1960 to 1999 in the mean monthly incomes of white women, brown men and women, and black men and women, expressed as a percentage of the income of white men. The figure reveals that the racial gap in income for men has increased since 1960. The mean income of black men was 60 percent of white men in 1960, decreased to 38 percent by 1976, but partially recovered to about 45 percent by 1999. Similarly, brown men earned about 57 percent of white men in 1960, decreased to 44 percent in 1976, and then only slightly increased to 46 percent by 1999. Contrary to the prediction of the liberal theory of industrialization, the racial gap for men increased mostly during the period of Brazil's so-called economic miracle from 1968 to 1974. This is consistent with the fact that, despite economic growth and urbanization, income became more concentrated among the highest earners, the large majority of whom were white.




FIGURE 5.3 Mean monthly income of selected color-sex groups as a percentage of white men's income (white men = 100 percent): 1960–1999. (1960 and 1991 censuses; 1976, 1982, 1986, 1996, and 1999 National Household Surveys.)

Similarly, the wages of black males in the United States were only about 40 percent of those of white men in 1940 and had risen to just over 50 percent by 1960. By 1975, though, black men made dramatic gains, as their wages increased to nearly 80 percent of white male earnings. Since then, the relative wages of black men have stagnated or slightly declined. By 1990, they became about 75 percent of those of white men.¹⁷

Black men in Brazil reported slightly higher incomes than brown men in the 1960 census, but the latter had higher incomes in all subsequent years. The turnaround may be partly due to the fact that browns have been historically concentrated in rural areas and the Northeast but migrated heavily to cities and wealthier regions from the 1950s to the 1970s. However, the small differences between brown and black men may also be due to changes in racial classification over time between the two categories, in which a large proportion of persons that identified as black in the 1950s and 1960s were reclassified as brown in the 1980 census.¹⁸

For black and brown women, the huge income gap with white men narrowed in each subsequent year for which data are available. In 1960, the mean income of black women was about 8 percent of that for white men, rose steadily to 24 percent by 1976, remained flat until 1986, and then rose to about 32 percent by 1996. The mean income of brown women in 1960 was 12 percent of white male income and subsequently remained very similar to the income of black women, as both slowly but steadily increased throughout the period. These steady increases for

the incomes of nonwhite women, unlike men, may be due to increasing enforcement of minimum-wage laws for occupations at the bottom of the income pyramid, especially domestic workers. The income gap between nonwhite men and women narrowed as men's income position worsened, especially from 1960 to 1976, and that of women's improved. While there were roughly 50 percentage points separating nonwhite men from women in 1960, by 1999 the two groups were only about 10 percentage points apart, accounting for greater convergence of the incomes of nonwhite men and women.

For nonwhite women, the more appropriate comparison group may be white women, which would allow us to understand whether trends were similar for women. The mean income of white women relative to white men's was similar in 1960 and in 1999, although it had dropped from 1960 to 1976 but rose steadily after that. Because white women's income dropped vis-à-vis white men, and black and brown women's income increased, racial differences in income among women decreased sharply from 1960 to 1976. Whereas white women earned about 5 times as much as brown women and 8.5 times as much as black women in 1960, by 1976 they earned about twice as much as both brown and black women, and the size of this gap roughly prevailed until 1999. Like Brazil, the greatest gains for blacks in the United States during the period were for women, where mean income steadily rose from a low of 36 percent in comparison to white men in 1962, to about 55 percent by 1975. However, unlike Brazil, the gap between white and black women was nearly eliminated in 1975, although it would increase in the following years.¹⁹

EDUCATION

Brazil's vast income inequality mirrors similarly great inequality in education. The government disproportionately subsidizes the wealthiest students—most of whom attended private schools until college—to attend high-quality public universities. On the other hand, poorer students attend the poorly resourced primary and secondary public school system, but they often do not qualify for admission to public universities. As a result, they are forced to pay to attend often poor-quality private universities. The wealthiest 7 percent of the population accounts for 27 percent of all college students, while the poorest 40 percent contributes only 5 percent to higher education. The Brazilian government spends three-and-a-half times its income per capita on each public university student, or 6.5 billion dollars each year on public higher education, for only 5 percent of the college-age cohort, which is roughly twenty times its expenditures for each elementary or secondary student. Moreover, Brazil has

the lowest professor-college student ratio (9:1) in the world. Based on his comparative study, C. Castro (2001) calls Brazil "the world champion in social injustice in higher education," complementing its title in income inequality. ✓

The Brazilian state has neglected public education at the primary and secondary levels throughout the twentieth century. According to Skidmore (1999, 87), schooling was clearly related to elites' perceptions of the largely nonwhite labor force.

Employers typically harbored racist attitudes and doubted their workers could ever rise above menial tasks. Conspicuously missing was an appropriate recognition of skilled labor, not only for industry but also for the multiple tasks of a modern economy. While the industrialized countries (and Argentina) were pouring money into public education at the turn of the century, Brazil continued to neglect this basic form of resource development.

Coming to realize in the 1940s, in part, that its high rates of illiteracy retarded Brazil's modernization and democratization, the Brazilian government set out to expand its public school system. Burns (1970, 452) notes that in 1940 there were 3¼ million students enrolled at all levels, and by 1965 the total had reached 11¼ million; but since the number of children had approximately doubled during that period, only 13 of every 1,000 students reached secondary school in 1965. In the 1970s, the public university system grew but the number of students it could serve continued to be small. Regional differences were especially large. For example, the state of São Paulo spent as much on education as all other states combined, and in 1965, 80 percent of its adult population was literate compared to 30 percent of the population in the Northeast.

Racial inequality in education is clearly dependent on one's geographic location, as the case of São Paulo demonstrates. Even primary schools have often not been available in many of the poorer areas of Brazil, a factor which disproportionately affects nonwhites. In addition to whether schools are available, education depends on whether individuals take advantage of them. Whether or not to take advantage of schooling depends on government requirements, usually a minimum number of years of schooling, and individual and family needs and resources. In response to poverty, families often depend on children to leave school and seek ways to earn income at an early age. For nonwhites, they are particularly likely to drop out early because they tend to have less resources than whites and perceive less chance of school success. ✓

Income depends largely on education because workers are rewarded for their knowledge and skills, so higher education means greater income. This is especially true in Brazil. In a comparison of Brazil, South Africa, and the United States, Lam (2000) demonstrates that the mag-

TABLE 5.4
Distribution of years of schooling completed by race and sex, 25–64 years of age:
Brazil, 1999

Years of Schooling	White		Brown		Black	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
0	8.4	8.8	22.2	21.6	20.6	22.0
1–3	12.6	12.9	20.3	19.4	19.5	19.4
4–7	31.5	30.7	30.3	30.1	32.3	31.0
8–10	15.0	14.0	12.1	11.5	13.3	12.3
11–14	21.1	22.8	12.7	14.6	11.7	12.5
15+	11.4	10.8	2.4	2.8	2.6	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra por Domicílios, 1999.

nitude of this relation is especially great for Brazil, where returns for income are about 15 to 20 percent greater with each additional year of schooling starting around the seventh grade. For example, at the extremes, an average nonwhite man with a college education in Brazil earns 11.3 times as much as his counterpart with no schooling. This situation is worsening in Brazil as returns to education have increased sharply for the university-educated but have decreased for those with primary and secondary education. Lam demonstrates that racial differences in education are smaller in South Africa compared to Brazil.²⁰ For example, among twenty- to twenty-four-year-olds, whites in South Africa completed an average of 11.8 years of education and similarly aged blacks completed 9.3 years, whereas nonwhite Brazilians of that age averaged 5.7 years of schooling while whites averaged 7.5. Thus, black South Africans have higher average schooling even than white Brazilians, especially for recent cohorts. However, despite smaller racial differences in education, racial differences by income are greater in South Africa than Brazil. This reflects a significantly weaker correlation between education and income in South Africa. In the United States, the correlation between education and income is intermediate to Brazil and South Africa, although the payoffs for additional years of education are the lowest, because of the United States' lower level of overall income inequality. In sum, the payoffs to years of education in Brazil are relatively straightforward and especially large.




FIGURE 5.4 Mean years of schooling for population ages 25 to 64 by color: 1960–1999. (1960 and 1991 censuses; 1976, 1982, 1986, 1996, and 1999 National Household Surveys.)

Table 5.4 shows the distribution of years of schooling for the Brazilian population aged 25 to 64 in 1999, by race and sex. Between 8 and 9 percent of whites (8.4 percent of males and 8.8 percent of females) have not completed a single year of school, compared to more than 20 percent of black and brown men and women. At the other extreme, 11.4 percent of white men and 10.8 percent of white women completed at least 15 years of school. By contrast, only between 2 and 3 percent of black and brown men and women completed the same level of education, with women doing marginally better. The findings from this table support Hasenbalg and Silva's (1991) research showing that nonwhites drop out at higher rates than whites at each point in the educational pipeline.

Figure 5.4 shows that whites, browns, and blacks aged 25 to 64 consistently increased their schooling during the 1960 to 1999 period.²¹ This age range includes many persons who completed their schooling decades prior to the year being investigated, but nevertheless this is an important indicator of racial inequality for Brazil's adult population. Since there is little gender difference in schooling by race, I combine males and females in the figure. Mean years of schooling in Brazil increased from about 2 to 6 years from 1960 to 1999 according to that figure. The means for both




FIGURE 5.5 Mean years of schooling for population ages 20 to 29 by color: 1960–1999. (1960 and 1991 censuses; 1976, 1982, 1986, 1996, and 1999 National Household Surveys.)

blacks and browns went from 1.0 to 4.6 years, while that for whites went from 2.6 to 7.0 years. Although schooling increased for all categories, the white-nonwhite gap increased from 1.6 to 2.4 years.

To better understand more current conditions of education, I also calculate the mean years of schooling from 1960 to 1999 for the population aged 20 to 29. Although a lower age limit of 25 is preferable because it is likely to include persons that are still in school, I use a cutoff at age 20 because it captures the most recent educational completion.²² Figure 5.5 shows those results. Young whites steadily increased their schooling from 2.9 years in 1960 to 8.3 in 1999, while nonwhites went from 1.3 to 6.1 years of schooling during the same period, much like that for the population aged 25 to 64.²³ Both figures thus demonstrate that the absolute gap between whites and nonwhites increased, although the relative gap narrowed. Despite tremendous growth during the first half of this period and uneven growth thereafter, racial inequality in average education was, thus, mostly unaffected.

Average years of education may hide inequalities at particular points in the educational hierarchy, but especially at the extremes. For example, although the racial gap in education may have remained the same, the gap




FIGURE 5.6 Percent illiterate by color and sex: 1940–1999. (1940, 1950, 1960, and 1991 censuses; 1976, 1982, 1986, 1996, and 1999 National Household Surveys. Note: 1940 and 1950 data are for persons 20 years and older, while other years refer to population over age 10.)

may have narrowed at one end but expanded at the other. Figures 5.6 on illiteracy and 5.7 on college completion show that this is exactly what occurred in Brazil.

Illiteracy has historically been a key indicator of citizenship in Brazil since illiterates could not vote until 1988. Unlike the other indicators of socioeconomic status, data for illiteracy by color is available from the 1940 and 1950 censuses.²⁴ Figure 5.6 shows the proportion of the population that is illiterate by color and sex from 1940 to 1999, and it demonstrates consistent declines for all color-sex groups. White men consistently had the lowest illiteracy rates and black women the highest throughout the fifty-nine-year period. While 39.2 percent of white men were illiterate in 1940, by 1999 only 7.4 percent were.²⁵ Most black and brown men and women were illiterate until 1960 and thus could not vote until 1988. The electoral reforms of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution meant that the more than 35 percent of the brown and black population that was illiterate was allowed to vote for the first time. Black women's illiteracy declined from 85.5 percent to 20.5 percent from 1940 to 1999. By 1999, sex differences had become small, whereas the most distinctive gap that remained by 1999 was between whites




FIGURE 5.7 Percent of population ages 25 to 64 that completed university by color: 1960–1999. (1960 and 1991 censuses; 1976, 1982, 1986, 1996, and 1999 National Household Surveys.)

and nonwhites. White men's and women's illiteracy converged at about 7.5 percent in 1999, while the illiteracy of black and brown men and black and brown women came together at between 17 and 21 percent.

At the other educational extreme, Figure 5.7 shows trends in university completion for persons 25 to 64 by color from the 1960 to 1999 period. At this level, the racial gap has consistently grown from 1.3 percentage points in 1960 to 8.3 in 1999. Although the percentage of blacks and browns finishing college has gradually increased, the numbers for whites increased at a much faster rate. While only about 1.4 percent of whites had completed college in 1960, about 11.0 percent completed college by 1999. By contrast, almost no nonwhites had completed college in 1960, and by 1999 only 2.6 percent of that population had. Thus, while gains from Brazil's tremendous industrial and economic growth have been largely reinvested in expanding its higher education system, these benefits have gone disproportionately to whites.

By contrast, educational differences between blacks and whites in the United States have certainly narrowed in roughly the same period.²⁶ By 1982, when the average years of schooling had reached 12 years, the white-black gap was nearly erased. Although racial differences in college enrollment increased in the 1960s, they decreased dramatically in the

1970s as the proportion of black men and women attending college rose from under 8 percent in 1965 to 19 percent in 1982. This compares to white men, whose enrollment rates were about 30 percent in both 1965 and 1982, although they dropped in several intervening years.²⁷ White women's college enrollment in the United States went from about 2 percent in 1960 to 27 percent in 1982, suggesting that they may have been the greatest beneficiaries of affirmative action in the university.

OCCUPATION

For sociologists, occupation is often believed to represent the best single indicator of status in a society. Like income and education, occupation represents one's position in the social hierarchy, but it has the advantage of being similar over time and across space. Racial inequality using occupation may thus be conceptualized as the occupational advantage or disadvantage of one group over another along a scale of ranked occupational groups.

Table 5.3, which I previously used to examine wealth, shows the distribution of whites, browns, and blacks in six major occupational groups (column 1), the monthly income from an individual's primary job (column 2), and the monthly income from all sources (column 3). Column 1 results reveal that 4.5 percent of whites are in the highest occupational group compared to 1.5 percent of browns and 0.3 percent of blacks. Based on the evidence from chapter 4 about whitening by Brazilians of high socioeconomic status, these data may have overestimated the percentage of browns and underestimated the percentage of blacks in the highest occupational category. However, because the differences are so large, I expect that substantial differences by color remain even if the whitening effect could be controlled. At the bottom of the occupational structure, only 14.7 percent of whites are in the unskilled rural category compared to 30.2 percent of browns and 26.8 percent of blacks. Nonwhites, and especially browns, are the most represented in this category, reflecting their greater predominance in rural areas.

Columns 2 and 3 reveal that whites earn more than browns and blacks in nearly every occupational group. For example, white rural workers earn a total of \$120 monthly from their primary job compared to \$70 for browns and \$65 for blacks. From all sources, whites earn \$165 compared to \$102 for browns and \$82 for blacks. Given the heterogeneity of these occupational groups, the differences in income might reflect racial stratification in specific occupations for each group, although it may also result partly from nonwhite concentration in the poor Northeast.

As the comparative income structures suggested, Brazilian nonwhites are more underrepresented in high- and mid-level professional occupations than in the United States. However, whites in Brazil are more likely than U.S. whites to share unskilled blue-collar occupations with nonwhites. Whites are more than three times as likely as nonwhites to be in high-level professional occupations in Brazil, according to comparable figures by Farley and Allen (1987, 264). Whites in the United States are about 1.8 times as likely as blacks to be in that occupational group. At the other extreme, about half as many whites as nonwhites were in the lowest category of urban occupational groups in both countries. Because the occupational structure, like the income structure, in Brazil is clearly smaller at the top and has a much wider base at the bottom, persons in high-level professional occupations thus constitute a more elite group in Brazil than in the United States. In Brazil, that occupational category is smaller, and average incomes are much higher than incomes for intermediate occupations, as the table shows. This reflects the fact that Brazil's high income inequality is largely the result of the top 5 or 10 percent earning much more than the rest. By contrast, there is a much smaller difference in income between the comparable top two occupational groups in the United States.²⁸

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND OCCUPATIONAL INEQUALITY

Returning to the issue of development, I now examine the relation between occupational inequality and levels of industrialization across urban areas. Unlike the previous sections that examined income and educational inequality over time, I take a different methodological tack for examining occupational inequality. Specifically, I analyze the relationship between racial occupational inequality and level of industrialization for the seventy-three largest urban areas in 1980, which is the last year of continuous economic growth in Brazil since before World War II.²⁹ A multivariate statistical analysis of these urban areas allows me to make conclusions about the industrialization-racial inequality relation with a much greater degree of confidence than the longitudinal analysis did. While the cross-sectional approach cannot necessarily be generalized historically, it has the advantage of allowing for the careful control of variables, besides industrialization, that might affect inequality. For example, multivariate analysis allows me to isolate the effect of industrialization from education, since both are thought to affect inequality. Also, the seventy-three urban areas available for 1980 provide the large sample size needed for the analysis. This compares to only fifteen or so time points that would be available for a multivariate longitudinal analysis.³⁰

To measure racial occupational inequality, I used the index of net difference (ND) using three hierarchically ranked occupational groups.³¹ Intuitively, net difference can be interpreted as the probability that individuals from one or the other racial group will be in higher-ranked occupational groups when individuals in the two racial groups are randomly paired. While ND measures overall occupational inequality, I use an odds ratio index to capture racial differences in managerial and professional occupations, since I expect the middle-class boundary is particularly rigid in Brazil.³² For industrialization, I used the percent of the total labor force that is employed in manufacturing industries in each urban area.

Such a comparison is important in Brazil because local levels of industrialization vary widely across Brazil for historical reasons. Prior to the 1930s, agricultural production for export was greatest in the Northeast, but the shift from agricultural to industrial production moved the center of the economy to the Southeast. Brazil's import-substitution policies accelerated industrialization, especially in places like São Paulo, thus accentuating unequal regional growth and development.³³ Also, high fertility and rural-to-urban migration caused rapid population growth, which affected the capacity of various regions to absorb increasing numbers into the modern job sector.³⁴ Modern, highly industrialized areas in the Southeast fared far better than those in the Northeast, which had bloated informal economies and almost no industrialization. Also, the Brazilian government made quality higher education much more available in industrialized regions. According to a major study in 1982, not one of the top-20 universities was to be found in the Northeast.³⁵

According to students of Brazilian race relations, changes from a traditional order have thus been especially great in the southeastern and southern regions, where "the dynamics of industrialization, rapid urbanization and massive European immigration have profoundly transformed race relations."³⁶ In these regions, according to Van den Berghe (1967), race relations have clearly moved toward a competitive mode and away from the paternalistic mode extant in other regions, where labor is divided along racial lines, and thus racial inequality is high. While analysts acknowledge that racial composition, urbanization, and immigration patterns all influence regional differences, they often point to industrialization as the key factor underlying regional variation in racial outcomes. However, such conclusions for Brazil are generally based on the comparison of two or three regions, and thus the independent effect of industrialization cannot be discerned.

Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, I illustrate the bivariate relationship between industrialization and racial inequality among the seventy-three urban areas in figures 5.8 and 5.9. Figure 5.8 demonstrates the net-difference scores of racial inequality in all urban areas, which


Racial Occupational
Inequality (Net Difference)

FIGURE 5.8 Relationship between industrialization level and racial occupational inequality in the 73 largest metropolitan areas of Brazil: 1980. (1980 census.)

range from 7.6 to 38.7. That is, whites are 7.6 to 38.7 percent more likely to hold higher-status occupations than nonwhites. Moreover, figure 5.8 shows that overall racial inequality is slightly correlated with industrialization at the bivariate level, with more industrialized places tending to have lower levels of racial inequality.³⁷ Similarly, figure 5.9 shows that whites are two to twelve times as likely as nonwhites to hold professional and managerial jobs, with such inequality varying slightly with industrialization. Racial inequality at the top of the occupational structure is greater in more industrialized places. A comparison of figures 5.8 and 5.9 thus reveals that more industrialized areas have lower levels of overall racial inequality but greater racial inequality at the top of the occupational structure.

However, the bivariate correlation of industrialization to racial inequality, using either of the two measures, is not strong, but this may be due to the confounding effects of other variables. To capture whether industrialization truly has an effect requires that we control for variables such as education, which may help explain the variations in the local levels of inequality. With the introduction of these variables, the relationships shown in figures 5.8 and 5.9 may be sharpened, may go away, or even be reversed. Table 5.5 presents the results, using four models to capture the effects of multiple variables on the two indicators of racial in-


Racial Inequality at
Professional/Managerial Level

FIGURE 5.9 Relationship between industrialization level and the relative likelihood that whites and nonwhites are in professional or managerial occupations in the 73 largest metropolitan areas of Brazil: 1980. (1980 census.)

equality. The first model regresses net difference on industrialization and two variables that control differences in migration and the effects of industrial domination by São Paulo.³⁸ The second model for net difference includes the educational inequality variables, which allow testing the extent to which variation in racial inequality among urban areas may also or only be due to educational differences, as some authors suggest.³⁹ Finally, model 3 is similar to model 1, and model 4 is similar to model 2 except that the dependent variable is for the odds-ratio index measuring racial inequality in professional/managerial occupations instead of overall occupational inequality. In sum, models 1 and 2 of table 5.5 refer to overall racial occupational inequality as did figure 5.8, and models 3 and 4 refer to racial inequality at the top of the occupational structures as in figure 5.9.

In multivariate analysis, a value or regression coefficient reveals the direction and strength of the relation between percent in manufacturing and racial inequality. The regression coefficients for industrialization are negative and statistically significant from models 1 and 2, which means that greater industrialization is related to lower overall racial inequality, thus supporting and apparently tightening the loose relation between industrialization and racial inequality shown in figure 5.8. Indeed, the

TABLE 5.5

Regressions of occupational net difference and odds ratio of being in professional/administrative occupations on industrialization and educational inequality: 73 largest urban areas in Brazil, 1980

Independent Variables	White: nonwhite occupational inequality (net difference)		White: nonwhite inequality for (odds ratio) being in professional/managerial occupations	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Industrialization	-.135*	-.120**	.055*	.022
	(.059)	(.028)	(.025)	(.017)
Racial inequality (odds ratio) at 4+ years of schooling	—	8.036**	—	—
		(1.01)		
Racial inequality (odds ratio) at 12+ years of schooling	—	.877**	—	.722**
		(.159)		(.082)
Mean years of schooling	—	4.355**	—	1.037**
		(.703)		(.441)
Intercept	25.323	-24.450	5.799	-7.376
R ²	.163	.862	.306	.745

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Control variables in all models not presented are whether in São Paulo State and the white: nonwhite odds ratio of being a migrant.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

relationship between industrialization and inequality sharpens with the introduction of education controls, as indicated by the halving of standard errors for model 1 to model 2. Thus, these findings support the conventional theory that industrial development leads to lower racial inequality. However, the size of the coefficients (.135 and .120) indicate that the net difference between a highly industrialized area with about 35 percent of its labor force in manufacturing and a poorly industrialized area with about 10 percent employed in manufacturing, would be about 3 points or a little more, which means, at best, a 20-percent difference in racial inequality. Thus, while Brazilian industrialization seems to have reduced overall racial inequality in those places which mostly benefited from it, there was a long way to go before eliminating this inequality.

The effects of industrialization on the top of the occupational structure, though, are different. Unlike its effect on overall racial inequality, model 3 suggests that industrialization produces greater white-nonwhite inequality in access to professional and managerial occupations, although model 4 shows that these effects are washed out with the introduction of the education variables. A comparison of models 3 and 4 thus suggests that the effect of greater industrialization on racial inequality at that level is indirect. Specifically, development leads to local expansion of higher education, precisely where racial inequality is increasing. As I have shown, whites have disproportionately benefited from university expansion in Brazil.

Relatedly, table 5.5 shows that education-related variables explain much more of the variation in occupational racial inequality than levels of industrialization. R²s at the bottom represent the proportion of the variation in inequality that is explained by the variables in the model. The huge improvements in R² with the introduction of the education control variables in models 2 and 4 over models 1 and 3, respectively, demonstrate that about half of the variation in inequality across metropolitan areas can be attributed to variations in educational inequality.

CONCLUSIONS

The findings in this chapter show that the Brazilian socioeconomic structure is largely divided along racial lines. On virtually all summary indicators of social conditions in Brazil, nonwhites score well below whites. Nonwhites, on average, have persistently earned less than half the incomes of white Brazilians since the 1970s. Comparatively, Brazil's racial gap is far greater than that for the United States, because Brazil's nonwhite population is less likely to be in the middle class and because of its greater income inequality in general. Despite Brazil's slightly higher levels of overall income inequality, racial inequality is lower than in South Africa because persons in poverty there, unlike Brazil, are almost entirely black.

This chapter has also shown considerable male-female and brown-black differences among the nonwhite population. Gender inequalities among the nonwhite population continue to decrease, like they do for the white population, although they remain significant. By contrast, racial inequality persists despite development, and in the case of the middle class, it continues to increase. Also, much of the national data I have presented in this chapter show that browns tend to be slightly better off than blacks, although brown-black differences in income and wealth become

clearer when occupational differences are considered. Overall, though, white-nonwhite differences are generally greater than those between blacks and nonblacks, making it the primary racial divide in Brazil. Indeed, the position of the mulatto population in the United States, although defined as "black," is better relative to dark blacks in the United States than in Brazil.

Since 1950, Brazil has experienced tremendous economic growth, making it one of the largest industrial economies in the world. During these years and after, illiteracy plummeted, Brazil went from predominately rural to urban, and its higher education system greatly expanded. Despite these advances, racial disparities have increased at the top of the social structure. The expansion of higher education during the period led to the sizable growth of a professional middle class, but by disproportionately benefiting whites, it produced a growing racial gap in access to a university education. Thus, the Brazilian case demonstrates that industrial development may actually increase racial inequality in the top part of the class structure, contrary to the traditional liberal or the more modern perspectives, which argue that industrialization either reduces or does not affect racial inequality. Increasingly sophisticated technology, organizational complexity, and pressures on increasing production required by growing competition in world capitalist markets require an increasingly educated labor force. In this scenario, the Brazilian state decided to invest heavily in higher education, while nearly ignoring education at the primary or secondary level, and effectively, education for nonwhites. Consequently, Brazilian development has brought with it stunted social development, including greater racial inequalities.

Chapter Six

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

We don't have a racial problem. In Brazil,
blacks know their place.

—Popular saying

WE OFTEN assume that racial inequality is due to discrimination, but there is really no automatic link. In Brazil, racial inequality is sometimes thought to be simply the result of historical inequalities such as those created by slavery, so that its disappearance simply requires the passage of time. Thus, the nondiscriminatory mechanism of class rather than racial discrimination reproduces racial inequality, according to this perspective. Racial inequality has also been explained as being due to the lower human capital and disadvantaged geographical characteristics of browns and blacks, which may or may not be related to discrimination. For example, some argue that nonwhites have lower incomes than whites largely because they are more likely to reside in the poorly resourced Northeast or simply because they have lower levels of education, which is presumably unrelated to discrimination. Another explanation is that because "money whitens," then racial inequality is overestimated.

Light and Gold (1999) note that, in comparison to whites and many other ethnic groups, blacks in the United States are disadvantaged because of both discrimination, particularly in the labor market, and resource disadvantage. Resource disadvantage may refer to factors as diverse as historical conditions, education, wealth, access to networks, social capital, and self-esteem. Given the interrelationship between resource disadvantage and discrimination, how do we isolate discrimination? This is no easy task. Discrimination is often diffuse, difficult to measure, and has multiple manifestations. Therefore, multiple forms of evidence are required to make a compelling case. In the following sections, I present three statistical tests that isolate racial discrimination from resource-disadvantage variables including region, education, occupation, and even interfamily and neighborhood differences. Furthermore, these tests seek to control for potential status-whitening effects on racial classification—a concern that has been absent in previous statistical studies